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INTRODUCTION
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) uas the wake-up call
that disturbed America from its mid-twentieth century slumber concerning
the dangers of communicable diseases. Until AIDS was identified in 1981,1
most Americans felt largely impervious to health threats posed by viruses or
bacteria. Polio, smallpox, and tuberculosis had been brought under control
by the "magic bullets" of antibiotics and vaccines." We felt more susceptible
to the ravages of cancer or the debilitation of heart disease. But, over the last
twenty years,3 the (re)emergence of serious or life-threatening microbial-
based conditions such as Ebola, 4 hantavirus,5 Lyme disease,G West Nile virus,7
1. See generally Crs. FOR DISEASE CO,'ROL & PREVEN1TION (CDC), Pneur..estitis
Pneumonia-Los Angeles, S0 MORBIDITY & MORTALriY WLx. REP. [hereinafter MMWR] 7, 250
(1981) [hereinafter CDC, Pneumogstitis Pneumonia]. By die end of 1999, there were 113,167
people reported to be living with HIV in the United States, and another 299.944 living uith
AIDS. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CDC, 11(2) HIV/AIDS SURTEILLANCE REP. 5
(1999) [hereinafter CDC, SURVELLNCE RFP.]. At least 430,441 people have died of HIV/AIDS
in the United States. Id. at 30.
2. See Allan Mi. Brandt, Behavior, Disease, and Health in the Twentieh Cnturj, United States:
The Moral Valence of Individual Risk, in MORALIY AND HEALTH 53, 57 (Allan M. Brandt & Paul
Rozin eds., 1997) [hereinafter Brandt, Beavior, Disase, and Healh]:
With the introduction of sulfa drugs in the 1930s and antibiotics in the 1940s, the
germ theory had spawned effective technologies to combat infection. The promise
of... 'magic bullets,' specific chemotherapies that would root out and destroy
'invading organisms,' had, at last, been realized. Diseases that a mere decade
earlier posed a serious threat to life now could be quickly and definitively treated;
antibiotics were routinely saving those previously damned.
Id.; see also EDWARD S. GOLUB, THE LIMITS OF MEDICINE How SCIENCE SHAPES OUR HOPES FOR
THE CURE 183 (1997) ("Between the Salk and the later Sabin polio vaccines, the children of the
world can now be protected from a terribly crippling disease and the polio vaccine has become
a standard against which we measure not only other vaccines but the efficacy of all medicine.:).
In 1798, Edward Jenner developed a then controversial procedure of vaccination to protect
people from smallpox. Id. at 120. "From 1953, the year after the introduction of the
antituberculosis drug, isoniazid, through 1984, the number of tuberculosis cases reported
decreased from 84,304 to 22,255, an average decline of 5% per year. Ronald Bayer & Laurence
Dupuis, Tuberculosis, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, in NEW ETHIcs FOR THE PUC'S HFLT11
[hereinafter NEW ETHICS] 225, 226 (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock eds., 1999)
[hereinafter Bayer & Dupuis, Tuberculosis].
3. See David P. Fidler et al., Emerging and Reemnging Infetaious DL-as: Challengvs for
Intemationl, National and State Law, 31 INT'L LA W. 773, 780 (1997) [hereinafter Fidler et al..
Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases] (stating that as of 1997, "deaths caused by infectious
diseases [since 1980 had] increased by 58 percent in the United States. Mthough much of this
increase [was] related to AIDS, infectious disease deaths [had] risen 22 percent excluding
AIDS."). Id. (citations omitted).
4. Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever is a virus spread through contact uith an infected animal or
with fluids from an infected person. Symptoms include rash, fever, and myalgias (muscle
aches), leading to chest pains, shock, blindness, internal bleeding, and death. Since its
recognition in 1976, there have been 1095 cases, with 803 resulting in death. All case but one
have been in Africa. SeeCDC, DISEASE INFORNMATION: FACTSHEETS: EBOI HEMORuL G1FE ER
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and even newly-recognized strains of hepatitisa have underscored our
vulnerability. History teaches that new plagues will continue to emerge. 9
What does this mean for the development of public health law and
policy? Each epidemic provokes legal and political challenges that raise basic
questions about our conceptions of social justice and that shape the
available at http://vw.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/spb/mnpages/dispages/ebola.htm (last visited
July 24, 2000) (providing facts about Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever).
5. Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome is a virus spread through contact with infected
rodents or their feces. Symptoms include fever, chills, and myalgias, leading to acute respiratory
distress; approximately 40% of infected persons die. A total of 250 cases were reported in the
United States between 1993, when the virus first was recognized, and May 8, 2000. See CDC, ALL
ABOUT HANTAVIRUS, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/hanta/hps/index.htm
(last modified May 11, 2000) (providing an introductory discussion of Hantavirus); see also
LAURIE GARRETT, All in Good Haste: Hantaviruses in America, in THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY
EMERGING DISEASES IN A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE 528-49 (1994) [hereinafter GARRETr, TIIE
COMING PLAGUE] (describing the first known hantavirus outbreak in the United States).
6. Lyme Disease is a bacterial infection spread through the bite of an infected tick.
Symptoms including rash, fever, myalgias, and joint pain leading to arthritis, neurologic
abnormalities (e.g., facial tics), and encephalitis (inflammation of the brain). Approximately
15,000 new cases are reported annually in the United States, primarily in Northeastern states.
Div. OF VECTOR-BORNE INFECTIOUS DISEASES, CDC, LYME DISEASE: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/LymeQA.htm (last modified Apr. 25, 2000).
7. West Nile Encephalitis is a virus spread through bites from infected mosquitoes.
Symptoms include fever, headache, and stiff neck leading to a coma, tremors, paralysis,
encephalitis, and death. Although primarily found in Africa, in the summer of 1999 there were
sixty-two reported cases in NewYork City, with seven deaths. Div. OF VEcrOR-BORNE INFECTIOUS
DISEASES, CDC, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, WEST NILE VIRUS, available at http://wv.cdc.gov/
ncidod/dvbid/westnile/q&a.htm (last modifiedJune 21, 2000). In response to this threat, New
York City and many surrounding counties have engaged in wide-spread mosquito control
efforts, including extensive spraying of insecticides. Tina Kelley, Staten Island Becomes Center of the
West Nile Virus Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, at 26.
8. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 784 (26th ed. 1995) (stating that hepatitis is an
inflammation of the liver caused by a viral infection spread either through transfer of bodily
fluids or the fecal-oral route; hepatitis A, B, and C (HAV, HBV, and HCV respectively) afflict
over 500,000 people annually in the United States; HBV alone ranks as the ninth-leading killer
in the world; HCV affects 150,000 Americans annually, and accounts for a large portion of
cirrhosis, liver failure, and liver cancer cases; types D and E are less frequently diagnosed in the
United States); CDC, HEPATITIS D (DELTA) VIRUS, available at http://wivw.cdc.gov/ncidod/
diseases/hepatitis/d/hepOO05l.htm (last modified Feb. 1, 2000) (noting that hepatitis D
(HDV) requires a pre-existing HBV infection; epidemiological data suggest that HDV infects
less than 10% of asymptomatic HBV carriers and less than 25% of those with chronic HBV
related liver disease); Martin L. Tepper & Paul R. Gully, Viral Hepatitis: Know YourD, E, Fand Gs,
156 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1735, 1735-36 (1997) (stating that hepatitis G (HGV) "was fully
characterized in 1996... and as of yet the role of HGV in fulminant hepatitis is an unresolved
question") (citations omitted).
9. See generally GARRETr, THE COMING PLAGUE, supra note 5 (describing global microbial
threats including Lassa fever, Ebola, Legionnaires' disease, Hantavirus, Marburg virus, Yellow
Fever, Bolivian Hemorrhagic Fever, Swine Flu, Brazilian Meningitis Epidemic); Paul R. Epstein,
Emerging Diseases and Ecosystem Instability: New Threats to Public Health, in NEW ETHICS, supra note
2, at 244 (explaining emerging and re-emerging disease in the late twentieth century).
[20011
HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 872 2000-2001
LESSONS FROM THE PLA G UE YEARS
development of our public health jurisprudence.10 How do we identify those
at risk or those in need of care? Is it ethical to force people to learn they are
ill if no cure exists for their underlying disease? How do we protect those
who are healthy from becoming ill? In a world of limited resources, how do
we distribute available or emerging treatment? How do we protect those who
have fallen ill from inappropriate discrimination or other harms? It is an
enormous challenge to determine how these decisions should be made and
who should make them.
Legislative efforts to answer these questions largely have been
inadequate. Public health law has developed in piecemeal fashion,
responding to each crisis as it arises," resulting in an amalgam of legislative
provisions generally unprepared to deal with existing-or future-threats to
the public health. 12 Indeed, the law frequently has revealed itself to be ill-
equipped to deal with the social and political issues that inevitably attach to
any wide-spread medical crisis. 13
10. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and tlewPutli's Health: A
Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REv, 59, 61 (1999) [hereinafter
Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini] ("The most important social debates about public health take place
in legal fora--egislatures, courts, and administrative agencies--and in the law's language of
rights, duties, and justice."). See generally L ,WRENCE 0. GOSTIN & ZWit LzMzwRNI, HtCwLA
RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE AIDS PA,DE.tic (1997) [hereinafter HuLC.t RIGiTs]
(describing the dynamic relationship between human rights and public health); Dan
Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock, Introduction, in NEW ETHICS, supra note 2 (noting the
relevance of ethics in public health discourse).
11. See LAURIE GARRETr, PreferingAnardqy and Class Dispnit . in BETxRVIL OF TRusT: TilE
COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 266-89 (2000) [hereinafter G.RETr, BETRYAL OF
TRUST] (noting that unlike European policies, which are handed down from above, "American
public health... arose from the local level, and no two cities or states had precisely the same
policies"); Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Lau, 12 A-. J.L & MED. 461, 476
(1986) (stating that most public health statutes are "severely outdated" and w-ere "fashioned on
an ad hoc basis"); Gostin, Burnis & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 101.02 ("[Successive layers of
statutes and amendments, built up over one hundred years or more in response to disease
epidemics[,] ... tell the history of disease control in America mud as geologic strata tell the
history of the earth."); infra Part HA (reviewing existing law regarding communicable diseases).
12. See GARRErr, BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 266 (describing the American
public health system as a "hodgepodge of programs, bureaucracies, and failings" in "dire
disarray"); Ren6 Bowser & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Managed Care and the Health of a Nation, 72 S.
CAL- L. RE,. 1209, 1257-58 (1999) (noting the lack of resources necessary "to identify and
respond effectively to the great variety of health risks facing populations"); Fidler et al., supra
note 3, at 782 ("Often the flexibility needed to respond to new threats is not present ithin the
legal system of many states.... "); Gostin, Burris & lazzarini, supra note 10, at 106 ('State
health codes typically contain Iaws that are simply no longer relevant and fail to address new
approaches to disease control."). For an example of an outdated statute, see N.J. STAT. .%N.. §
26:4-10 (West 1999), which prohibits the use of the "common drinking cup" in public places
because it is an "undoubted source of communication of infectious diseases").
13. See Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 113 (finding public health legislation
"silent on the trust, legitimacy, and stigma issues that animate health disputes today'); ef.
Human Rights and Public Health, in HEALTH A\D HUMNLAN RIGHTS 5 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds.,
1999) ("Promoting and protecting health requires explicit and concrete efforts to promote and
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Lawrence 0. Gostin, Scott Burris, and Zita Lazzarini, leading public
health thinkers, have authored one recent proposal to remedy this
incoherence in the law by recommending that each state overhaul its
communicable disease law in a manner consistent with constitutional
principles of due process and equal protection. 14 This innovative plan seeks
to eliminate distinctions based on history and habit, and instead create
affirmative and negative burdens based on the nature of a given disease, the
severity of the harm to the infected, the likelihood and means by which it
will be transmitted to others, and the harm it is likely to cause.' The authors
of the proposal seek to maximize protection for the healthy while preserving
the individual liberties of those who are fighting disease or infection.' 6 They
recognize that those who fall ill experience not only medical hardship
("medical risk"),17 but also extraordinary stigma, social hostility,'8  and
discrimination ("social risk").
protect human rights and dignity, and greater fulfillment of human rights necessitates sound
attention to health and to its societal determinants.").
14. See Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 118 (proposing a "disease control law"
that would "conform to current standards of general constitutional and statutory law"). For a
more detailed description of this proposal, see infra Parts IIA-B.
15. See Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 121 ("[S]ound public health statutes
should set out a rational and reliable way both to assess risk and to establish procedures to
ensure the protection of individual rights."). These factors are rooted in the statutes and case
law that have developed to protect the rights of people living with disabilities. See Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000) [hereinafter ADA] (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, public accommodations, and public
services); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C, §§ 701-7961 (2000) [hereinafter
Rehabilitation Act] (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability by federal employers
or contractors); Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987) (setting forth thie
factors courts should use to determine whether a person with a disability constitutes a
significant risk of harm to others and therefore does not receive the antidiscrimination
protection of the Rehabilitation Act); infra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing a
statutory scheme that would look to the least restrictive alternative in accomplishing a public
health goal).
16. See Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 119 (proposing protection of
programs that encourage healthy choices" as well as "strong protections for privacy and
security").
17. The term "medical risk" refers to the range of disease-based sequellae an ailing
individual is likely to experience, as well as the likelihood that the disease, and its attendant
health-related harms, will be transmitted to others. This concept also is integral to the doctrine
of informed consent, which requires a patient to give knowledgeable and voluntary consent
prior to undergoing a procedure that reasonably could be expected to cause medical harm. See
generally RUTH B. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMPi, A HisToRY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
(1986) (reviewing the development and uses of informed consent doctrine); JAY KATZ, THE
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (discussing pragmatic aspects of seeking and
obtaining informed consent in the health care setting).
18. See Scott Burris, Fear Itself AIDS, Herpes and Public Health Decisions, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 479, 480 (1985) [hereinafter Burris, Fear Itsey] ("While it is obvious that medical
knowledge has changed vastly in the past century, there is little to suggest that basic human
responses to disease have changed at all. People are still afraid of both disease and the sick.").
[2001]
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Although the term "medical risk" is familiar as a concept describing the
range of harms that may result from a medical disease or procedure, the
term "social risk" is less well-known. As described by Scott Burris, "[s]ocial
risk in health behavior may be broadly defined as the danger that an
individual will be socially or economically penalized should he become
identified with an expensive, disfavored, or feared medical condition." 9
Such penalties may include discrimination or other forms of ostracization
for which no legal recourse may be available.
Social risk may be "actual" or "perceived."=° Actual social risk refers to
the concrete attitudes and actions that cause or genuinely threaten social
harm to a person living with disease.2 Perceived social risk is just as tangible
19. Scott Burrs, Law and the Social Risk of Healh Care: Lesons foa HmlTestin; 61 :La. L
Rox'. 831, 862 (1998) [hereinafter Burris, Social Ris]. More specifically, social risk correlates
with perceptions and experiences of both stigma and social hostility. Se- Gostin, Burris &
Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 92-93 (citing ERVIN GOFIF.%,, STiG%%: NOES ON TilE MA UN\%(E.ir
OF SPOmD IDENTnY 1-19 (1963)):
Stigma has been understood as a social relation between a stigmatized and a.normal' person, based on a shared belief that some part of the stigmatized
person's identity is,... 'spoiled.' Social hostility involves negative social attitudes
towards certain individuals, but without the individual feeling any shame about his
identity or condition.
See also SusAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 32-33 (1988) (discussing the idea of a "social
death" that may accompany diagnosis of disease); Burris, Social RisMk stupra at 831-32 ("Today,
the notion that diagnosis or treatment of... [certain] conditions can trigger social harms is
widely accepted").
The AIDS epidemic is our most recent object lesson of the interaction of medical risk
and social risk. Past examples include diagnoses of cancer and syphilis. -ow PETER LEWIS.ALE-N,
THE WAGES OF SIN: SEX AND DISEASE, PAST AND PRESENT 42 (2000) (Perhaps more than any
other disease before or since, syphilis in early modem Europe provoked the kind of widespread
moral panic that AIDS revived when it struck America in the 1980s."); Au.AN M. BfIuDT, No
MAGIc BULLET: A HISTORY OFVENEREAL DISEASE IN THE UNrrED STATES SINCE 1880, at 5 (1937)
[hereinafter BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET] (describing the stigma of sexual irresponsibility
attached to venereal disease); SONTAG, supra, at 16:
In recent years some of the onus of cancer has been lifted by the emergence of a
disease whose charge of stigmatization, whose capacity to create spoiled identity, is
far greater. It seems that societies need to have one illness which becomes
identified with evil, and attaches blame to its "victims," but it is hard to be obsessed
with more than one.
Genetic testing also brings with it a host ofsocial risks that will need to be confronted.
See Elizabeth B. Cooper, Testing for Genclic Traits: Te NcM for a New Legal Dcarine of Infcirtcd
Consent; 58 MD. L. REv. 346, 352-53 (1999) [hereinafter Cooper, Testing for Cncais Traits]
(noting that genetic testing "present[s] a host of social risks related to access to health care,
stigma, psychological well-being, and potential discrimination").
20. Burris, Social Risk supra note 19, at 862; sce also infia Part lI.B.1 (discussing further the
concept of social risk, including the "perception of the risk, which may or may not be tied to
the actual level of threat").
21. See Scott Burris, Surveillance, Social Ris and Symbolism: Framing the Anasisfar RParch
and PoLy, 25 J. ACQUIRED IMtUNE DEFICIENCY S1NDROMES, S120, S122-23 (Supp. 2, 2000)
[hereinafter Burris, Sur'eillance] (offering three suggestions for refraining the disctumion of
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to this person, who may adopt a way of thinking or pattern of behavior in
anticipation of, and to protect himself from, actual social risk-usually from
22community, government, or bureaucratic systems.
The authors of this important attempt to modernize public health law
are troubled by the disproportionate impact of disease on communities
traditionally disenfranchised from social, political, and economic power 2- -
communities significantly defined by class, race, and, to a certain extent,
gender.2 4 However, despite the innovation of this model statutory scheme, it
does not go far enough to recognize and mitigate the social risk that
accompanies the historic, population-based, enhanced risk of disease. Its
chief failing is that it is composed of a set of neutral principles that, by
definition, are not likely to attend sufficiently to the needs of the
disenfranchised, particularly in the context of an epidemic or other health
crisis. This failing is likely to be made manifest in two important ways. First,
the targeted communities2- may decide not to comply with a legislative or
policy initiative that they perceive as carrying significant social risk,2 6 thus
surveillance and other possible influences on HIV prevention behavior).
22. See Burris, Surveillance, supra note 21, at S122; infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the role of
perceived social risk).
23. This does not mean that the wealthy do not fall ill. However, the illnesses of the
dominant culture tend to be more often associated with overindulgence (alcohol, food, or
drugs) than those of the nondominant culture, which tend to be associated with poverty and a
lack of access to health care. See Scott Burnis, Law as a Structural Factor in the Spread of
Communicable Disease 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1755, 1767-69 (1999) [hereinafter Burrs, Law as a
Structural Factor] (citing Bruce Link & MaryJo Phelan, Social Conditions as Fundamental Causes of
Disease, 1995 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 80 (1995)) (noting that structural factors including
money, knowledge, power, and prestige influence the outcomes of disease); see also Gostin,
Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 75-76 (noting that "social institutions and activities, human
equality and economic activities [may constitute] the major health risks in a population")
(citations omitted).
24. For a description of the experience of women in the AIDS epidemic, see GENA COREA,
THE INVISIBLE EPIDEMIC: THE STORY OFWOMEN AND AIDS (1992). See Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini,
supra note 10, at 75-76 (noting the unequal impact of diseases on the poor). See generally "IT
JUST AIN'T FAIR": THE ETics OF HEALTH CARE FOR AFRIcAN AMERICANs (Annette Dula & Sara
Goering eds., 1994) [hereinafter ITJusT AIN'T FAIR] (exploring disparities in accessibility and
quality of health care for African Americans and reasons for higher incidence of disease in
African American populations).
25. I use the term "targeted communities" to refer to the people whose lives are most
directly affected by a given statute or policy initiative. Cf. Robert B. Seidman, Justifying
Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist Approach to the Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theomy, and
Practical Reason, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5 (1992) (describing law as having a "targeted
addressee"). Part III.B.1 further defines the term "targeted community."
26. See David Satcher, The History of the Public Health Service and the Surgeon General's
Priorities, 54 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 13, 14-15 (1999) (noting that turn-of-the-century San Francisco
community officials, leaders, and residents "denied the existence" of an outbreak of tile
bubonic plague and "resisted quarantine and immunization efforts because [of concerns]
about how fears and other reactions to such a disease would affect their lives and businesses").
But see James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through Government: An
Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 93, 104
[2001]
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rendering the measure ineffective.2 7 Second, the enactment of policies that
increase stigma or social hostility, in the absence of a compelling state
interest, constitutes an avoidable and unacceptable harm to human
dignity. 28
To address these and other problems in the current state of public
health law, I propose a Harm Assessment ProtocolP that will aid legislators
and policymakers as they tackle the challenge of modernizing this area of
law.5 0 This Protocol will allow them to avoid-or at least mitigate-the harms
that othenvise might derive from implementing a health-based statutory
proposal that may be attractive to or popular with the general public, but
which is not, in reality, likely to benefit the public health.
Although courts have struggled for decades to find appropriate w%-ays to
implement equal protection principles as a means of redressing harm,
legislatures have not carried their burden beyond the drafting of such"equality" principles.s t Indeed, democratic fora, by design, are not geared to
attend to the needs or perspectives of the minority., 2 Too often, pressure on
legislators dissuades them from supporting legislation that is "in the public
interest"s--that is, legislation which may protect the interests of the
disenfranchised and serve the overall greater good, but which may not be
(1997) [hereinafter Hodge, Modem Public Healih] ("[A] federal court in 1900 voided a
quarantine measure to control bubonic plague among Chinese immigrants, finding that the
action, which actually posed a danger to the health of the community, uas passed as a guise for
discrimination against the Chinese community.") (citations omitted).
27. See infra notes 88, 149, 260 and accompanying text (describing factors, such as lack of
trust, that interfere ith implementation of effective public health measures).
28. See infra Part 11I.B.3 (noting that such harm may undermine the trust bet;een
government and the governed that is necessary to preserve the public health).
29. The Harm Assessment Protocol is introduced ir~fta this Part, described in detail infia
Part I.A, and set forth in a flow chart, infra fig.1.
30. See infra Parts I.B and ll.C for a discussion of the role and authority of legislators and
policymakers. This Protocol is designed to assist legislators in drafting statutes, policymakers in
preparing regulations and guidelines, and public health researchers and thinkers in examining
of how public health law and policy can be improved.
31. See infra Part I.C (discussing the pressures that keep legislatures from addressing these
problems).
32. Our democratic model is designed to ensure that minority interests do not dominate
the desires of the majority. See CASES A'D hMTERLUS ON LEGISLTION: STAWTES %ND ThE
CREATION OF PUBLC POLICY 46 (William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLXTION] ("Where [a] faction remains a minority,
any form of popular government is sufficient to contain it, because its views will not command
the necessary majority."); Tracy E. Higgins, Democrao, and FeniniM, 110 ARV. L REV. 1657,
1658 (1997) (discussing the inherent tension in democracies between "a democratic
commitment to respect the political will of the people and a liberal commitment to respect te
rights of the individual"); cf THE FEDERALIsT No. 51 (James Madison) (describing the theory of
checks and balances both among the arms of the government and idthin a bicameral
legislature).
33. See infra Part ll.C (discussing "the public interest" theory of governance).
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endorsed by constituents or corporate supporters.3 Notwithstanding
legislators' duties to represent the needs of their constituents, there are
times when they also must consider the needs of the broader community.
For example, because disease disproportionately affects the
disenfranchised3 5 and because these groups often have less of a voice in their
legislatures, legislators bear a particular responsibility to ensure that the
36interests of these groups are protected .
As difficult as it may be to define what is meant by the term "in the
public interest," critical thinkers seek to expand the definition to include
the voices of the disenfranchised. Most begin with the fundamental concept
of autonomy, particularly the autonomy of the individual to consent to be
governed-a core principle underlying much democratic theory. 7 Critical
theorists have shown that it is virtually impossible for disenfranchised
populations to function autonomously, or perhaps more accurately, to assert
complete agency.-8
This critique also has been heard in the context of bioethical
scholarship, which concerns itself with the development and application of
public health law and policy.3 9 As bioethicists direct their attention to
developing policies that recognize "the moral significance of groups," 40 they
assert that those in power bear responsibility for valuing the "standpoint," or
life expertise, of those who identify as members of subjugated groups,
thereby providing a "corrective lens for the myopia of the dominant
group."41 Alleged "neutral principles" therefore do not exist: they merely
reflect the interests of the dominant group.
Logic, then, directs us to theories that accept the place of group identity
in developing appropriate public health law and policy. Communitarianism,
as tempered by critical race and critical feminist analysis, provides one
option. Other options which might be more useful rely on reconceptions of
34. See infra note 96 and accompanying text (describing pressure that may be brought to
bear on legislators); infra Parts II.B.3 and III.B.3 (describing the social risk caused or
exacerbated by legislators' current behavior and agendas).
35. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (commenting on this disproportionate
effect).
36. See infra Part II.C (observing that attending to the needs of the disenfranchised does
not constitute disruptive factionalism, but is instead an appropriate area of concern for
legislators).
37. See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text (discussing autonomy and agency).
38. See infra note 195 (discussing complete and partial agency).
39. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing autonomy and agency).
40. See infra note 208 (explaining this term); see also notes 205-24 and accompanying text
(same).
41. Mary B. Mahowald, On Treatment of Myopia: Feminist Standpoint Theoy and Bioethics, in
FEMINISM AND BIoETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 95, 101 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996)
[hereinafter FEMINISM AND BIoETHIcs].
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autonomy based on narrative ethics, pragmatism, and even empiricism.42
The Harm Assessment Protocol proposed in this Article is designed to
bring the voices of the disempowered-if not literally, then at least
conceptually-to the halls of the legislature and the offices of policymakers,
and it relies on these cogent critiques of the primacy of autonomy. Instead
of relegating social risk considerations to the end of the process, when they
often are ignored or overlooked, my multi-prong anal)sis begins with an
inquiry into such factors. "4 Under this Protocol, if the proposed policy would
not increase the social risk of those groups targeted by the initiative and
otherwise promotes a legitimate public health goal, it should be supported,
enacted, and implemented.? If, however, implementation of the policy
proposal would have a negative impact on the lives and well-being of the
disenfranchised (i.e., would increase social risk), policymakers ought not to
consider the proposal unless the state's interest in implementing it is
compelling, rather than merely legitimate. Moreover, the proposal must be
the least restrictive alternatives5 available to achieve the identified public
health goal. If it does not satisfy these requirements, policymakers should
reject the proposal and seek more acceptable means of achieving their goal.
Finally, if the proposal represents the least restrictive alternative, but the
state interest is not compelling, policymakers should conduct a balancing
test to assess the strength of the state interest, the ability of the proposal to
achieve the identified goal, and the anticipated harm to social risk or
dignity. Without accounting for such factors, lawmakers should not
presumptively support such a proposal.
It is only by privileging the inquiry on behalf of the disenfranchised that
lawmakers can ensure that their interests are not inappropriately
ovenvhelmed by the actions of the majority, no matter how well-intentioned
they may be. In so doing, our legislative and policy leaders can enact and
enforce public health law and policy that will increase public trust and
enhance the public health.
This Article begins by reviewing historical and modem approaches to
disease control, emphasizing the fact that, despite growing medical
breakthroughs, we continue to face profound challenges to our national
health and well-being. Part I also identifies the various governmental and
42. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing communitarianism, pragmatism, and empiricism).
43. See infra Part EliA (describing the Harm Assessment Protocol); infra Part lILA fig.1
(providing a flowchart of the Harm Assessment Protocol).
44. Clearly, if the proposal were to harm the public health, it should be disapproved. If it
is neutral, it then requires a consideration of competing interests. This Article will not address
the economic or partisan political issues that may influence whether a particular legislative or
policy initiative is worthy of support.
45. Courts require that a challenged measure satisf, a least (or less) restrictive alternative
test, a real or substantial relation test, or a narrowly tailored test when a complaining party
alleges violations of fundamental rights or incidents of invidious discrimination. &e infra notes
263-65 (discussing the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine).
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political actors who currently are responsible for the development of public
health law and policy and explores the limits of their power. This historical
and structural background provides a context for the modern questions of
public health law and policy addressed later in this Article.
Part II examines in greater detail the model public health statute
described earlier. It then explores the role that stigma, social hostility, and
social risk play in the lives of people who experience serious illness. This
Part surveys pertinent critiques of the traditional principlism of bioethics-
particularly the value of autonomy-and notes that "neutral rules" often are
insufficient to attend to the needs of those who are disenfranchised from
wealth, power, or good health. Part II concludes with a survey of the
structural influences that mitigate against legislators' and policymakers'
attending to the interests and priorities of the disenfranchised.
Building on Part II's observations, Part III introduces the Harm
Assessment Protocol as a means of evaluating public health law and policy,
including existing dominant public health law, the model public health
statute, and possible future proposals. To illustrate the advantages of using
the Protocol within the realm of public health law, I apply it to an important
legal and policy conflict that has arisen in the context of attempting to
contain the spread of communicable diseases: the reporting of names of
HIV-infected people to the government ("HIV name reporting"). This
application of the Protocol reveals that although conducting disease
surveillance may be a compelling state interest, the gathering of names does
not satisfy the least restrictive alternative prong. As it is possible to gather
essentially the same information by using unique identifiers that do not
reveal personal identifying information, legislative and policy leaders should
reject HIV name reporting as a means of conducting disease surveillance.
Part III will further demonstrate that the Harm Assessment Protocol is
an important addition to the current state of the law because it both
privileges the voices of the disempowered and simultaneously remains
grounded in the legitimate governmental need to prevent and treat disease.
The success of the Protocol thus challenges the accepted wisdom that
protecting the public health requires minimizing individual rights and
liberties. 47 On the contrary, this Article demonstrates that successful public
health policy requires assessing the social risk factors experienced and
46. This result is contrary to the conclusion reached by Gostin and his colleagues. See
Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 125-26 (suggesting that HIV name reporting is an
appropriate public health policy); see also Chandler Burr, The AIDS Exception: Privacy Vs. Public
Health, in NEw ETHICS, supra note 2, at 211 (arguing that the public health benefits of HIV
name reporting outweigh privacy interests); Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The
"Names Debate": The Casefor National HlVReporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 742-43
(1998) [hereinafter Gostin & Hodge, The Names Debate] (asserting that HIV name reporting is
justified on public health grounds).
47. See HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 43 ("[T]he two compete: Human rights protect
the rights of individuals, and public health protects the collective good.").
[20011
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perceived by targeted groups. By so doing, we are able to shift the discussion
away from competing rights and develop a more thoughtful evaluation of
both existing and proposed public health policy. As a result, we have the
potential to protect the public's health and well-being better than ever
before.'4
I. HISTORICAL AND MODERN APPROACHES TO DISEASE CoNrrROL
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTI VE: MfI AM, GFR TERY; AM7) SOCZAL COATROL
The precursor to the modem public health movement dates back to the
mid-1700s. At that time, it was not fully understood how diseases were
transmitted,49 and many people subscribed to a "miasma" theory, believing
that disease spread through inhaling bad odors.r9 Often, people associated
such "odors" with the crowded and unsanitary conditions accompanying
poverty, particularly in immigrant communities.1 Health advocates focused
their disease control efforts on broad social and environmental goals, 2 such
as food safety laws, building codes, and social welfare programs. 3 Despite
48. Id. (noting that "[e]volving approaches to public health... emphasize respect for
individual rights, trust between public health personnel and the community, conditions of
nondiscrimination, and adequate access to health care and education").
49. SeeEHZABETH FEE, DISEASEAND DiscoVFs.t A HisroRYOFTMEJOHXS HOPKINS SCHOOL
OF HYGIENE AND PUBuC HEALTH, 1916-1939, at 19 (1987) (quoting William Sedguick, a
biologist and public health worker, as saying, "'[B]efore 1880 we knew nothing; after 1890 we
knew it all'").
50. See Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: T7e Rise and Fall of the
Constitutionalization of Publ& Health, 40 A.%LJ. LE-L I-isr. 476, 484 (1996) (noting that, in the
early nineteenth century, with its increased urbanization, "filth and the resulting miasma wus
thought by public health authorities to cause disease").
51. See BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET, supra note 19, at 21 (citing W. Travis Gibb, Crininal
Aspects of VenerealDiseases in Children, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE AN IERI QV\N SOCIET FOR S'NITWR
AND MORAL PROPHYLAxis 2 (1908)) ("Much of the vice we see around us," noted Dr. Hw;ard
Kelly of Johns Hopkins, "is bred in the pestilential hot house atmosphere of dark, dirty, ill-
ventilated homes, which induces abnormal cravings in ill-conditioned bodies."); GARRETr,
BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 285 ("[F]ilth [] generally was seen to be associated with
immigrants.... [Nineteenth century] sanitarians blamed the poor for their own poverty; they
labeled slum and tenement residents lazy, idle, and immoral."); SoN'TG, supra note 19, at 42
("The conviction that living in dark, dirty cities causes (or at least produces a susceptibility to)
tuberculosis is aversion of the miasma theory, and continued to be given credence well into this
century, long after the actual cause of tuberculosis had been discovered.").
52. See generally Sylvia N. Tesh, Miasma and "Sodal Factors" in Disease Causali. Lesson from
the Nineteenth Cent uy, 20 J. HEALTH POL POL'Y & L 1001 (1995) (noting the focus on "broad
social factors" until the end of the nineteenth century).
53. See GARRErr, BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 281-82 (commenting on measures
that significantly enhanced public health, including "[s]e%%er and privy construction, improved
drinking water quality, quarantine policies, street cleaning, enforcement of safer food, meat
and milk production standards, paved roads," and improved diets); BRA'DT, NO MAGIC BLI.ET",
supra note 19, at 156 ("City and state health departments continued to pass ordinances
requiring the examination for venereal disease of domestics and food handlers, although it uas
well-known that infections were rarely, if ever, transmitted wvithout intimate sexual contact.");
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misconceptions about disease transmission, a dearth of effective treatment,
and an often highly moralistic approach to their work,54 the nature and
scope of the efforts of these "sanitarians" led to a reduced incidence of
major communicable disease.55
With the discovery of bacteria and viruses in the latter half of the
56nineteenth century, public health policy made a significant shift to belief
in an "anti-disease" approach, which focused on the elimination of the
germs that caused a particular disease.57 In contrast to the social reform
efforts of early public health advocates, these interventions "[t]ended to be
individualistic in orientation, often dismissive of social and cultural factors
and heavily driven by technology and the market."58 While this anti-disease
Tesh, supra note 52, at 1004 ("The 1848 public health law in Britain-and similar industrializing
countries-commanded government officials to undertake massive sanitary reforms: to pave
streets, build sewers, provide clean water, establish ventilation and crowding standards for
housing, and haul away garbage.") (citations omitted).
54. See GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 296 (noting that "the sanitarians
... imposed a moralistic judgmentalism that openly expressed disdain for the religious, family,
and cultural lives of the poor").
55. See id. at 285 (noting the growth of "the sanitarians" in New York and elsewhere from
the mid-1800s); GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 187-92 (1958) (noting that the
results of this approach "were impressive," despite the absence of effective medical treatment);
see also id. at 98 n.148 (noting that "[tiubercuosis declined [in the early 1900s] because of
broad improvements in general living and working conditions (and food purity mea sures)");
Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 77 n.54 (citingJOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS 93-
108 (1990)).
56. See GARRETr, BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 292 (noting the publication in
1880 of Dr. Louis Pasteur's GERM THEORY OF DISEASE); Burris, Fear Itself, supra note 18, at 479
("The late nineteenth century discovery that infectious diseases are transmitted by infectious
agents such as viruses and bacteria revolutionized medicine. [This] was the basis for the
development of precise diagnostic and curative techniques, changing the responses of doctors
and public health officials to disease."); see also SONTAG, supra note 19, at 4142 (noting that by
1880, miasmic theory was replaced by the germ theory of contagion).
57. See GARRETr, BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 282-83 (discussing the scientific
discoveries of the late nineteenth century and developments in germ theory); Brandt, Behavior,
Disease, and Health, supra note 2, at 55-56 ("With the focus on the organism as the cause of
disease, the significance of the social environment diminished. Other critics suggested that
medical science began to focus on the specific aspects of pathogenesis, losing a perspective on
the 'whole' patient."); Charles E. Rosenberg, Framing Disease: Illness, Society, and Histoy, in
FRAMING DISEASE: STUDIES IN CULTURAL HISTORY (HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY) xiii, xvii (Charles E. Rosenberg &Janet Golden eds., 1992):
The germ theory created another kind of framework for imposing a more firmly
based taxonomic order on elusive configurations of clinical symptoms and
postmortem findings. It seemed only a matter of time before physicians would be
able to understand all those mysterious ills that had puzzled their professional
predecessors for millennia; the relevant pathogenic microorganisms need only be
found and their physiological and biochemical effects deciphered.
58. Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 77 n.56 (citing DAN E. BEAUCHAMP, THE
HEALTH OF THE REPUBLIC: EPIDEMICS, MEDICINE, AND MORALISM AS CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY
55-57 (1988), and RENE DUBOS, THE MIRAGE OF HEALTH: UTOPIAS, PROGRESS AND BIOLOGICAL
CHANGE (2d ed. 1987)). Germ theory "provided a rationale for public health officials to
[20011
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approach had some positive effect for individuals where viable treatments
were available, it also constituted a significant lost opportunity to focus on
improving public health through systemic change.9
It was not, however, until the mid-1900s, with the development and
mass-production of antibiotics 6--medicine that could relatively easily and
inexpensively cure those with bacterial infections-that this "anti-disease"
approach reached its stride. Until that time, treatments for disease,
particularly hexually transmitted disease, were often painful, of dubious
positive effect, and sometimes more harmful than the disease itself.6 '
Indeed, prior to the advent of antibiotics, health advocates often were left in
the uncomfortable position of knowing what caused the illness but being
unable to help the individual affected. a
Social reformers, largely in the role of "progressive physicians," stepped
disengage themselves from commitments to moral and social reform. .. " Scott Burris, Public
Health, "AIDS Exeptionalism" and the Law, 27J. MARS-A.L L RE%,. 251, 256 (1994) [hereinafter
Burris, AIDS Exeptionalism] (quoting PAUL STARR, THE SOC'IAL TP-,NsFOR.,,%TiON OF AMERIcaN
MEDliciN: THE RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 180-97
(1984)); see also Brandt, Behavior, Disease, and Hcalh, supra note 2, at 56 (explaining that vhile
"the bacteriologic revolution... offered the possibility of disconnecting disease from ... sin,
moral turpitude, and idleness," there were still some illnesses, including those sexually
transmitted, that continued to have "powerful moral meanings") (citation omitted).
59. See Brandt, Behavion Disease, and Health, supra note 2 at 53, 55-56 ("With the focus on
the organism as the cause of disease, the significance of the social environment ws diminished.
. . . [Mledical science began to focus on the specific aspects of pathogenesis, losing a
perspective on the 'whole' patient."); cf GARRErr, BETRYA,. OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 293
(noting that germ theory allowed public health efforts to have an empirical basis, resulting in
more substainable prevention programs).
60. See BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET, supra note 19, at 161 (describing the search for and
use of the "magic bullet" of antibiotics to improve public health in the twentieth century).
61. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 52-56 (describing the range of harsh, often toxic,
treatments used on people with syphilis, including near-lethal doses of mercury); G.RRErr,
BETRAYAL oFTRusr, supra note 11, at 287 (observing that some physicians "were unintentionally
killing their patients with toxic tinctures, salves, and potions, and ... were worsening public
health catastrophes ... through inept handling of patients"). Unfortunately, these "magic
bullets" were not without their problems. See GARRETr, BETRAY.L OF TRUST. supra note 11, at
324 (noting that many of the new antibiotics "were ushered into clinical use after only a
modicum of testing" and, as a result, "side effects wvere often severe and dosages uncertain").
Vaccines, some of which were developed even before germ theory vs fully
understood, grew in number and effectiveness throughout the nineteenth century. S, supra
note 2 (discussing the discovery of a smallpox vaccine in the late 1700s). However, uidth each
new vaccine, political, community-based resistance also developed. GARRErT, BETrP,YAL OF
TRUST, supra note 11, at 298-99.
62. In 1882, Robert Koch discovered the bacteria responsible for tuberculosis. &Ze N.J.
MED. SCH. NAT'L TUBERCULOSIS CTR., BRIEF HISTORY OF TUBERCULOSIS, at http://wwv,.umdnj.
edu/-ntbcweb/history.htm. It was not until 1943 that an antibiotic to treat tuberculosis as
discovered. Id. The gap between discovery and antibiotic treatment for gonorrhea was similarly
lengthy. See SUSAN POIRIER, CHICAGO'S WAR ON SYPHIuS, 1937-1940, at 2 (1995) (noting that dte
gonorrhea bacteria was identified in 1879); BRANDT, No MLGIC BULLET. supra note 19, at 171
(stating that in 1949, gonorrhea was virtually eradicated with the widespread availability of
antibiotic therapy).
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into this gap.Y Their approach combined elements of rudimentary disease
control (e.g., quarantine) with a good dose of moral education. 64 They
sought to reduce the prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases "STDs" by
"improving" the behavior of those prone to becoming ill-overwhelmingly
perceived by society as the poor and immigrant classes.F' This shift in
approach led to the further shaping and understanding of disease as"socially constructed"-affected by both biological and cultural factors-
facilitating an interdependence of social movements and medical care that
had not previously existed. 6 While this approach was, on one level,
pragmatic and appealing in its recognition of the interdependence of good
health and favorable social conditions, it also facilitated development of a
belief structure in which those who were ill, particularly with STDs, were
63. See BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET, supra note 19, at 8 ("Progressive physicians helped to
pull together two of the most significant threads of the complex Progressive ideology: the desire
for a rigorously defined moral order and a growing reliance on technical expertise. Indeed,
Progressive physicians were quick to suggest the relationship of social pathology to medicine.");
see also DOROTHY PORTER, HEALTH, CIVILIZATION AND THE STATE 156 (1999) ("The ideological
aim of the Progressive movement was to achieve scientific management in government through
an increased role of specialist professionals in the construction and execution of public policy
.... Health reform was an excellent target for Progressivism because sanitary improvement
alleviated the conditions of poverty without restructuring society.").
64. Brandt discusses the moral aspects of disease:
Venereal diseases offered physicians an opportunity to develop a comprehensive
approach to health and disease, for here was a massive problem that clearly
demanded the broadest possible view of the doctor's task from an educational,
social, and clinical perspective. In fact, venereal disease, as a social construct,
provided a means of organizing and explaining many of the social dilemmas which
Progressivism sought to address.
BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET, supra note 19, at 8-9.
65. See POIRIER, supra note 62, at 7 ("Because intimations of immorality and sexual
lasciviousness were often part of particular racial or class stereotypes, 'venereal disease' was
often associated with specific-usually socially oppressed or disadvantaged-groups of
people ... ."); cf GARRE, BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 296 (noting that despite the
improvements in public health achieved by the sanitarians, they also "imposed a moralistic
judgmentalism that openly expressed disdain for the religious, family, and cultural lives of the
poor" and immigrant communities).
66. See BRANDT, NO MAGIC BULLET, supra note 19, at 5 (remarking that illness and disease
are associated with social "symbols and images" which "reflect social values .... Fundamental to
this notion that disease is socially constructed is the premise that it is profoundly shaped by
both biological and cultural variables"); Kenneth Keniston, Introduction to the Issue, 118(3)
DAEDALUs, Spring 1989, at ix, x:
AIDS is socially constructed ... in the sense that any disease is, be it typhoid fever,
bubonic plague, chicken pox, Legionnaire's disease, syphilis, or influenza. That is,
we assign a meaning to the condition, including all that is implied by calling it a
disease, in a broader framework of traditional meanings, appealing metaphors,
and convincing theories.
See generally SONTAG, supra note 19 (arguing that images of illness and disease are social
projections or metaphors).
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castigated for having become ill and often blamed for their own illnesses. 6'
In the 1930s, Surgeon General Thomas Parran took an important step
away from this burgeoning moralistic approach to disease control when he
developed the first set of comprehensive public health guidelines designed
to stem disease progression. 63 His guidelines consisted of a five-step program
which was designed to focus extensively on prevention, specifically to help
stop the rampant spread of syphilis that wras overtaking America's cities)'
These five steps included: testing those suspected of carrying a particular
pathogen,'0 screening designated populations (e.g., applicants for marriage
licenses, newborns) to identify individuals ith the disease and to prevent
parent-child transmission, contacting and notifying partners who may have
been put at risk, requiring treatment of infected individuals, and conducting
extensive public education programs.
Parran's approach seemed facially objective and sound. In fact, many
public health authorities adopted Parran's program, and many aspects of
67. See POIRI, supra note 62, at 17 (noting that one particular social reform group, the
American Society for Sanitary and Moral Prophylaxis, preferred an educational approach, but
the Society "usually chose its words deliberately to instill fear and revulsion for the diseases and
the sexual profligacy with which they were usually linked"). The progressive moement also
became known for its support of the nascent eugenics movement of the early part of the
twentieth century. See BANDT, No MAGIC BULLET, supra note 19, at 19 ("Fears about the impact
of venereal diseases on the future of the family led physicians to ally 1ith the nascent eugenics
movement in the first decades of the twentieth century."); Cooper, Testing for Ge'nehr Trails,
supra note 19, at 355 (describing the domestic eugenics movement of the early twentieth
century, which endorsed "[r]estrictive immigration laws, forced sterilization, and prohibitions
on interracial marriage") (citations omitted).
68. See BRANTDT, No MAGic BULLET, supra note 19, at 138, 154 (noting Parran's publication
of "The Next Great Plague to Go" to publicize his new five-point program and describing his
emphasis on sexual morality and ethics, reliance on science and medicine, and forcing state
governments to accept some financial responsibility to help curb the spread of venereal
disease); PoIRIER, supra note 62, at 20 ("By casting syphilis as a public health problem rather
than a moral one, a matter of sound business economics rather than family righteousness, and
an opportunity for scientific ad,ancement rather than an outrage against social purit, Parran
created a new realm for governmental action."). Parran, however, %as not immune from
permitting stereotyping to influence the development of policy, as ias evident in his belief that
syphilis manifested itself differently in Blacks than in whites. Id. at 139.
69. See BRANDT, NO MAGIC BULLET, supra note 19, at 129 (noting that "[bly the early
1930s ... citizens of the United States contracted almost half a million new infections" each
year); see also id. ("Among blacks, the poor, and the young, rates of venereal infection reached
disproportionately high levels.").
70. See PoiRirR, supra note 65, at 93 (noting that Parran, as part of the Chicago Syphilis
Control Program, set up clinics where "free and secret" syphilis testing w%as provided to "Works
Progress Administration employees and people on the city's relief roles, but the rest of
Chicago's citizenry ias also 'invited' to partake of the service").
71. See Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 77-78:
Surgeon General Thomas Parran pushed for the legal authority to deploy modem"epistemological methods" of disease control . . . .The pathogen, not social
conditions, was thought to be the problem, and through modem methods like
these, the pathogen could be defeated. Health authorities sought the power to test
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his five steps are still a part of public health efforts to control the spread of
sexually transmitted disease today.72 Indeed, Parran's program was a vast
improvement over the intertwining of morality and medicine, neither of
which seemed to improve in their marriage.73 However, public health
officials, including Parran, found it hard to abandon campaigns that preyed
on shame and allegations of immorality,74 as it was far easier to blame the ill
for their own poor condition than to accept societal responsibility for
improving the state of the public's health.
As a result, the guidelines often were implemented in widely disparate
manners. The poor and immigrant communities, wholly dependent on the
state for health care-if any was provided-were the true targets of the new
public health initiatives. Reporting regulations often were enacted or
enforced for public hospitals. 75 The wealthy, who could afford health care
suspected carriers, screen populations (such as marriage license applicants and
newborns), trace partners, and require treatment.
72. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (providing statutory examples of Parran's
impact).
73. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 60 ("Those unfortunate Europeans who suffered from
syphilis experienced the worst of disease, medicine, and religious condemnation all at once-a
deadly mixture, and a dangerous model for the centuries ahead."); BRANDT, No MAIr1c BULLET,
supra note 19, at 147 (describing federal and state-based efforts that "had a substantial impact
upon the problem of venereal disease in American life"); see also BRANDT, supra, at 141-50
(describing Parran's campaign against venereal disease).
74. See BRANDT, No MAGic BULLET, supra note 19, at 157 (describing the persistent view
that disease, especially venereal disease, "particularly affected the working class, the immoral,
and certain racial and ethnic groups"); see also id. at 155-58 (describing Parran's failure to avoid
a campaign based on fear and moralism). Parran perhaps unwittingly contributed to this
problem by advocating that "syphilis ignorance" be replaced by "syphilophobia," which actually
served to encourage "fear, stigma, and denial." Id. at 155. Parran also commented on syphilis as
a punishment:
Yet, as [Parran] continued to argue for open-mindedness, a qualification slipped
in. "Before we are capable of teamwork," Parran continued, "all of us
together-physician, public official, citizen-must learn to think of syphilis
scientifically as a dangerous communicable disease, which it is; rather than
moralistically as a punishment for sin, which it often is not." Thus, Parran said,
syphilis is, sometimes, a punishment for sin.
POIRIER, supra note 62, at 82.
75. See BRANDT, No MAGic BULLET, supra note 19, at 42:
The New York City Board of Health enacted a regulation in February 1912 that
obligated all public hospitals to report venereal cases under their care, and under
which physicians were requested to report by number... as it was assumed that the
institutional cases constitute the poorer and more ignorant class, and the class
most in need of supervision.
See also Rosenberg, What Is an Epidemic? AIDS in Historical Perspective, 118(2) DAEDELUS, Spring
1989, at 8 [hereinafter Rosenberg, What Is an Epidemic?] (explaining that to combat New York's
1916 polio epidemic, prophylactic measures were enforced in the "dirty and densely populated
immigrant slums... and not in the more prosperous, less crowded, and seemingly salubrious
suburbs and middle-class areas that in fact produced so many of the cases"); GARRETr,
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from private physicians, often were able to avoid these mandates.7f As a
result, the disenfranchised communities, already subjected to greater
intrusions by the state, were now increasingly blamed for the spread of
disease-as it was their names and identities that were collected on state
rosters. 77 Despite objections from the beginninga and ongoing doubts about
the equity of its enforcement as well as its overall efficacy, Parran's
approach had a dramatic impact on the development of public health law
and policy.80
BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 290 ("[T]he U.S.-born population often saw immigrants
as little more than sources of disease and filth, readily blaming them for all epidemics and,
indeed, supporting sanitarian interventions that prejudicially targeted the newly arrived
poor.").
76. In 1912, New York passed an ordinance where "the implicit assumption uus that
patients who could afford to pay for treatment could be trusted not to spread their infections."
BRANDT, No IAGIc BuLLEr, supra note 19, at 42; cf. Rosenberg, Ml Is an Epidemic?, supra note
75, at 8 (noting how nineteenth-century quarantines were imposed on the poor but not on the
wealthy).
77. See PoniRR, supra note 62, at 94-95, 141 (noting that data-such as patient's name,
age, race, gender, disease-gathered at free public clinics underrepresented Anglo-Americans
and people from the wealthier classes so that the interpretations of these statistics were
skewed). Poirier also noted:
Another problem with interpreting and reporting statistics had a direct impact on
people's lives. For example, from the start, the project differentiated tests and
treatments by race; statistics for syphilis and gonorrhea for "white and "Negro"
men and women were a source of comment in the earliest reports, with tie
incidence of both diseases continually higher among African Americans. How
these numbers were related to syphilis's own relation to poverty mas often not
dearly discussed-nor was a comparison of the income levels of the two racial
groups or the fact that most of the dragnet stations and city clinics were situated in
poor, ethnic (largely African-American) neighborhoods.
Id. at 181.
78. See Gostin, Burris & I.azzarini, supra note 10, at 82 n.73 (citing Daniel M. Fox, Seial
Policy and City Poltics: Tuberculosis Reporting in New Yorl; 1889-1900, 49 BULL HIsT. MfED. 169,
173 (1975)) (noting that the reporting of names of people wih tuberculosis to the New York
health department, mandated in 1897, raised substantial negative reactions).
79. Despite the intensive campaign against syphilis waged by Parran and other
governmental officials in the 1930s, there were still more than 485,000 cases in 1941. &Z
BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET, supra note 19, at app. While the discovery of pencillin lead to a
significant drop in cases during the 1950s, the 1960s saw syphilis infection rates grow
exponentially, the number of cases quadrupled between 1958 and 1975. Id. at 170-75. In the
decade from 1965 to 1975, cases of gonorrhea more than tripled, rising to over one million per
year. Id. at app.
80. See, e-g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFrn' CODE § 120520 (Deering 1999) (requiring the health
department to conduct educational and publicity work); FL. STAT. A%-%. § 384.26(1) (West
1999) (outlining the contact investigation program for those ith sexually transmitted
diseases); AID. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-307 (1999) (requiring the screening of all
pregnant women for syphilis); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-30 (West 1999) (stating that health
officers may order tests of any person suspected of having a venereal disease); N.Y. Po.
HEALTH LkiW § 2303 (McKinney 1999) (requiring treatment or isolation for anyone infected
with a venereal disease).
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Notwithstanding the more sanguine efforts of the modem public health
movement and particularly effective advances in modem science since the
mid-1900s, the country has continued to suffer through epidemics such as
polio, 81 syphilis and gonorrhea,82 AIDS, and hepatitis." Thus far, our
approaches to combating public health crises have not been sufficiently
effective. Before considering improvements to the public health system,
however, one must understand the players within the system, their tools, and
the limits on their authority.
B. MODERN THEORYAND PRACTICE OFDISEASE CONTROL
1. Who Is Responsible for Creating Public Health Policy Today?
Public health matters generally are legislated by the separate state
governments rather than the federal government. 84 Within each state, the
legislature sets the overall limits on the reach of its state (or local)
department of health. Despite these limits, the respective departments
exercise a significant degree of autonomy in setting public health policy.
83
81. Polio ravaged the United States from its first significant outbreak in 1916 until the
discovery of the Salk vaccine in 1955 and the Sabin vaccine in 1961. See NINA GILDEN SEAVEY ET
AL, A PARALYZING FEAR: THE TRIUMPH OVER POLIO IN AMERICA 15 (1998).
82. The ancient diseases of syphilis and gonorrhea continue to plague us, despite effective
cures. See supra notes 2, 69, 79 and accompanying text (discussing the occurrence of new
infections, despite the availability of treatments and cures). It is noteworthy that the CDC's most
recent efforts to obtain congressional funding to try to eliminate syphilis were denied. Malcolm
Gladwell, The Talk of the Town: Cheap and Easy, NEW YORKER, July 10, 2000, at 21; see CDC,
TRACKING THE HIDDEN EPIDEMICS: TRENDS IN STDS IN THE UNITED STATES 2000, available at
http://vv.cdc.gov/nchstp/dstd/Stats-Trends/Trends2000.pdf (noting that between 1997
and 1999, gonorrhea rates increased by nine percent). Although syphilis rates around the
country have experienced a decline, id., they have continued to rise in New York City. GARRETI',
BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 476 (citing data from 1998 and 1999).
83. See supra notes 1, 4 and accompanying text (providing statistics on the effects of these
and other diseases).
84. See Bowser & Gostin, supra note 12, at 1235 (noting the state governments' "near
plenary authority to act for the health, safety and welfare of society"); Burnis, Fear Itself, supra
note 18, at 479 ("States have the authority to exercise their policy power to protect public
health. The law upon which this authority rests has been well settled for decades."); Hodge,
Modern Public Health, supra note 26, at 100-02 (describing the states' powers of public health
regulation as "the broadest and least limitable source of authority and support for government
action in the United States") (footnote omitted). Although there have been varying degrees of
federal influence, public health regulations traditionally have been "considered legislative
questions for local and state health authorities."James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism
and Public Health Law, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 326 (1998) (hereinafter Hodge, New Federalism];
see also Seidman, supra note 25, at 2 (describing legislation as the "principal legal device by
which the organized political community attempts to resolve pervasive social problems").
85. See Josephine Gittler, Controlling Resurgent Tuberculosis: Public Health Agencies, Public
Policy, and Law, 19J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 107, 108 (1994) (noting that "it is customary for
[state governments] to delegate [their broad public health regulatory powers] to local
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These factors lead to considerable inconsistency in health policy from state
to state.""
Each state health department has both "actual jurisdiction," which
allows it to regulate behavior directly, and "persuasive jurisdiction," where
the department derives power from developing goodwill from work done in
concert with other agencies, policymakers, and the public.&7 The greater
degree to which a department of health has developed a trusting
relationship with the general public and with policymakers, the more likely
it is to be successful in implementing effective public health strategies.E3 The
agency "must be willing to embrace and excel in the political process, "5 yet
governments") (citation omitted); Gostin, Burnis & Iazzarini, supra note 10, at 104-05
("[G]rants of power to health officials and local governments tended to be made in broad
terms."); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administmth,e Stale, 89 COLUtM. L REv. 369,
369 (1989) (observing the degree to which we live in an "administrative state" in which
legislative policies are implemented by "large administrative agencies"); me also GQL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 120145 (Deering 1999) ("The [health] department may quarantine, isolate,
inspect, and disinfect persons, animals, houses, rooms, other property, places, cites, or
localities, whenever in its judgment the action is necessary to protect or preserve the public
health."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-2 (West 1999) (delegating power to the state department of
health and local boards of health to define communicable diseases, declare epidemics, require
reporting of diseases, isolate and quarantine "wherever deemed necessary," remove any infected
person to a suitable place, disinfect premises, and remove and destroy articles 'when in its
opinion the safety of the public health requires it").
86. See Fidler et al., supra note 3, at 781 ("No two states have a similar list of reportable
conditions, and reporting is not required in all states for many of the nationally reportable
diseases."); Hodge, New Federalism, supra note 84, at 356-57 (suggesting that states might be
encouraged "to enact uniform legislation at their own level" by te implementation of national
incentives, such as funding and the sharing of expertise).
87. Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 91 ("[Elvery health agency faces the
challenge of using its expertise and persuasive power to encourage and facilitate others to take
actions that are consistent with the goals of public health."); see David P. Fidler, &turn of the
Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International Law, 81 MiN. L REV. 771, 849
(1997) [hereinafter Fidler, EmergingInfectious Diseases] (noting that tie issue "of whether public
health authorities should coerce through law or persuade through education arises at every
level of public health policy: local, national, and international") (footnote omitted).
88. See Gostin, Burris & Iazzarini, supra note 10, at 94-95 ("'Compliance without
enforcement' is essential to public health. One of the most important determinants ofvoluntary
compliance is the credibility of the health department." (quoting Robert A. Kagan &Jerome H.
Skolnick, Banning Smoking. Compliance Without Enforcement, in SMOI.NG POucV: LA.W, POLITCS,
AND CULTURE 69, 76-87 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugerman eds., 1993))); Note, Var-e
Brands: The Effects oflntrusi'e HlV Legislation on Higt.Pish Demographic Groups, 113 HRV. L REV.
2098, 2106-08 (2000) [hereinafter Name Brands] (discussing the distrust of public health
officials "among populations now most affected by AIDS and HIV," resulting from "the very real
specter of past medical abuse," as a significant deterrent to the effectiveness of any regulation);
see also CDC, Public Opinion About Public Health-Utnited States, 1999, 49(12) XMIMWR 25S-59
(noting that "[s]ocietal support is critical for public health efforts").
89. Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 94. The authors note that it is "precisely
that political involvement [which] risks weakening the impression of professional neutrality and
expertise from which public health officials draw much of their political power. This is to some
extent a Gordian knot that, like the original, can only be untied by inspired action." Id.
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at the same time must guard against losing its legitimacy as a moral agent."
2. What Are the Limits on the Power of Public Health Officials?
The broad outlines of the limits of public health law and the executing
authorities are fairly straightforward. The state has the authority to limit
individual liberty in the face of a public health emergency so long as its
interest in doing so is compelling and it uses the least restrictive means
available.9' An example of a commonly accepted exercise of this power
would be the state's use of quarantine to contain a life-threatening airborne
epidemic (e.g., infectious tuberculosis) .92 Similarly, courts have upheld state-
mandated vaccinations of school-age children, because it is only when
virtually all children are immunized that we have a chance of eradicating
diseases such as measles and rubella, as we have seen with smallpox. 93
90. A department of health, as moral agent, must walk a fine line between encouraging
behavior that improves the public health (e.g., not smoking, wearing seatbelts, engaging in safe
sex) and functioning as a voice of moral condemnation, which may undermine its efforts.
Compare supra Part IA (discussing historic, and largely moralistic, attempts to improve public
health), with infra Part I.B.3.a (discussing more modern attempts to facilitate behavior
modification and thereby improve public health). See also Gostin, Burris & Lazzaini, supra note
10, at 94 (noting that "public health authorities must find ways of meeting objections
concerning legitimacy"); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual
Liberty: The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. Prrr. L. REv. 419, 444 (2000) (arguing that the
legitimacy of a campaign focused on the indirect social costs of smoking is belied by a positive
.net economic impact" and masks a paternalistic imposition of moral values).
91. The leading case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824), held that each
state's powers "form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything
within the territory of the state, not surrendered to the general government .... Inspection
laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description.., are component parts of this mass." In
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Supreme Court addressed the scope of die
states' powers in the case of involuntary vaccination. The Court stated: "Upon the principle of
self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members." Id. at 27. The public health
regulation, however, must have a "real or substantial relation to the protection of the public
health and the public safety." Id. at 31. This is widely regarded as a "forceful statement by the
Court of the constitutional limits of the exercise of police powers in the interests of public
health." Hodge, New Federalism, supra note 84, at 328. Hodge further notes that "[t ] lie authority
of states.., does not extend to worthless, blanket provisions restricting personal freedoms in
the name of public health." Id.
92. See In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d 553, 558 (1966) (holding that consecutive
quarantine orders were not an unjust deprivation of liberty as long as the person quarantined
was still infected with active tuberculosis). However,
[b]ecause casual contact cannot spread [HIV/AIDS], infected individuals present
no health hazard to anyone with whom they do not have sexual relations,
exchange blood or other body fluids, or share intravenous needles. A quarantine
of [people with HIV/AIDS], unlike a smallpox quarantine, would be similar to
isolating people merely because they are ill, which is plainly unconstitutional.
Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HoFsTRA L. REV.
53,85 (1985).
93. See CDG, Vaccinia (Smallpox) Vaccine Recommendations of the Immunization Practices
[20011
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Achieving this compelling public health goal places only a minimal burden
on schoolchildren and their families. 94
Choices in the development of public health policy, however, are rarely
so clear. There are difficulties inherent in both protecting the well-being of
those who are healthy and safeguarding the rights of those who are ill and
often stigmatized. This tension arises in numerous contexts. For example: Is
it appropriate for the government to collect the names of people who have
sexually transmitted diseases? Should they be permitted-or required-to
contact the sexual partners of those so diagnosed? Should health care
providers be required to offer-or should pregnant women be required to
undergo-tests for syphilis, hepatitis, or HlV/AIDS? The options, of course,
are infinite.
To complicate matters further, public health decisions rarely are made
in a vacuum. Both legislators and policyrnakers face substantial pressure
from their constituents when a community is, or perceives itself to be, faced
with the threat of a health crisis.95 While it may be easy to enact laws and
institute policies that appease the commonweal, public opinion-generally
formed in direct response to a crisis-is not ahways the best guide to
developing effective public health measures. Indeed, such measures may do
little to protect the public health and may, in fact, ultimately cause harm.>5
Advisory Committee (ACIP), 40(RR14) MINWR 1 (1991) [hereinafter llazcinta] (Vaccinia
(smallpox) vaccine is a highly effective immunizing agent that brought about the global
eradication of smallpox."); CDC, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE STOPPED VCCINATIONS?,
available at http://wwv.cdc.gov/nip/publications/fs/genWhatifStop.htn (last modified
March 28, 2000) (noting the significant effectiveness of measles and rubella vaccines in helping
to stem the spread of these diseases). By 1971, routine vaccination against smallpox 1%s
discontinued. Vaccidnia, supra. "The last naturally occurring case of smallpox occurred in
Somalia in 1977." Id. In 1980, "the World Health Assembly certified that the world was free of
naturally occurring smallpox." Id.
94. SeeJacobson, 197 U.S. at 29 ("[lit was the duty of the constituted authorities primarily
to keep in view the welfare, comfort and safety of the many, and not permit tie interests of the
many to be subordinated to the visshes or convenience of the few.").
95. See Burris, AIDS Eweptionalsm, supra note 58. at 257 ("As a general matter, public
health controversies have little to do xith the technical attributes of the measure at issue, but
rather turn on more complex questions of culture, class, and pow er.:); see also infra Part IL.C
(discussing the role of the legislature in fostering and maintaining public health).
96. See Costin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 89 ("While Americans are, as a group,
quite as ready as public health officials to worry about threats to health, public health officials
and the public rarely worry about the same ones in the same way."). An example of a misguided
policy was the decision of the Illinois legislature to test all people for HI, ' prior to issuing a
marriage license; in the ensuing year over 40,000 people crossed state borders to get married.
Elizabeth B. Cooper, l1ry Mandatoyy HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Ncr'nms Must FaL" A
Legal, istorica4 and Public Policy Analvsis, 3 CGADozoWOMEN'S LJ. 13, 21 (1996) (citing Robert
Enstad, AIDS Test Has 40,000 eing State to ISM4, CHi. TRIB., Jan. 4, 1989, at CI). Citing lost
revenues and a fear of "alienating a lot of Illinoisians from the laws of this state," the Illinois
legislature repealed the act tw-enty-one months after passing it. Daniel Engler & Rick Pearson,
Premarital AIDS Test Law Repeaed, CHt. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1989, at CI; = Hodge, New Federahsri,
supra note 84, at 325-30 (noting the existence of "public health actions which purported to
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The following section explores in greater detail the tools-and conceptual
frameworks-available to legislators and public health officials in their
efforts to control disease and improve the public health.
3. Modern Tools and Models for Understanding and Achieving Public
Health Goals
The three essential tools that health departments rely on-prevention, 97
treatment, and surveillance s--roughly correspond to the three current
models of understanding disease and health: the behavioral model, the
microbial model, and the ecological model.9 Public health is best protected
when each of these approaches is relied upon in appropriate proportion.
a. Prevention
The primacy of prevention is rooted in the behavioral model, which
examines the ways in which our lifestyles expose us to pathogens or
otherwise tend to cause illness or death.1°° At the core of this model is the
protect the public, but in reality involved some arbitrary interference with private business or
imposed unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful activities"); cf Burris, Social Risk,
supra note 19, at 891:
Existing legal protection does not address all important social risks, and even those
people whose interests are protected in theory may not wish to rely on law in
practice. As a person becomes poorer and more socially marginalized, the law
becomes less likely to protect key economic interests, and more likely to itself be a
source of social risk.
97. See Gostin, BuriS & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 79 ("The main job of health agencies is
to directly promote good health and prevent illness."); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-
102(a) (2000) ("The Secretary shall adopt rules and regulations necessary to prevent: (1) The
introduction of an infectious or contagious disease into this State; or (2) The spread of an
infectious or contagious disease in this State."); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.021
(Vernon 1999) ("The board shall exercise its power in matters relating to protecting the public
health to prevent the introduction of disease into the state."); cf COMMNo. FOR THE STUDY OF THE
FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 7-8 (1988) (defining
the "core functions of public health agencies" as "assessment, policy development, and
assurance," which broadly correspond to surveillance, development of regulations and
programs, and implementation thereof).
98. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-103(a) (2000) ("The Secretary shall: (1)
Obtain accurate and complete reports on communicable diseases in this State; (2) Determine
the prevalence of each communicable disease; and (3) Devise means to control communicable
diseases."); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.047 (Vernon 1999) ("[Tlhe department
shall require epidemiological reports of disease outbreaks and of individual cases of disease
suspected or known to be of importance to the public health. The department shall evaluate
the reports to determine the trends involved and the nature and magnitude of the hazards.").
99. See Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 64, 69-77 (describing the models).
100. Id. at 64; see also Brandt, Behavior, Disease, and Health, supra note 2, at 63:
By the early 1970s, an emerging critique of modem biomedicine and medical
technology centered attention on the question of responsibility for disease and its
prevention .... Individuals could no longer rely on public health interventions,
the activities of the medical profession, or the health-care delivery system to solve
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understanding that every step each person takes to prevent individual illness
or disease is a step that works to improve the public health overall.'0 ' Public
education campaigns to urge changes in behavior (to cease smoking, wear
motorcycle helmets, or use condoms) are among the most familiar
prevention tools. Other prevention tools require a deeper role of
government in our lives, ranging from universal vaccination programs (to
prevent measles or rubella) to temporary quarantine (to stem the spread of
measles or tuberculosis).102 As expected, the validity of each prevention tool
is highly dependent on context.
Crafting effective prevention strategies can be very difficult. Despite the
broad range of available prevention tools, politics or public sensibilities may
affect the degree to which public health officials are illing to be explicit
about disease prevention, particularly concerning sexually transmitted
conditions. 10 3 Moreover, the complexity of the human psyche often renders
it impervious to pragmatic suggestions about disease or accident
preventionY°4 Therefore, development of effective prevention measures is
an extraordinarily challenging aspect of preserving the public health.
the problems of disease. Rather, the mantle of responsibility in te quest for health
would now be carried on the shoulders of individuals.
101. See Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health as SocialJustice, in NEW ETics, supra note 2, at
106:
Like the other principles of public health, prevention is a logical consequence of
the ethical goal of minimizing the numbers of persons suffering death and
disability. The only known way to minimize these adverse events is to prevent te
occurrence of damaging exchanges or exposures in the first place, or to seek to
minimize damage when exposure cannot be controlled.
102. See supra note 91 and accompan)ing text (discussing the state's ability to limit
individual liberty under certain circumstances).
103. See BP.ANix, No MAGiC BULLET, supra note 19, at 193 (noting that President Ronald
Reagan did not speak the word "AIDS" until 1985, folloing the death of Rock Hudson, four
years after the epidemic was first identified); sce also Gay Men's Health Crisis V. Sullivan, 733 F.
Supp. 619, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (striking down government restrictions on the use of sexually
explicit AIDS education materials).
104. Public resistance to the behavioral model is expressed in two %ays: (1) rejection of an
official endorsement of what they regard as deviant behavior" (e.g., harm reduction efforts
concerning safer sex education and drug use) or (2) rebellion against "unacceptable
paternalism" (e.g., requiring use of motorcycle helmets). Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note
10, at 64. Despite the increase in awareness of how HIV/AIDS is transmitted and the wide
availability of condoms in the United States, thousands of people become infected each )ear.
See GARRErr, BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 477 (describing a study of gay men who
admitted to having unsafe sex, and reporting that interviewees said that "[they knew
everything that the CDG and groups like GNI-.,.. had to say about HI, yet they rejected the
prevention campaigns, calling public health officials and prominent gay leaders 'safer sex
police' and 'condom police'"); GABRIEL ROTELLO, SEX.AL EcOLOG% AIDS Al THE DESrIN OF
GAY IEN 118-23 (1997) (describing various studies during the earl)' 1990s reporting high levels
of unsafe sex among gay men despite initial adoption of safer sex practices).
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b. Treatment
Since the discovery of pathogens and the tools to treat them, the"microbial model" has played a crucial role in enhancing public health. This
model values the production of mechanisms to kill microbes either before
or after they infect human beings.'0 * We commonly think of antimicrobial
treatment as something as simple as completing a round of antibiotics or
being given a vaccine. In fact, it has multiple, contextually-determined
definitions.
Treatment for some diseases, such as syphilis, can mean a relatively
short-term course of medication with few side effects that results in both a
cure and an inability to transmit the disease to others.10 6 However, treatment
for other diseases, such as tuberculosis, can involve both enforced
quarantine for a discrete time period and a prolonged regimen of numerous
medications with significant side effects. While these treatments may heal
the patient and render him noninfectious, they do not necessarily prevent a
relapse. 1°7 With HIV/AIDS, treatments may keep the disease in abeyance
and reduce symptomatology, but they are noncurative and often involve
serious, even life-threatening side effects.'03 Moreover, anti-HIV treatments
have not been found to render a person incapable of transmitting the
virus."
105. See Fidler, Emerging Infectious Diseases, supra note 87, at 777 ("Once the biology and
epidemiology of a disease agent are understood, public health authorities can implement
treatment and control measures. Antimicrobial drugs are commonly used to kill pathogenic
microbes or to prevent them from reproducing.") (footnotes omitted); Gostin, Butrris &
Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 64 (describing the assumptions of the microbial model).
106. See Mike Mitka, US Effort to Eliminate Syphilis Moving Forward, 283 JAMA 1555, 1555
(2000) ("Syphilis is a completely preventable disease that can be cured with one dose of
penicillin." (quoting Helene Gayle, M.D., Director, CDG National Center for HIV, STD, and TB
Prevention)).
107. See Div. OF TUBERCULOSIS EuMINATION, CDC, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUEsTIONS, at
http://wvw.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb/faqs/qa.htm (last modified Aug. 31, 1999) (stating that
multiple medications must be taken for at least six months to be effective; that side effects may
include loss of appetite, nausea, jaundice, fever, abdominal pain, rashes, dizziness, and blurred
vision; and that the patient may no longer be contagious two to three weeks after beginning a
drug regimen). After treatment is complete, it is still possible to contract TB again, especially
multidrug resistant TB. Id.
108. See GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 473 (noting the emergence of
drug-resistant HIV strains that require physicians to prescribe "extraordinarily complex
cocktails of ... antivirals"); DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., GUIDELINES FOR USE OF
ANTIRETROVIRAL AGENTS IN HIV-INFECTED ADULTS AND ADOLESCENTS, at http://www.livtis.
org/trtgdlns.html (Jan. 28, 2000) (stating that HIV is presently incurable, treatments are
palliative in nature, and that the treatments' adverse effects may be fatal; treatment 'vacations'
may be recommended due to intolerable side effects, unfavorable drug interaction, and during
the first trimester of pregnancy- most clinicians would recommend that treatment continue
indefinitely until either the patient dies or the drugs stop working).
109. Fleming et al., Tracking the HIVEpidemic: Current Issues, Future Challenges, 90 AM.J. PUB.
HEALTH 1037, 1038 (2000) (stating that although there is indirect evidence that early treatment
can reduce infectiousness, the risk of transmission remains).
[2001]
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The development of efficacious treatment-particularly in the face of
life-threatening and contagious or congenital illness--can also raise
troubling questions about whether and when treatment should be
mandated. Although there are few instances in which mandated treatment is
permitted (such as directly observed therapy ("DOT") for people with
noninfectious but active tuberculosis and prophylaxis to prevent syphilis in
newborns), n ° it remains a part of the microbial model's emphasis on
preserving the public health. As such, it is not surprising that the risk of
mandated treatment renders this model more likely "to produce political
disputes about the proper scope and exercise of the state's power to attack
the pathogen by controlling the human being who carries it." t
c. Surveillance
Surveillance-or the collection of data about disease patterns--often is
identified as a chief goal of the guardians of the public health. '2 Disease
surveillance permits public health officials to monitor an epidemic's scope,
thereby enabling them to engage in effective prevention efforts and target
appropriate resources for treatment113 However, because surveillance
permits the government to acquire such deeply personal information about
its citizens, it is vitally important that there be clear links between the
surveillance activity, and the corresponding prevention and treatment goals.
Surveillance is a means to achieving a goal, but ought not to be the goal
itself.11
4
110. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121365(c) (Deering 1999) (authorizing directly
observed therapy for those with active tuberculosis); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 10, § 69-
2.5(c) (2000) (mandating treatment for newborns who test positive for syphilis).
111. Gostin, Burris & Lazzarni, supra note 10, at 64.
112. See Fidler, Emerging Infectious Disezse, supra note 87, at 791 ("The first crucial step in
dealing with infectious diseases is identifying the pathogenic agent. which is entrusted to public
health surveillance systems."); Gittler, supra note 85, at 116 ("The foundation of efforts of
public health agencies to control TB and other communicable diseases is surveillance of tmese
diseases.").
113. See Nancy Krieger & Sally Zierler, 117Tat Explains the Publics Htalthi?--A Call far
Epidemiologic Theory, in NEW ETHICS, supra note 2, at 45, 48 (noting that epidemiologists' use of
HV surveillance data, under a social production of disease theory, allows for research that
"explicitly names social policies and political priorities (for e.ample, availability of low-income
housing, employment, and affordable education) as critical cofactors in the geographic spread
of AIDS in the United States").
114. See Larry Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategics, in AIDS Luv TODAY: A GUtIDE FOR
THE PUBuC 59, 68 (1993):
[Sicreening is a means, not an end. It provides information, the %,alue of which
depends on the use to which it is put. In both the legal and medical arenas,
proposals for screening can be sensibly evaluated only in terms of how- well they
accomplish some desirable public health goal.
See also Gostin, Burns & Lazzarini, Infectious, supra note 10. at 125 (identif)ing the authors'
criteria tojustify data collection); Kevin M. Kramer, A NalionalEpida.i, a Naional Co07rratian,
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As surveillance can take many forms, choosing a means of obtaining
surveillance data can be quite complicated. Indeed, because it permits the
government to learn such personal information as whether individuals are
afflicted with stigmatizing conditions including HIV/AIDS, syphilis, or TB, it
can be among the most politically charged activities of a health
department.115
Under the rubric of surveillance, the government could-and does-
require laboratories or physicians to provide names and other identifying
information to their respective state health departments when people test
positive for certain conditions. Many states employ this policy to monitor the
scope of syphilis, gonorrhea, and HIV.1 6 Government officials also may
collect this data using other means. For example, they could require health
care providers to report all cases to the health department, but allow them
to use unique identifiers instead of names or other compromising
identifiers. Other means of generating surveillance data, though less
comprehensive, include requiring anonymous serologic tests at various
locations (such as hospitals, emergency rooms, or STD clinics)11 7 or
requesting that physicians voluntarily report their patients' positive test
results to the department.
Surveillance has the potential of being closely aligned with the
ecological model of improving public health. This model recognizes that the
distribution and experience of disease is dramatically affected by "the way
a National Law: In Support of Unique Identifier Reporting for HIV Surveillance, 16 J. CoNtEMp.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 173, 181 (1999) ("Physicians see their duty primarily as one maintaining the
bond between themselves and their individual patients. Mandatory reporting requirements,
therefore, while showing the appearance of talismanic preventive power, directly conflict with
physicians' obligations under the ... Hippocratic Oath.") (citations omitted).
115. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-201 (Michie 2000) (requiring reports
including the names of all persons with infectious or contagious diseases that endanger the
public health, except asymptomatic HIV, which is reported using a unique patient
identification number instead of the patient's name); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5114
(West 1999) (requiring the reporting of HIV positive test results, including the patient's name,
unless the patient requests anonymity); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-38, -40 (West 1999) (requiring
the reporting of all cases of venereal disease to include the name of the patient); TEX, I-HALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 81.041(e), 81.044(b)(1) (Vernon 1999) (requiring the reporting of
AIDS and mandating that AIDS reports include the name of the patient). Carried to the
extreme, the government could require the general population to submit to disease screening
at regular intervals, with the results reported to the department of health. Under existing
conditions, this would, of course, be legally suspect. It also would be a tremendous waste of
taxpayer money. Cf Ronald Bayer et al., HIV Antibody Screening. An Ethical Framework for
Evaluating Proposed Programs, 256 JAMA 1768, 1768 (1986) ("Even were [mass HIV antibody]
screening feasible, it would require an extraordinary and repeated intrusion into the privacy of
all Americans, with little probable benefit.").
116. See supra note 115 (providing examples of state statutes).
117. See Bayer et al., supra note 115, at 1769-74 (describing possible approaches to
screening and testing for HM); Penelope Ploughman, Public Policy Versus Private Rights: The
Medical Social, Ethica4 and Legal Implications of the Testing of Newbornsfor HIV, AIDS & PUB. POL'Y
J., Winter 1995/1996, at 182, 188-89 (discussing the pros and cons of testing newborns for HIV).
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society organizes itself, produces and distributes wealth, and interacts ,ith
the natural environment." 1 8 Moreover, it recognizes a "collective
responsibility" for improving unhealthy behavior and therefore inevitably
serves as a.means of critiquing the status quo."9 The lessons available
through such data analysis can guide us toward developing more systemic
approaches to understanding and improving public health.
Along these lines, epidemiologists Bruce Link and MaryJo Phelan have
concluded that "'fundamental causes' of disease [should be d]efined
'broadly to include money, knowledge, power, prestige and the kinds of
interpersonal resources embodied in the concepts of social support and
social network.'" 2 0 Employing this model allows one to see
that risk factors, and diseases themselves, are actually intermediate
factors in illness-pathways through which deeper social causes
operate to have their effect[, and] explains the durability of social
factors in health outcomes. When one intermediate factor, such as
poor sanitation, is eliminated, another, such as drug use, take[s] its
place.1
2'
Therefore, current epidemiological thinking about disease causation
asserts that, while it is appealing to think one can improve public health by
attempting to control microbes through treatment tools such as vaccinations
or cures, and to seek to change human behavior through prevention tools
such as encouraging use of clean needles or condoms, our efforts are
doomed to be frustrated unless we look at-and try to do something
about-the systemic factors that are the primary influences on "multiple
disease outcomes."'2 By ferreting out patterns of disease and population-
based ill health (such as pockets of HIV/AIDS, asthma, or lead paint
exposure), surveillance has the potential to energize efforts to make some of
the systemic changes called for under the ecological model.123 It is
118. Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 64.
119. Id. Not surprisingly, the public most often resists the ecological model's method of
"pointing to such fundamental social causes of disease as poverty, racism, and severe income
inequality." Id.; see also Jonathan Mann, Medidne and Public Health, Ethics and Hunan Righ%, in
NEW ETHICS, supra note 2, at 83 (explaining the public's resistance). Mann posits the limited
focus of public health education to result from a denial of "societal factors whose dominant role
in determining levels of preventable disease, disability, and premature death is beyond dispute."
Id. at 86.
120. Burris, Law as a Structural Factor supra note 23, at 1767.68 (citing Link & Phelan, supra
note 22, at 80, 81-83, 85-87).
121. Id. at 1768.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 1766 ("There is a growing recognition throughout the disciplines of public
health that the 'structural,' 'environmental,' and 'fundamental social' causes of dsease have a
pervasive impact on disease and must be more effectively identified and addressed if substantial
improvements are going to be made in public health.") (citations omitted); David P. Fidler,
International Law and Global Public Hea/th, 48 U. KAw. L RE%. 1, 47-48 (1999) (reaching a similar
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unfortunate that this too rarely occurs.
The next part of this Article begins by examining a model statutory
proposal that seeks to incorporate all three tools of preserving and
improving public health-prevention, treatment, and surveillance-in a
more thoughtful and comprehensive fashion than public health law
currently reflects.
II. PROBLEMS WITH MODERN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND POLICY
A. A REViEW OF COMMUNICABLEDISEASELAW
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Scott Burris, and Zita Lazzarini explore in detail
the ways in which current communicable disease law fails to achieve essential
public health goals.'2 4 They observe that, among other flaws, public health
statutes from state to state are terribly inconsistent. The "one-size-fits-all"
approach to disease control and prevention found in many states' code
books often is simultaneously too aggressive and ridiculously meek, and
therefore unable to protect and improve the public health effectively.12
5
To rectify these and other problems, these authors suggest that public
health statutes:
* be based on provisions that apply equally to all communicable
diseases;
* embrace the reality that most interventions depend on
voluntary compliance by the public;
* provide health officials with the authority to use coercive
public health powers when there is a demonstrated threat of
significant risk to others... includ[ing] due process
protections;
* offer health officials a range of measures including a graded
conclusion on the international level and describing "education, housing, and employment" as
"basic social determinants of human health"). Fidler concludes that "the right to health
depends on the fulfillment of other economic, social, and cultural rights (for example tie right
to education, right to housing, right to work)." Id.
124. See Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 102 ("[T]he [state] health codes in
their entirety have evolved independently, leading to profound variation in the structure,
substance, and procedures for detecting, controlling, and preventing communicable
diseases.").
125. See generally id. at 101-18 (surveying state public health codes across the nation). "Suite
health codes typically contain laws that are simply no longer relevant and fall to address ncw
approaches to disease control." Id. at 106. They often are "arbitrary and outdated in light of
current approaches to disease control and causation." Id. at 109. For example, older statutes
designed to combat "venereal disease" often permit "severe restrictions on liberty, often based
on vague or nonexistent criteria." Id. at 110. In the absence of appropriate statutory guidance,
public health officials often tend to operate at extremes-either overusing or underusing the
coercive powers available to them'. Id. at 116.
[20011
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series of less restrictive alternatives and require the use of the
least restrictive alternative that will accomplish the public
health goal; [and]
0 establish strong protections for privacy and security of public
health information while defining exceptions that permit
disclosures necessary to protect the public."'t
This approach seeks to eliminate "[s]tigmatizing, and unnecessary,
distinctions between sexually transmitted and other diseases[, ... would
add needed clarity and coherence to legal regulation, and would reduce the
opportunity for politically motivated disputes about how to classify newly
emergent diseases." 127 Moreover, it incorporates the crucial notion that the
finding of an actual and individualized-rather than generalized or
stereotyped-"medical risk" is a prerequisite to the limitation of personal
liberty. The authors import the disability discrimination principle that,
absent a "direct threat," defined as "a significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation," it is
inappropriate to impose any limitations on a patient's liberty' 3
In further deference to the presumption of liberty to which all people,
including people with communicable diseases, are entitled, the model
statutory scheme requires both the development of a "graded series of less
restrictive alternatives" and the employment of "the least restrictive
alternative that will accomplish the public health goal." t. The authors note
that this approach "would help align communicable disease statutes with the
evolving standards of both antidiscrimination law and constitutional law, by
allowing only those measures that are reasonably necessary to contain a
significant risk to others." 13
Finally, the legislative scheme of Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini encourages
the development of "strong protections for privacy and security of public
126. Id at 119. The authors also recommend that "public health statutes define the mission
of public health agencies and the scope of their activities" to include prevention and control of
communicable diseases through "interventions [at] the microbial, beha.ioral, and ecological
[levels]." Id.
127. Id. at 120.
128. Id. at 121 (citing the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994)).
This assessment of "significant risk" is based on a consideration of four factors first identified in
SchoolBoard of Nassau County v. Arline 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987). These factors include: "(a) the
nature of the risk[,] (b) the duration of the risk[] (c) the severity of the riskl,] and (d) the
probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm." Id.
(quoting Brief of Amid Curiae American Medical Association at 19). Gostin, Burris, and
Lazzauini propose a model statute that would require public health officials "to proe the
existence of a health threat by clear and convincing evidence" and to provide detainees with"an immediate hearing, a showing of current infectiousness, and evidence of die need for
continued detention or isolation." Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 122-23.
129. Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 123-24.
130. Id.
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health information with narrowly drawn exceptions for disclosure when
necessary to protect the public." 13 1 Under this scheme, the authors assert,
" [a]cquisition of health information cannot be considered an inherent
good"; rather, public health authorities should not collect personally
identifiable information absent clear justification from public health
authorities. 12
B. THE CRITIQUE
There are many attractive elements to this statutory scheme: it relies on
essential constitutional principles of due process and individualized
assessments; it strives to remove-or at least reduce-the odd stigmatizing of
some diseases; and above all, it seeks to bring coherence to a system that is
badly broken.13
3
Unfortunately, this proposal stops short of adequately integrating
concerns of "social risk" into its structure for developing public health law
and policy. The heart of the problem lies in what is also the beauty of the
proposal: in seeking to create a uniform system of laws, it articulates and
relies upon "neutral principles" familiar from both constitutional and
disability rights law.3' As we already know from these other contexts,
however, neutral principles are not enough to surmount embedded and
institutionalized oppressions; indeed, they often serve to reinforce unequal
assignments of power13 5 Therefore, as one might expect, the greatest
problems arise when public health authorities attempt to apply this
theoretical model to the lives of real people.
As noted earlier, the disenfranchised and those who have fewer
resources are most likely to need public health care services.1 36 Therefore, it
is particularly important to assess the proposed model statutory scheme by
determining its impact on those most likely to experience its effect."3 7
131. Id. at 125. According to the authors, "[rleasonably justifiable criteria for data
collection include: (1) preventing a significant public health risk, (2) providing a likely benefit
to the subject (e.g., treatment or other services), and (3) conducting surveillance to monitor
and maintain the community's health." Id.
132. Id. The authors identify additional privacy protections: informing subjects of the
nature of data to be collected including adopting fair information practices, developing privacy
and security assurances, creating established guidance concerning disclosure of data, and
regular reviewing of the development and enforcement of the privacy and security measures. Id.
at 125-26.
133. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the proposal
by Gostin, Burris, and Lazzarini).
134. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing and critiquing the application of principles of
autonomy and agency to the public health context).
135. See infra notes 204-17 and accompanying text (discussing the uses and failings of
neutral principles).
136. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (arguing that fundamental causes of
diseases should be defined broadly).
137. See Susan M. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a Ner
[20011
HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 900 2000-2001
LESSONS FROM THE PLAGUE YEARS
Fundamentally, neither traditional communicable disease law nor the
proposed overhaul is complete because neither sufficiently considers the
importance of social context1 ss Therefore, the Harm Assessment Protocol
focuses on the role of public health measures within the context of the
communities they seek to serve.
1. Stigma, Social Hostility, and Social Risk
This section begins with an exploration of the role that stigma, social
hostility, and social risk play in the lives of people who experience serious
illness. Sociologist Erving Goffman and his successors have helped us to
understand stigma as something beyond mere status, but rather as "a social
relation between a stigmatized and a 'normal' person, based on a shared
belief that some part of the stigmatized person's identity is... 'spoiled.'" 1S
The person who experiences stigma has internalized feelings of "deviance"
and "shame," which may affect him as profoundly as would external threats
by others. 4 Understandably, then, people who experience stigma often are
exceptionally discreet, and at times secretive, about disclosing what they
perceive to be their stigmatizing condition.' 4' If their stigma cannot be
Pragmatism, 20 Am. J.L. & MED. 395, 411 (1994) [hereinafter Wolf. Shifting Paradzigms]
(advocating a "rejection of theoretical elegance as the measure of good bioetics and health
law, and insistence instead on evaluating what meets the needs of indihiduals in clinical settings
is a diagnostically pragmatist move"). Wolf suggests that to have true force. theory cannot be
and should not be wholly disregarded; bioethics and health law work must be linked to "the
vision we ought to pursue and whether that vision is ultimately progressive." Id. at 414-15. On
the interrelationship of health law and bioethics, see generally GEORGE J. ALNAS, JUDGI G
MEDIcINE 3 (1988) and Alexander Morgan Capron & Vicki Michel, Law and Biwtrhis, 27 Loa.
LA. L. RE%. 25 (1993).
138. See Wolf, Shfling Paradigms, supra note 137, at 402 (discussing the failure of bioethics
to consider individual characteristics such as "race, gender, or resources"). "Part of the
challenge to bioethics method comes from an empirical literature provoking fundamentl
questions about the agreed wisdom." Id. at 403. This in turn ushers in "the rise of a new
pragmatism in bioethical theory and health law development." Id. at 411 (borrowing from tie
title of Wolf s artide).
139. Burris, Social Risk supra note 19, at 870-71 (citing ERING GOEFmi.A, STIGMI NOTES ON
THE MANAGEMEN'r OF SPOILED IDENTrY (1963)).
140. Id. at 871.
141. See Barry K. Furrow, Doctors' Dirt, Little Serts: T1e Darl Side of Medical Pivacy, 37
WASHBURN LJ. 283, 285 (1998) ("We are constituted of layers of group memberships, some we
proudly display and some we shield from others .... The protection of secrets by our
silence... shields us from others' awareness of our odd traits, our deviances. behasior that may
marginalize and injure us in ourjobs or social spheres."); Gregory M. Herek, llness, Stigma, and
AiDS, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SERIOUS ILLNESS: CHRONIC CONDITIONS, FATAL DiSExSES,
AND CLINICAL CARE 107, 134 (Paul T. Costa, Jr. & Gary R. VandenBos eds., 1990) [hereinafter
Herek, Illness, Stigma, and AIDS] ("[Pleople with AIDS or HIV infection may wish to hide their
status from others because of a fear of straining family relationships and friendships, a wish to
maintain normalcy[,]... or a desire to avoid revealing their homosexuality or use of
intravenous drugs.") (citations omitted).
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hidden, they may make significant efforts to "manage" information about
it.142
Sources of stigma vary from community to community, but may include
racial identity, gender, sexual orientation, drug use, or illness. It is
important to understand that it is possible for "a stigmatized person [to]
uphold the stigma relation even if she does not believe there is anything
'bad' or 'wrong' about her condition (such as deafness), as long as she still
accepts that it is a deviation from a state that she accepts as normal." 4 3
Social hostility is closely related to stigma, but is not quite the same
concept. Even if a person does not experience stigma as attendant to one or
more aspects of his identity (race, gender, sexual orientation, or disease), he
may be affected by the belief that external sources seek to cause him harm.
This is not just paranoia, but the genuine belief-based on personal history
or that of others with whom one identifies-that harm is (more or less)
likely to occur based on one's social identity.144 Social hostility can include
intentional, as well as nonconscious but equally painful, acts of social
ostracism and discrimination.
Finally, social risk is the term that attempts to explain how individuals
who experience stigma or social hostility attempt to negotiate a relatively
safe place for themselves in society. As described by Scott Burris, social risk
has two components: the actual threat of social risk ("attitudes and behavior
that cause or threaten social harm") and the perception of social risk
("attitudes and beliefs about the threat among those who are in some way
142. See Burris, Social Risk, supra note 19, at 871 (observing that stigmatized individuals
expend a great deal of effort and experience deep psychological stress as they try "to avoid
rejection [and simultaneously seek] to maintain otherwise rewarding relationships"); see also
Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43
UCLA L. REV. 263, 301-02 (1995) [hereinafter Karst, Myths ofIdentity (noting that multiracial
individuals may choose to claim membership of one ethnic group, and that "writers on sexual
orientation generally assume that even today a majority of Americans who think of themselves
as gay or lesbian are 'passing,' presenting public identities that are heterosexual").
143. Burris, Social Risk, supra note 19, at 870 n.190; see Herek, Illness, Stigma, and AIDS, supra
note 141, at 109 (emphasizing Goffman's theory that stigma arises in social interactions where
the attribute is relevant and differs from the expected, such as an African American attending a
white supremacist meeting, or conversely, a person with AIDS who normally experiences stigma
in numerous settings escaping it in an AIDS support group).
144. See Karst, Myths of Identity, supra note 142, at 328:
To validate an individual's claim to equal citizenship ajudge need not inquire into
the validity of the person's racial or ethnic self-identification .... It is enough to
know that the official actor discriminated against the individual 'on account of' his
racial identity-on the basis of his supposed membership in a racial group.
Id. Admittedly, it is difficult to conceive of an individual who could rationally assess social
hostility without internalizing it as stigma. For example, it would be an accurate perception of
social hostility for a gay man or lesbian to believe that certain legislators would like to enact
antigay legislation; even a person comfortable with her sexual identity would have difficulty not
internalizing such expressions of social hostility over time.
[2001]
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tied to the trait or disease") .1 In many contexts, the latter is as
determinative as the former.146
Burris identifies the following four aspects of social risk:
" Social Vulnerability-the degree to which one's social or
economic capital is thought to be, or is, at risk;147
* Psychological Vulnerability-the internalization of stigma and
the ways in which it influences social interactions; 4 3
* Perceptions of Social Hostility-the extent to which one
mistrusts the social, governmental, or bureaucratic systems
upon which one generally must rely-'t 9 and
* Perceived Probability of Harm-the factors that contribute to
one's assessment that harm is likely to occur, including
optimism, pessimism, and the human tendency to expect that a
risk may occur "if it is easy to imagine or recall."'
Burnis further notes that is quite difficult to manage both perceived and
actual social risk:
145. Burris, Social Risk, supra note 19, at 862.
146. See Burris, Surveillane supra note 21, at S122 (noting that human behavior is as likely
to be governed by perceived threats as by actual threats); Larry G. Martin, Stigma: A Se.ial
LearningPerspective, in THE DIIEMMA OF Di.FERENcE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARYVIEW OF STIGM 145,
149-50 (Stephen C. Ainlay et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter THE DI.2-IMA OF DIFFLVECE]
(observing that social learning "predicates how stigmatized persons come to expect certain
modes of treatment from others... ," affecting self conception); see also Lerita M. Coleman,
Stigma: An Enigma Demystified in THE DI.EMMA OF DIFFERENCE, supra, at 211, 224 ("The most
pernicious consequence of bearing a stigma is that stigmatized people may develop the same
perceptual problems that nonstigmatized people have.").
147. Burris, Social Risk, supra note 19, at 863; see infra notes 151, 153 and accompanying text
(defining the term "capital"). Within the context of HIV, for example, Burris recognizes several
subparts of social vulnerability, including threats of loss of confidentiality, threats to
employment and health insurance, threats to other forms of economic support, fear of
discrimination in housing and services, threats of violence, threats of adverse legal action, and
threats to social status. Burris, SocialRisk, supra note 19, at 864-70.
148. Burris, Social Risk, supra note 19, at 870-74; see alsoJennifer Crocker & Neil Luisky,
Stigma and the Dynamics of Social Cognition, in THE DILE ,A OF DIFFERENcE, supra note 146, at 95,
97-98 (noting that recent research has explored the ways stigmatized persons' expectations
about likely beliefs and reactions of nonstigmatized persons can affect social interaction); supra
notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing the role and sources of stigma).
149. Burris, Social Risk, supra note 19, at 874-76; see also Herek, Illness, Stigna, and AIDS,
supra note 141, at 116 ( "[C]ommunities 'at risk' may not trust or believe medical experts and
government officials... [and] may have different priorities for whiich problems must be
solved").
150. Burrs, Social Risk supra note 19, at 876 (describing the "availability" heuristic, (citing
Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Ris; in JtUDG.%IE.1 UNDER
UNcERTAINI HEuRISTIcs AND BIAsEs 463,464-65 (Daniel Kalneman et al. eds., 1982)); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availabili(,: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Lr~aiht, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNcERTAINrl: HEURISTICS AND BLSES, supra at 163.
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To perceive a social risk is to experience one's interdependence on
others-their actions and beliefs-as well as the degree to which
one's own beliefs and expectations embody the norms and
attitudes one's socialization has taught. It also entails an experience
of one's independence from these forces, which may take the form
of shamelessness, cunning or persuasiveness, or lie in more
tangible assets such as wealth, professional skills, or fame. It entails,
that is, an ongoing assessment of one's ability to manage social risks
as one perceives them to one's advantage.151
One must negotiate social risk in the myriad settings in which one must
operate-including family, work, and social networks-and in each of these
settings the rules of the game may be different. 15
2
Perhaps self-evidently, not everyone is equally able either to avoid or
manage social risk. One's success depends highly on the depth and range of
social skills or the available capital one possesses., 3 Logically, then, those
with the fewest resources are the least likely to be able to manage either
actual or perceived social risk. 1' 4 This relationship between management of
social risk and the availability of resources often facilitates a downward spiral
as those with fewer resources continue to lose their footing, while those with
greater resources may be able to negotiate a (relatively) safe or comfortable
151. Burris, Social Risk, supra note 19, at 863. Burris relies significantly on Pierre Bourdieu's
philosophical concepts of "habitus" and "capital" to explicate the notion of social risk. See id, at
856-60 (citing PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER (Gino Raymond & Matthew
Adamson trans., 1991); PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice
trans., 1977); DEREK ROBBINS, THE WORK OF PIERRE BOURDIEU: RECOGNIZING SOCIETY (1991)).
152. Gaylene Becker & Regina Arnold, Stigma as a Social and Cultural Construct, in TIlE
DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 146, at 39, 49-51 (discussing methods that stigmatized
individuals may use to attempt to reduce their variance from cultural norms, thus making the
stigma less salient); Herek, Illness, Stigma, and ALDS, supra note 141, at 132 (reviewing strategies
that stigmatized individuals use to safeguard self-esteem in different situations).
153. Burris, Social Risk, supra note 19, at 856-60. Burnis describes Bourdieu's concept of
"habitus" as:
more than a received sense of the rules of the game, for the concept also
encompasses the social skills that such an innate sense of the game provides. The
habitus... implies the individual's capacity for structured improvisation, the
ability to deploy social competence to win the spoils of the social game.
Id. at 858. "Capital" is not only wealth, but also "anything socially recognized as a tradable asset
in a field" (e.g., education). Id. at 859-60. As one would expect, having access to capital helps.
[W]ealth as capital allows one to rig the social game--to buy better tools, practice
more, purchase allies, and so on. Many forms of capital in our society also have the
convenient capacity to legitimize themselves, so that they at once confer social
status andjustify that status by their existence.
Id. at 860.
154. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the correlation between increased susceptibility to
social risk and a diminished capacity to exercise autonomy, or agency).
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place in society.1 55
2. Practical Ramifications of Stigma, Social Hostility, and Social Risk
What relevance do these concepts of stigma, social hostility, and social
risk have to the development of public health law and policy? As it turns out,
a great deal. As noted earlier, disease tends to aggregate in those
communities with less access to wealth, power, or other resources." 5
Traditionally, these communities have included poor people, people of
color, and women.15 7Just as gender, race, class, and sexual orientation have
been recognized as markers for disenfranchisement and discrimination,'r'
people with disease also have experienced outright discrimination, stigma,
and social hostility when trying to obtain access to jobs and services that
155. See Marcia Bayre-Smith, Health and Women of Co!or A Contextual mrmlew, in RPUE,
GENDER, AND HEALTH 1, 9 (Marcia Bayne-Smith ed., 1996) (l[I]n any money'driven economy,
the people on the bottom of the stratification hierarchy will experience some level of material
deprivation. The unequal distribution of income from earnings and wealth creates inequality of
access to everything, from basic necessities... to life-sustaining resources such as education and
health care.").
156. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (describing the disproportionate
incidence of disease among the disenfranchised); see also supra notes 120-22 and accompanying
text (observing that fundamental causes of diseases should be understood broadly).
157. Examples of the potential for disease to be experienced disproportionately include he
impact of tuberculosis in poor and immigrant communities, higher rates of heart disease in
African American communities, and HV/AIDS in gay communities. SeCDC, EPICIFDIOLOG OF
TuBERcULosis, available at http://wwvcdc.gov/nchstp/th/pubs/2.pdf (last modified July 7,
2000) (noting that low income groups with poor access to health care are at a higher risk of TB
exposure or infection); CDC, Tuberculosis Morbidit,-United States, 1997, 47(13) MWR 253
(1998), available at http://v.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb/pubs/mm'T/mm4713.pff (stating that the
TB case rate for foreign-born persons has remained at least four to fi'e times higher than for
U.S.-born persons); OMB Watch, Paper on Health Care Reform and lw.-Incorx Population, Octer/
November 1996, available at http://www%.omb-atch.org/budget/health/paper.htnl ('People of
low income are, on average, less healthy compared uith persons of higher incomes.... Poor
people have higher rates of disease and disability; they report themselves as less healthy and
have higher rates of diabetes, heart condition, HIV and tuberculosis."); American Heart
Association, 2001 Heart and Stroke Statistical Update 5 (noting that the age-adjusted prevalence of
cardiovascular disease in adults for non-Hispanic whites is 30% for men and 23.8% for women,
compared with 40.5 % for non-Hispanic Black men and 39.6% for non-Hispanic Black women);
see also infra note 267 and accompanying text (providing demographic statistics on the AIDS
epidemic showing the disproportionate impact of the disease on people of color).
158. See Marda Bayne-Smith, supra note 155, at 18 ("It has been documented by researchers
and historians that neglect based on racism accounted for the disproportionate deaths of
women of color, compared with white women.... "); Rebecca Dresser, Mlliat Bieahics Can Learn
from the Women's Health Movement, in FE-MINIsM & BIOEThICs, supra note 41, at 144, 147
(addressing the women's health movement's criticism that "physicians frequently are
patronizing, detached, disrespectful, racist, homophobic, and unwilling to trust the reports of
their women patients"); LaurenJones Young, Toward an Ethic of Care and Community in Education
and Medidne, in IT JUST AIN'T FAIR, supra note 24, at 244 [hereinafter Young, Trard an Ethic of
Care] (noting the effect of race, class, and gender on disparities of access to health care and
education).
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others often take for granted. 159
Civil rights statutes-including the Civil Rights Act of 196410 and the
Americans with Disabilities Actt6 -have outlawed outright discrimination
against people of color, women, and people with disabilities (which, in many
circumstances, includes people with disease)16  in employment, public
accommodations, and other contexts. 63 However, the mere prohibition of
discrimination does not result in its elimination.164 Moreover, while it is
important for state actors and employers to ban bad acts, laws cannot ban all
bad behavior and do not necessarily lead to the removal of bad thoughts,
including stereotyping and stigma.'65
The causes and effects of discrimination, stigma, social hostility, and
stereotypical assumptions as experienced by people based on race, class,
159. See Herek, Illness, Stigma, and AIDS, supra note 141, at 116 ("AIDS-related stigma is
manifested in a variety of ways. HIV-infected people continue to be rejected by friends and
relatives, fired or forced to resign from their jobs .... ."); Renslow Sherer & David Goldberg,
HIVDisease and Access to Care: A Crisis Within a Crisis, in ITJUST AIN'T FAIR, supra note 24, at 149,
155 [hereinafter Sherer & Goldberg, HIVDisease] ("No discussion of access to HIV-related care
would be complete without an analysis of discrimination against HIV-infected persons.... It
manifests itself through apathy and neglect, denial of basic rights, and outright violence.").
160. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h (1994).
161. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12218 (1994).
162. Whether disease constitutes disability can be a complex determination. See generally
Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1998) (exploring the complex
tensions that may result from being found disabled under federal civil rights provisions and
commenting on the ways in which this finding may, but ought not to, preclude one from being
found disabled under federal benefits programs); Cha R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under
FederalAnti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000) (describing difficulties that have arisen in implementation of the
ADA that were not anticipated by its drafters, including defining what it means to be
"disabled").
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (banning discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (3) (1994) (acknowledging
that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication,
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services" and
explaining that the ADA is designed to eradicate this discrimination).
164. Enactment of a nondiscrimination statute merely provides someone who has
experienced discrimination with a vehicle by which to seek redress, usually in the form of
financial compensation.
165. See Burris, Surveillance supra note 21, at S122 (noting that an HIV-infected church
congregant who is shunned by his fellow congregants lacks a cognizable legal claim against
those who shun him, as does an abandoned HIV-infected woman whose husband has left her).
Burris further observes that, even when law provides a remedy in theory, it may not be effective
in practice, and further that "for some people, law is a hostile or alien force that is either
inaccessible or positively dangerous to encounter." Id. (citations omitted); see also Frederick X.
Gibbons, Stigma and Interpersonal Relationships, in DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 146, at
123, 125-26 (noting that despite the enactment of progressive legislation designed to better
integrate persons with disabilities in the general population, individual attitudes have been slow
to change because nonstigmatized persons often avoid interaction with stigmatized individuals).
[20011
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gender, or an intersection of one or more of these characteristics,' (1 are
numerous and have been explored in detail elsewhere."t  This Article
accepts the well-drawn conclusion that they continue to negatively affect
poor people, people of color, and women, not only in the more obvious
settings of work and public accommodations, but also in facilitating the
spread of disease.16s
The spread of communicable disease is greatly facilitated when
individuals do not have access to health care providers or do not go to them
because of a lack of trust. When this occurs, disease is neither detected nor
treated, and it remains capable of being transmitted to others' 9 Access to
health care in the United States is highly dependent on employment status,
as it is extraordinarily difficult to gain access to health insurance in any
other way.170 Whether in times of prosperity or economic hardship, women
166. Critical theorists have drawn our attention to the multiple burdens chat people may
experience when they do not fit within "one category" of race, gender, sexual orientation, and
the like. For example, see Kimberl Crenshaw, Demarginaliing the Intas aion fRare and S'Yr A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscimination Doctrine Feminist Theoj and Antiracist P ditfir 1989 U.
CH. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989) ("Black women are sometimes excluded from feminist theor)
and antiracist policy discourse because both are predicated on a discrete set of experiences that
often does not accurately reflect the interaction of race and gender.:) and Dorothy E. Ruberts,
Reconstructing the Patient Starting uith Women of Color, in FEMINISM A.ND BioETII5, supra note 41,
at 116, 116-22 ("Black women experience various forms of oppression simultaneouI), as a
complex interaction of race, gender, and class that is more than te sum of its parts."). & also
infra notes 192, 268 (discussing new theories that seek better to explain the experiences of
people whose identities are not uni-dimensional, such as African American lesbians, Asian men
with disabilities, and Caucasian low-income women).
167. For a more thorough examination of these phenomena, see generally APrULT\IO'S
OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN'S LIV.S: SEX, VtOLENcE, WORK.uND REPRODULTON (ID.
Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996); CTrMCAL RACE FFtlNISM: A READER (Adrien Wing, ed., 1997);
CRTIC.L RAcE THEORY (KimberlM Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); FE2.ttNISf LEGAL THEORv:
FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
168. See Burris, Law as a Structural Factor, supra note 23, at 1776 ('Dicimination against
women, de facto and de jure, renders them disproportionately vulnerable to HIW/ADS.
Women's subordination in the family and in public life is one of the root causes of de rapidly
increasing rate of infection among women . . .")(citation omitted); Herek, lllnas, Stigra, and
AIDS, supra note 141, at 131 (asserting that "[flears of harassment, job discrimination, and loss
of insurance coverage may deter [people at risk for HIV] from being tested [or treated]");
Lorna Scott McBarnette, African American limen, in RACE, GENDER, A.,D HEALTH, supra note
155, at 43, 63 ("[P]ersistent barriers to preventive and primary care senices influenced not onl
the quality of life but also the patterns of illness observed among African Americans ....
[A]fter decades of universal access to health services, health inequalities are persisting and
increasing. . . ."); Susan Sherwin, Feminism and Bioeatdis, in FEMItSMAND BIOETHICS, supra note
41, at 47,55-56 (exploring the exclusion ofiwomen from research studies).
169. See Name Brands, supra note 88, at 2106-08 (asserting that, becaue many of dte
populations most affected by AIDS and HIV generally distrust government and health officials,
it is likely that these individuals will avoid seeking medical care); infra notes 1G9-77 and
accompanying text (providing examples and a discussion of how access to health care %-ies
based on economic class).
170. See Rebecca LewinJob Loc: lUIPAA Sohe theJob Mility PnA e'?, 2 U. PA.J. LB. &
EmP. L 507, 509 (2000) ("[M]ost Americans receive their heallth insurance through their
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and people of color consistently experience the greatest amount of under-
and unemployment-and hence, less access to health insurance and health
care.' 7' Even programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, should one be
eligible for their coverage, are insufficient to meet the health care needs of
most people.172
Access to health care is stymied for less obvious reasons as well. For
centuries, poor people, women, and people of color have experienced
mistreatment in health care settings.173 Examples abound. Historically,
doctors experimented on female slaves before using new surgical
procedures on white women.' 74 The federal government conducted the
infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study from 1932 until 1972 to study the ravages
of untreated syphilis on Black men and continued long after antibiotics and
other treatments became available.1t 5 Through the 1960s and 1970s women
of color were subjected to horrific forms of sterilization abuse, either where
doctors conditioned performing abortions or delivering babies on the
woman's being sterilized or where government doctors threatened
withdrawal of welfare benefits unless they could perform the irreversible
procedure. 17
6
employers .... The minority of insured Americans ... either purchase it individually, obtain it
through groups unrelated to employment (such as geographically-based groups or religious
and fraternal organizations), or receive it through state or federal programs, such as Medicare
and Medicaid.").
171. See McBarnette, supra note 168, at 61 ("[G]aps in insurance coverage restrict access to
services for growing numbers of the population, and African American women are especially
vulnerable because of... unemployment and marginal employment.").
172. See Marian Gray Secundy, Lack of a Moral Consensus on Health Care: Focus on Minority
Elderly, in ITJUST AIN'T FAIR, supra note 24, at 56, 57 ("Currently, co-payments and deductibles
are rising and are increasing out-of-pocket costs so that in 1991, Medicare paid less than half of
the health expenditures of the elderly in the United States."); Young, Toward an Ethic of Care,
supra note 158, at 249 ("The 'safety net' intended by Medicaid fails millions; complex eligibility
requirements leave many poor families among the estimated 37 million uninsured.").
173. See Roberts, Reconstructing the Patient, supra note 166, at 123 ("It is well documented
that race and class differences affect the type of care patients receive.") (citing Council on
Ethical andJudicial Affairs, Black-WhiteDisparities in Health Care 263JAMA 2344 (1990); Mark B.
Wennecker & Arnold M. Epstein, Racial Inequalities in the Use of Procedures for Patients with Ischemic
Heart Disease in Massachusetts, 261 JAMA 253 (1989); Robert J. Blendon et al., Access to Medical
CareforBlack and White Americans: A Matter of Continuing Concern, 261 JAMA 278 (1989)).
174. See Roberts, Reconstructing the Patien supra note 166, at 123-24 (quoting GJ. BARKER-
BENFIELD, THE HORRORS OF THE HALF-KNOWN LIFE: MALE ATTITUDES TOWARD VOMEN AND
SEXUALITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURYANIERICA 101 (1976)).
175. See Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock, Introduction: Ethical Theory and Public
Health, in NEW ETHICS, supra note 2, at 3, 20 (describing the horrors of the Tuskegee study); see
also BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET, supra note 19, at 157-58. See generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD
BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1981) (exploring in-depth the ramifications of
the Tuskegee study).
176. SeeAida L. Giachello, Latino Women, in RACE, GENDER, AND HEALTH, supra note 155, at
121, 152 ("Since the mid-1930s, sterilization has been used extensively as a means of population
control in Puerto Rico. By 1982, over 40% of women aged 15 to 49 who were ever married had
[20011
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Differences in treatment continue to persist, some less obviously than
the historical examples, but equally pernicious in their effect. For example,
one study found that poor women with cervical cancer treated by rotating
residents in a community clinic were more likely to be treated surgically with
hysterectomies, generally an unnecessarily drastic measure, than more
affluent women who were treated by the same physician in a faculty clinic. '
Other studies have found that Black patients were less likely than white
patients to be treated with life-saving surgeries and other aggressive
treatments."78 At least one study found that "'the darker a woman's skin
and/or the lower her place on the economic scale'... [the] more likely
[she was] to be considered 'difficult' and 'to be talked down to, scolded, and
patronized.'"" 9 In turn, these women were given inadequate explanations
about their conditions and options, and ultimately received poorer care. ' '
Finally, clinical studies continue to exclude women, yielding skewed data
about both the natural history of disease as well as the safety and efficacy of
drugs being used to treat disease."
It should not be surprising that people living with disease also
experience stigma, social hostility, and social risk that is linked to their
disease condition-regardless of their class, race, gender, or sexual
orientation. This ostracization can result in severe employment
been sterilized."); Annette Dula, Bioathics: The Nwd for a Dialogue u'ith Afnean Areritan, in IT
JuSTALN'T FAIR, supra note 24, at 11, 17 [hereinafter Dula, Bietthics] (noting that "by 1963 one-
third of the women in Puerto Rico had been sterilized") (citations omitted).
177. See Roberts, Reomnstructing the Patient, supra note 166, at 123 (citing SCE FISHER, IN THE
PATIENT'S BEST INTEREST: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF MEDICAL DECISIONS (1938)).
178. See Dula, Bioehis, supra note 176, at 12 ("The mortality rate for heart disease in black
males is twice that for white males; research has shown that blacks tend to receive les aggressive
treatment for this condition."); Sherer & Goldberg, HlVDiscase, supra note 159, at 153 ("In one
study... whites were nearly tice as likely to have been offered AZT [(the first anti-HIV drug))
as nonwhites ... 2').
179. Roberts, Reconstruding the Patient, supra note 166, at 123 (quoting ALEXALNDPR DINDAS
TODD, INTLMATE ADvERsAuIs: CULTURAL CONFLICT BETEEN DocToRS AND WMoiE P.TIEN-S,
at 77 (1989)).
180. See i. at 123; see also Young, supra note 158, at 254 V'Disrepect and inferior
treatment-or the perception of inferior treatment-diminish the power of learning and
combine to discourage many from any type of health care until it is too late. Doctor-patient
encounters become... 'micropolitical situations'....").
181. See generaly Sara Goering, omen and Undcrsm'id Populations: Access to Clinical Trials, in
ITJUSTAIN'T FAIR, supra note 24, at 182, 186-87 (discussing clinical trials on cardiac health and
HIV infection performed on white men, the results of which proved inaccurate for women);
Vanessa Merton, Ethial Obstades to the Participation of llbmen in Biomxdical Reearch, in FEMILI1SM
AND BIOETHICS, supra note 41, at 216, 216 (discussing the negative effects of excluding women
from clinical trials).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994) ("[I]ndividuals uith disabilities are a discrete and
insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a histoq- of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society..."); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigna, and "Dia tilit','86 VA. L REV. 397,401
(2000) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Subordination] ("Even though people with 'disabilides' may have
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discrimination, social exclusion, and even rejection from health care
facilities and by health care providers. 18 3 The degree of shunning often is
linked to such factors as who is likely to get the disease, is4 whether it is
fatal,lss whether it is disfiguring, or whether it is sexually transmitted .
8 7
Thus, disease is socially constructed: society creates layers of meaning about
disease that extend well beyond the medical aspects of illness-and most of
these meanings are not complimentary. 1SS
vastly different medical conditions-indeed, many may experience no medical limitations at
all-they have one crucial thing in common: a socially assigned group status that
tends to result in systematic disadvantage and deprivation of opportunity."). In prohibiting
discrimination against people with disabilities, the ADA has provided legal protection for many
people with chronic illness, including HIV. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998)
(holding that asymptomatic HIV can be a disability under the ADA).
183. See MARK S. SENAK, HIV, AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE TO OUR RIGHTS AND
CHALLENGES 86 (1996) ("Discrimination did not occur merely between individuals; whole
institutions became deeply involved. Healthcare facilities, certainly insurance companies, and
even government bureaucracies such as social security offices discriminated against people with
AIDS in the most obvious ways. ... "); see also Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 79 (N.D. Ohio
1994) (holding a hospital liable under the ADA for a physician's refusal to admit an HIV-
positive patient for treatment of an allergic reaction); Abby Ellen, Seeking Laws for Disabilities of
the Attitude, N.Y. TtIMES, July 26, 2000, at GI ("[D]espite federal law to protect them against
discrimination in hiring and promotion, and despite efforts by companies to recruit and train
them and make job sites more accessible to them, the disabled continue to face a huge struggle
for full workplace equality."). See generally Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 182 (describing
the range of social and economic exclusion experienced by people with disabilities, including
those with disease).
184. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at xv ("[Tihere was a long tradition in the West of seeing
disease as [God's] punishment for sin-especially for sexual sins .... [D]espite America's
apparent modernity, many people in this country-including many of those in power-were
convinced that the healthy were saved and the sick were damned."); see also SONTAG, supra note
19, at 16 (1989) ("In contrast to cancer,... AIDS is understood in a premodern way, as a
disease incurred by people both as individuals and as members of a 'risk group'-that neutral-
sounding, bureaucratic category which also revives the archaic idea of a tainted community that
illness hasjudged.").
185. See SONTAG, supra note 19, at 38 ("A fiction about soft or easy deaths [such as that
which accompanied tuberculosis] is part of the mythology of most diseases that are not
considered shameful or demeaning.").
186. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 25 (discussing how leprosy and its "slow and loathsome
disintegration" was among the most feared diseases of the European Middle Ages); SONTAG,
supra note 19, at 40 ("And however lethal, illnesses like heart attacks and influenza that do not
damage or deform the face never arouse the deepest dread.").
187. SeeBRANDT, No MAGIC BULLEr supra note 19, at5:
Since the late nineteenth century, venereal disease has been used as a symbol for a
society characterized by a corrupt sexuality. Venereal disease has typically been
used as a symbol of pollution and contamination, and cited as a sign of deep-seated
sexual disorder, a literalization of what was perceived to be a decaying social order.
188. According to historian Allan Brandt:
Fundamental to the notion that disease is socially constructed is the premise that it
is profoundly shaped by both biological and cultural variables .... Only if we
understand the way disease is influenced by social and cultural forces-issues of
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In conclusion, disparities abound in many aspects of social interaction,
including perception of and ability to confound instances of social risk.
These disparities often cross lines of race, gender, poverty, and illness, and
are compounded by socially constructed responses to multiple sources of
identity. Common to all is an experience of powerlessness-an inability to
create a reality devoid of such socially constructed inequities.
3. Autonomy and Agency- Bioethics and Democracy
The value of autonomy'8 and its first cousin, agency,'"3 are dominant in
theories of American democracy, 91 as well as in American medical law and
ethics.192 While few would dispute the importance of these values in either
class, race, ethnicity, and gender--can we effectively address its biological
dimension. A 'social construction' reveals tacit values, it becomes a s)mbol for
ordering and explaining aspects of the human experience. In this light, medicine
is notjust affected by social, economic, and political variables-it is embedded in
them.
Id; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing social construction of disease).
189. &e LwANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METMP-SICS OF MOR.LS 41 Uames W.
Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g 3d ed. 1993) (1785) ("[Alutonomy is the ground of the dignity
of human nature and of every rational nature."); Daniel Callahan, Aulonomy: A Moral GcJd, Net a
Moral Obsession, 14 HAsrTNS CENT. RFP. 40, 40 (1984) ("Autonomy can... be understood as
the basis for moral enfranchisement, establishing [one's] standing as an equal in the
community and [one's] liberty to pursue [one's] own ends."); Willard Ga~lin, In Defenns of the
Dignity of BeingHuman, 14 HASTNGs CENT. REP. 18, 18 (1984) ("Kant defined the special value
of our species as residing in our autonomy.").
190. As described by Tracy E. Higgins, "The use of the term ag-eny, instead of the more
common autonomy, is intended to denote not simply freedom from external constraints, but an
internal capacity to develop and act on conceptions of oneself that are not defined by
oppressive notions of gender[, race, or class]." Higgins, supra note 32, at 1664 n.31; see Kathryn
Abrams, Redefining Women's Agency: A Response to Professor llllliamn 72 IND. LJ. 459, 461 (1997)
(emphasizing that personal accounts of agency extend to individuals "shoing alert attention to
their numerous, ongoing needs-even under hideously oppressive circumstances"); Susan H.
Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Sodet 72 L"ND. UJ. 417, 434 (1997) [hereinafter
Williams, A Feminist Rossessment] ("[I]t is recognition by another person with whom you need to
interact that provides the experience ofagency.").
191. SeeHiggins, supra note 32, at 1664 ('[The] assumption ofagency-of citizens' freedom
and ability to define their own ends--is... essential to all mainstream constitutional theory.");
see also CAss R. SuNsTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITLrioN' 176-78 (1997):
The notion ofautonomy should refer... to decisions reached ith a full and vivid
aw-reness of available opportunities, with all relevant information, and without
illegitimate or excessive constraints on the process of preference formation.
Government action might ... be justified on grounds of autonomy Owten the
public seeks to implement, through democratic processes culminating in law,
widely held social aspirations or collective desires.
192. See Roger B. Dworkin, MAedical Law and Fthics in the Post-Autonoro Age, 68 LD. UJ. 727,
727 (1993) ("Concern for patient autonomy in the liberal individualist sense dominates the
rhetoric of American medical law and medical ethics.").
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context, some scholars critique this theoretical underpinning as
insufficiently protective of the rights of those who are not part of majority
culture and politics. 9 3 Indeed, if traditional notions of autonomy, or
perhaps more appropriately agency, depend on an individual's ability to
"define her preferences free from politically relevant constraints," t '9 4 it must
be understood to be nearly impossible for those traditionally
disenfranchised from political (or social) power to assert a pure, or full,
conception of agency.'9 5
193. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 166, at 140 (urging legal theorists to examine the
compounded effect of race and gender on discrimination of Black women because "in race
discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of sex- or class-privileged
Blacks, in sex discrimination cases, the focus is on race- and class-privileged women,.,
marginaliz[ing] those who are multiply burdened.... "); Angela P. Harris, Race andEssentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 615 (1990):
[L]egal theory, including feminist legal theory, has been entranced for too long
and to too great an extent by the voice of 'We the People.' In order to energize
legal theory, we need to subvert it with narratives and stories, accounts of the
particular, the different, and the hitherto silenced... women of color.
See also Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1189 (1994) ("[To
an important extent, women's preferences are socially constructed and constrained. The state
does not simply respond to expressed desires; it plays an active role in legitimating, suppressing,
or redirecting them."); Robin L. WestJurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988)
("[AilI of our modem legal theory-by which I mean 'liberal legalism' and 'critical legal theory'
collectively-is essentially and irretrievably masculine."); Williams, A Feminist Assessment, supra
note 190, at 426 (observing that traditionally "[ajutonomy is a characteristic belonging to
individual human beings, conceived as separate from and independent of the social context in
which they exist[; yet, m]any feminists ... claim that women's desires are often not autonomous
in this sense because they are the result of sexist social conditioning").
194. Higgins, supra note 32, at 1664.
195. Id. Higgins uses the term "incomplete agency" to express:
the idea that, in a range of legal contexts, women's choices should be understood
as neither fully free nor completely determined. Taking into account the ways in
which women are constrained differently from men has revealed situations in
which facially neutral assumptions about responsibility and choice contribute to
women's equality.
Id. (citing Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 304, 346-48 (1995) (formulating a theory of "partial agency")). Higgins notes
that "[tihe term 'incomplete agency' is not meant to imply that complete agency is possible.
Rather, it conveys the idea that women's agency is incomplete relative to men's agency or
relative to the agency assumed by mainstream theory." Id. at 1691 n.170; see Williams, A Feminist
Assessment, supra note 190, at 432 ("[A]utonomy is neither a pre-existing condition to be
assumed for all persons, nor is it an end-state that can be taken for granted once achieved.
Instead, it is a process... that must be continually ongoing in order for a person to be
autonomous.") (citations omitted).
Feminist social construction theory, which is "concerned not so much by the way
patriarchy limits women (implying external constraints) but by the way it creates or defines
women (implying internal as well as external constraints)," also bears on this discussion.
Higgins, supra note 32, at 1691, 1665 n.34 (citing NancyJ. Hirschmann, Toward a Feminist Theory
of Freedom, 24 POL. THEORY 46, 51 (1996)). Higgins defined social construction as:
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Scholars also traditionally have recognized the principle of autonomy as
"the pivotal value"19 in bioethics.' 97 In the past decade, however, a growing
number have critiqued the discipline's orientation around principlism t '1
and its insufficient attention to the social context of the people whose lives
these principles have sought to guide.'9 As a result, the field of bioethics has
experienced a decided shift in consciousness, with increased attention being
paid to empiricism,2 0 0 pragmatism,20' narrative bioethics,- 2 and feminist and
the idea that human beings and their world are in no sense given or natural but
the product of historical configurations or relationships. The desires and
preferences we have, our beliefs and values, our way of defining the world are all
shaped by the particular constellation of personal and institutional social
relationships that constitute our individual and collective histories.
M
196. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms, supra note 137, at 402. The three other highly %slued
principles employed in bioethics are justice, beneficence, and nonmalfeas-ance. These
principles, originally identified in the Belmont Report, THE BEusOhTr REPORT: EnIc.%.
PRINIPnLEs AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESFARcit (Nat'l
Comm. for the Prot. of Human Subjects of Biomedical & Behavioral Research ed., 1979), have
been widely popularized through Tom L. Beauchamp's andJames F. Childress's, PRLNPI.FES OF
BiotrDIcALETHIcs (4th ed. 1994).
197. "[Bioethics] is the study and formulation of the ethics of health care and the
biological sciences .... [It is] a collaboration of several disciplines (including philosophy, law,
medicine, science, theology, social science, and economics], with their relative importance
shifting over time." Susan M. Wolf, Introdudion: Gender and Feminism in Biahihfm in FE.%ItiS'%t &
BrOTics, supra note 41, at 3, 7 [hereinafter Wolf, Inlroduaion]. The study of bioethics
primarily developed out of concern for "the protection of vulnerable patients and research
subjects, the relationship between medical and scientific fact and social meaning, and the ethics
that should guide physicians and scientists." Id. at 10; see also DAVIDJ. Rom.wN, STRA ,GERES.AT
THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIoErHics TmNSFORMED MDICal. DECISION MAING
(1991) (discussing the change in relationship dynamics between doctors and patients
beginning in the mid-1960s).
198. See Woltf Shifting Paradigm, supra note 137, at 400 (CPrinciplism is an approach to
reasoning about ethical problems that proceeds in the main not deductively from higher-order
theory, or inductively from fine-grained attention toward the situation presented, but from
middle-level principles down to the case presented."); see also John D. Arras, Pnncipks and
Particulart.: TheRoks of Cases in Biodhics, 69 IND. UJ. 983, 986 (1994) (discussing the "mid-level
principles" that have become "the dominant paradigm for serious work in bioethics'1.
199. Seeg, e AFRIcAN-AMEuIC.N"PERSPECrTIVESON BIOMEDICAdLEThIlCSx.ii (HarleyE. Flack
& Edmund D. Pellegrino eds., 1992) ("[T]he ethical principles of health care (e.g., autonomy,
justice, beneficence) are the same for all[; however,] African Americans invoke these principles
differently, based on the unique historical experiences that have shaped their moral
philosophy."); RebeccaJ. Cook, Feminism and the Four Pindples, in PRINCIPLES OF HFALTH1 C .rE
ETHICS 193, 193-206 (Raanan Gillon & Ann Lloyd eds., 1994) (critiquing the four principles of
bioethics-autonomy, beneficence, nonmalfeasance, and justice--from a feminist perspecthe);
Annette Dula & Sara Goering, Infrodudion, in ITJUsT AIN'T FAIR, supra note 24, at 4 (noting that
"the traditional ethical framework[,] in an effort to be impartial and colorblind[, fails to see
particular groups in their unique social contexts"); Wolf, ShiftingParadigns, supra note 137, at
400 (observing the historic "failure of bioethics to attend to differences associated uith gender,
race, ethnicity, and insurance status").
200. See generally Carl E. Schneider, Biochics with a Human Face, 69 IND. J. 1075 (1994)
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race-attentive critiques.2 0
3
Why are such concerns important to consider? Indeed, why are the
neutral principles of bioethics, a discipline inherently concerned with
examining and correcting inequities, insufficient to correct any injustice that
may exist? Traditional "principlism," 2°4 while useful in many ways, has been
part of a deductive philosophy that favors "abstract rules and principles that
disregard individual differences and context [, and that embraces a] liberal
individualism that obscure[s] the importance of groups."20 5 In many
contexts, these neutral principles fail "to attend to differences associated
with gender, race, ethnicity, and insurance status." 20 6
At the heart of this critique is a belief in "the moral significance of
groups, " 207 or perhaps more accurately, a belief in the importance of
(discussing ways in which empiricism could and should be more fully integrated into bioethical
scholarship).
201. See Wolf, Shifting Paradigms, supra note 137, at 398 (observing a shift toward
incorporating pragmatism into bioethical discussions).
202. See Susan M. Wolf, Foreword Bioethics-From Mirror to Window, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUIB. L.
REv. 183, 186 (1996) [hereinafter Wolf, Foreword] ("Instead of resting bioethics on principlism,
writers advocate a revival of casuistry, narrative bioethics, a rich ethnography, and other
methodologies.").
203. See generally Dula & Goering, supra note 24 (discussing African American perspectives
on biomedical ethics); Margaret Olivia Little, Why a Feminist Approach to Bioethics?, 6 KENNEDY
INST. ETHics J. 1 (1996) (describing how feminist theory makes a unique contribution to
bioethics); Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, in FEMINISM AND BIOETHICS, supra
note 41 (describing the views of feminist theorists in challenging the traditional bioethics);
Wolf, Shifling Paradigms, supra note 137 (noting the increasing awareness of race and gender
differences in bioethics). These shifts in bioethics mirror those that previously started to shape
new ways of thinking in other disciplines, including law, jurisprudence, and philosophy of law.
SeeWolf, ShiflingParadigms, supra note 137, at 401 ("The new debates on method and attention
to gender arrived late compared to [other] fields. ").
204. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Principles and Other Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics, 69 IND, LJ.
955, 955-56 (1994) [hereinafter Beauchamp, Principks in Bioethics] ("Moral principles are simply
relatively general norms of conduct that describe obligations, permissible actions, and ideals of
action .... If principles are adequately expressed, relatively more particular moral rles and
judgments are supported by, though not deduced from, the principles.").
205. Wolf, Introduction, supra note 197, at 14.
206. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms, supra note 137, at 400. The four principles become easy
targets for criticism because they do facilitate deductive reasoning. In context, however, it is
evident that Beauchamp and Childress "never proposed a completely deductive system whose
principles were merely to be applied to specific cases." Wolf, Introduction, supra note 197, at 16;
see also Beauchamp, Principles in Bioethics, supra note 204, at 959 ("Because principles are stated
at a lofty level of abstraction, little practical content can be drawn directly from the principles,
and that content is still subject to competing interpretations. More precision through
specification is therefore essential for regulative and decision-making contexts."). Still, Wolf
notes that "[w]e have developed a bioethics primarily for the person with access to health care
and with a doctor likely to listen to, understand, and respect that person. It is bioethics for the
privileged." Wolf, Introduction, supra note 197, at 18.
207. Susan Sherwin, Feminism and Bioethics, supra note 168, at 52 (observing that there is a
'moral significance" to recognizing those who are "disadvantaged, dependent, exploited,
responsible for the care of others, or othervise limited in their ability to assert their rights in
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recognizing that one's views are shaped by one's identity as belonging to a
particular group or set of groups. Standpoint theory helps us to understand
this argument. Traditional standpoint theory suggests that each person's"point of view, expertise, and authority are situated and partial."" Critical
theorists recognize both that "there is no neutral standpoint from which to
impose... moral principles and rules"20 and that some standpoints, namely
those of the dominant, are more valued than others.2 10 As such, "[t]he
standpoints of subjugated groups... provide a corrective lens for the
myopia for the dominant group"21 1 and may provide a conceptual
fi-amework to correct past injustice.
Postmodernists are willing to take this reasoning a step further,
observing that: "Otherness, for all of its associations with oppression and
inferiority, is much more than an oppressed, inferior condition. Rather, it is
a way of being, thinking, and speaking that allows for openness, plurality,
diversity, and difference."21 2 With these understandings of standpoint theory,
the moral significance of groups-and the importance of attending to their
voices and perspectives-becomes much more apparent, as does the
recognition that insistence on using neutral principles is likely to disservice
outsider groups and serve to reinforce the status quo.21
competition with the claims of other persons"); Wolf, Introduction, supra note 197, at 5; see also
Wolf, Introduction, supra note 197, at 6 (noting the failure of bioethics "to recognize the moral
significance of groups, to pay attention to the particularity of experience, and to analyze
differences among individuals").
208. Mahowald, supra note 41, at 98.
209. Wolf, Introduction, supra note 197, at 15.
210. SeeIRIS MARIONYOUNG,JUSTICEAND THE POLUICS OFDIF-RENcE 58-59 (1990):
To experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the dominant
meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one's owm group
invisible at the same time as the stereotype one's group and mark it out as the
Other. Cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant groups'
experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm.
See also Mahowald, supra note 41, at 100 ("[S]ome perspectives are privileged in comparison
with others... "); Tong, Feminist Approaduzs to Bioahis, supra note 203, at 87:
[W]hat traditional theory passed off as objective and impartial knovdedge was
nothing of the sort. Like all knowledge, [it] was the product of a set of
experiences-... the experiences of mostly white, privileged men. Because
women's experiences were not encoded in traditional theory, that theory
constituted itself in a very subjective, partial, 'male' manner.
(citation omitted).
211. Mahowald, supra note 41, at 101.
212. Id. (quoting ROSFMARIE TONG, FEML-ITsrTHOUGHT: A COMPREHENSIE IN 'rOncUcnoN
219 (1989)); see also id. at 99 ("Truth as known and knowable is inevitably partial, but not
relative. Although we cannot achieve omniscience, we can minimize our errors or mistakes
through collaboration"). This is not an acceptance of relativism, but an ackno wiedgment of
"the epistemological validity ofstandpoint theory." Id.
213. See Shenin, Feminism and Bi-ehkcs, supra note 168, at 49 ("[E]thics as it is usually
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An example, borrowed from Hilde and James Lindemann Nelson, may
shed light on how facially neutral rules interfere with achieving justice for
outsider communities. 214 In the face of limited resources to provide health
care services, some experts had proposed limiting the life-extending health
care available to elderly adults by cutting off benefits at a certain age. 2 5
Regardless of its merits, the proposal is troublesome because of a potentially
hidden problem: it would have a disproportionate impact on the ability of
women-who, on the average, outlive men-to gain access to health care.210
As such, this "neutral rule" would not, in fact, have a neutral impact.217
As this example reflects, "[P]ublic policies that ignore differences
between a dominant group and groups with less power tend to create a false
neutrality that favors the dominant group: its characteristics are taken as the
norm, while groups with other characteristics are marked as deviant.2 18
However, as Martha Minow has observed,219 there is a danger that focusing
pursued may actually be supportive of the oppressive status quo."); Wolf, Introduction, supra note
197, at 21 ("[T]here is no such thing as a neutral bioethics, one that views problems from a
vantage point unsituated in the moral and political universe.") (citing Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth
Potter, Introduction: When Feminists Intersect Epistemology, in FEMINIsT EPISTEMOLOGIES 13 (Linda
Alcoff& Eliz. Potter eds., 1992)). "[M]oral theories are partial and defective when they speak of
the interests, values, and rational choices of individuals as abstract entities, as if the personal
histories and social contexts of persons are irrelevant." Sherwin, supra, at 52; see also Malowald,
supra note 41, at 99 ("The proposal of an impersonal standpoint is ethically as well as
epistemologically problematic because definers of the standpoint- usually the dominant
group-attempt to impose their partial vision on others by proclaiming its universal
applicability.").
214. Hilde Lindemann Nelson &James Lindemann Nelson,Justice in the Allocation of Health
Care Resources, in FEMiINISM AND BIOETHICs, supra note 41, at 351-61 [hereinafter Nelson &
Nelson, Allocation of Health Care Resources].
215. Id.
216. Id. at 361 (citing A PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS: 1992 (Am. Ass'n of Retired Persons
& Admin. on Aging eds., 1992)).
217. Similarly, the fact that most people receive health insurance coverage from their
employers has a disproportionately negative impact on women and people of color-
populations that traditionally make up a greater proportion of the un- and under-employed. Id.
at 362.
218. Id. at 355-56 (citing MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION & AMERICAN LAw (1990) [hereinafter MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE]); see
Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1632-33 (1990)
("[T]he call to context.., reflects a critical argument... that prevailing legal and political
norms have used the form of abstract, general, and universal prescriptions while neglecting the
experiences and needs of women of all races and classes, people of color, and people without
wealth.").
219. See MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 218, at 20 (coining the phrase
"the dilemma of difference" and noting that "[tihe stigma of different may be recreated both
by ignoring and by focusing on it.... The problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by
treatment members of minority groups the same as members of the majority and by treating the
two groups differently."); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 11
(1987) (noting that when powerful professionals use categories such as gender and race to
presume objective differences in people's needs and experiences, injustice may result); Minow
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solely, or excessively, on difference may actually "perpetuate the oppression
and marginalization the group has experienced in the past" ' The key to
achieving proper balance in attending to the needs of the disenfranchised,
then, is to trace even facially neutral abuses of power employed to reinforce
the status quo and to exploit them as the fault lines along which to
challenge laws and practices that traditionally harm the disenfranchised.-.
How does one accomplish this balance in the context of public health
law and policy? If one accepts that there is "moral significance" to
inequalities based on the experiences of outsider groups, and if one believes
in the importance of focusing on "those historically least served and most
harmed," 222 it is difficult to continue to subscribe to the traditional model of
autonomy,9 which is one steeped in "liberal individualism.. 4
Acknowledging the deficiencies in the autonomy theory and the
& Spelman, In Contex, supra note 218, at 1598 (observing that just treatment of all people
requires us to recognize relevant differences in different contexts).
220. Nelson & Nelson, Allocation of Health Care Resoures, supra note 214, at 356.
221. See idU at 355 (noting that a critical analysis "must put its focus first on power.") (citing
YOUNG, supra note 210); see also Wolf, Si fting Paradigas, supra note 137, at 406 ("[Blioethical
analysis requires attention to power in biomedical settings: who has it, how it works, and how to
fix the current inequities.... [This] analysis of power and morality camnot proceed without
careful attention to context and difference.").
222. Wolf, Introduction, supra note 197, at 23; see also Higgins, supra note 32, at 1686 (I-Tihe
enlightened perspectives of marginalized people ought to be treated as having particular
authority."); Williams, A Feminist Reassessment, supra note 190, at 429 ([Fleminism must deelop
a model of personhood that includes some capacity to redefine ourselves and make self-
conscious change in the oppressive conditions that have shaped us.").
I do not seek to undermine the importance of bolstering autonomy, or the indiidual
exercise of agency, in the context of the doctrine of informed consent. Athough efforts to
improve the theory and practice of this doctrine have been incomplete, significant strides have
been made. See KATZ, supra note 17, at 82-84 (asserting that informed consent requires
physician-patient dialogues where patients "are viewed as participants in medical decisions
affecting their lives," but that "[t]he legal vision of informed consent, b:tsed on .,,,*
determination, is still largely a mirage"). However, one criticism of autonomy is that, once
again, too many patients--due to lack of insurance, language difference, or sheer
intimidation-can exercise only "incomplete agency" when faced with medical crises. Higgins,
supra note 32, at 1691; see Cooper, Testingfor Genclic Traits, supra note 67, at 3113-86 (noting that
language and cultural differences, as well as lack of trust, between patient and physician pose
significant barriers to a patient's ability to give informed consent to procedures); Sherwin,
Feminism and Bioethics, supra note 168, at 58 ("[Pleople who are oppressed face systemic barriers
to their freedom, so the choices they are offered in medical contexts are likely to be seriously
restricted by the limited choices available to them in their lives generally."). The most effective
wvay to strengthen this exercise of individual agency is to value "the moral significance of
groups." See supra note 207 and accompanying text (defining this concept as the recognition
that individuals' perspectives are shaped by their membership in particular groups).
223. See Sherwin, Feminism and Bioethics, supra note 168, at 53 ("[Greater equalit is a
precondition for any meaningful exercise of autonomy by seriously disadvantaged members of
society.").
224. Wolf, Introduction, supra note 197, at 16 (noting the "allegiance [of bioethics] not only
to Kant but toJohn Smart Mill .... ").
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importance of group identity, one is left groping for a suitable theory upon
which to rely. This struggle logically leads to an exploration of
communitarianism. Communitarians understand ethics through a lens that
values "establishing and honoring the social rules and cultural ideals that
motivate and regulate a group's practices. As such, they reject the
atomistic approach fundamental to liberal individualism and its
supervaluation of autonomy.2 26 Although the theory is initially attractive, 2 7 it
is problematic in that the communities most esteemed by communitarians--
including families, religious groups, unions, and neighborhoods22 -- have
been historically recognized as being oppressive of outsider groups,
including people with disabilities.2
225. Tong, Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, supra note 203, at 67:
[A) practice is 'any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to the form of activity are realized in
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate
to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods
involved, are systematically extended.
Id. at 69-70 (quoting ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 175
(1981)).
226. SeeJennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8 (1989) ("The now familiar critique by feminists and communitarians is that
liberalism takes atomistic individuals as the basic units of political and legal theory and thus fails
to recognize the inherently social nature of human beings.").
227. See Williams, A Feminist Reassessment, supra note 190, at 422 (remarking that "the notion
of... constitutive communities is very attractive to some feminists because it seems to capture
the more connected sense of self that many women experience and that liberal political theory
has generally ignored or rejected" and because it tends to "blur[] the boundaries and
significance" of the public/private distinction, which has been the subject of significant feminist
criticism.).
228. SeeJeffrey Blustein, Choosing for Others as Continuing a Life Story. The Problem of Personal
Identity Revisited, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 20, 27 (1999) (noting that communitarians view
individuals' identities as being intertwined with the community rather than as "private
spheres"). See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES,
AND THE COMMUNiTARIAN AGENDA (1993) (describing the tenets of the communitarian
movement).
229. See Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 182, at 430 (suggesting that disabilities "aris [e
primarily from the human environment, rather than from anything inherent in an individual's
physical or mental condition"); Harris, supra note 193, at 613 ("At the individual level, black
women have had to learn to construct themselves in a society that denied them full selves.");
Williams, A Feminist Reassessment, supra note 190, at 423-24 (noting that such institutions "have
historically oppressed women and maintained gender hierarchies" and that 'the potential for
oppression is built into the shared identity that communitarians are celebrating"); see also R.
George Wright, Consenting Adults: the Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coerdvely, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 1397, 1436 (1995) (citing Amitai Etzioni, On Communitarianism and Its Inclusive Agenda,
TIKKUN, Sept-Oct. 1993, at 49, 50) ("[Ilt would be foolish to deny that such groups ever act
coercively to enforce compliance with their norms. Groups are often the source of conformist
pressures and intolerant norms."). Notwithstanding this observation, Wright asserts that such
.groups can also crucially reinforce a person's own highest values..." Id. at 1436. He also notes
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The question then becomes how one "combine[s] the claim on the
constitutiveness of social relations with the value of self-determination."3'z
Although there is no easy answer, some scholars have recommended that, by
challenging some of the more rigid aspects of the conceptions of both
communitarianism and autonomy and by incorporating the life experiences
of the people about whom we are talking, we are more likely to facilitate the
creation of more potent expressions of agency.231
For example, Susan Williams proposes a theory of narrative autonomy
that accepts a role of social construction in facilitating autonomy. Her
theory calls for a modification of communitarian understanding of which
groups are to be valued to include those that are "constitutive, personal, and
responsive; [that] need not be found rather than chosen, nor need [to] be
face to face; [but] must be multiple" and "non-oppressive." Kathryn
Abrams recommends "redefining and advocating new configurations of
traditional communities with a potential for oppressive influence," -a 3
recognizing "the need for plural or multiple institutions in any given
woman's life,"2 and the potential benefits of "instrumental institutions or
communities"2 as sources to support an individual's expression of agency.
Others discuss the importance of narrative or case-based systems of ethics,2
that groups can facilitate the development of mutual and deserved trust. Id. at 1433-39.
230. Jennifer Nedelsky, ReconzeivingAutono;y, supra note 226, at 7,9.
231. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text (contrasting notions of incomplete or
partial agency with full agency).
232. Williams, A Feminist Reassement, supra note 190, at 441,444.
233. Abrams, Redefining Iomen' Agent., supra note 190, at 462 (calling for people to 'de-
emphasize some of the traditional configurations that have exposed women to systematic
oppressive treatment," including, for example, understanding a battered woman's commitment
to protecting her children as an impetus for engaging in resistant behavior and as reflective of
the potential for locating non-oppression within the mother-clild dyad, which traditionally is
understood as a source of women's oppression) (citing MLARTHA ALBERTsO. FINEA,, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CE-rVRE TRAGEDIEs 230-33
(1995)).
234. Abrams, Redefining Women's Agent, supra note 190. at 462. Abrams also notes that to
facilitate development and expression of agency, "a woman may need--at least temporaril--to
rely on communities that did not help to foster her earlier sense of self and life story."
235. Id Abrams continues: "A woman ... may develop important elements of... self-
understanding-particularly where it is connected with radical re-visioning or rupture-within
settings that do not involve the experience of being seen and understood by others as a human
being of a particular sort" I&L
236. See Arras, supra note 198, at 988, 1000, 1004 (noting "the intrinsic limitations of ethical
theory for practical purposes," "[t]he renaissance of casuistry, or case-based reasoning," and the
related ascendancy of "'narrative ethics'"). Arras also notes the similarities between "the
casuistical method [and] the method of the common law," especially "given the pivotal and
ubiquitous role of legal cases in the recent history of bioethics.... "Id. at 1001; 5ee aso Sumn H.
Williams, Bioethics andEpistemolo,: A Response toProfessorAras, 69 IND. LJ. 1021,1025-26 (1994):
[T]he narrative systems of ethics beginning to shape the field of bioethics should
be seen as the vanguard of a broad epistemological movement... [that] may carry
with it the seeds of a more far-reaching change in the nature of bioethics if it leads
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237 • 238pragmatism, 2 37 and empiricism. These approaches each emphasize that
the lives of the subjects are essential starting points for conducting ethical
assessments. 23 9
Where does this leave us? I do not attempt to construct new theories of
autonomy or agency or to weave coherent lines of connection magically
among communitarianism, standpoint theory, narrative theory, and
pragmatism. I do, however, take strands of these critiques and intertwine
them to form the theoretical foundation of the Harm Assessment Protocol.
The critiques of autonomy, the recognition of the "moral significance of
groups," and the awareness of the harms caused by social risk require that
we privilege the voices of the disempowered in our struggle to create
effective and sensitive public health policy. Before exploring how the
Protocol accomplishes this, it is important to understand both the political
context and the structural factors that historically have impeded legislators
and policymakers from attending to the voices of the disenfranchised.
C. HABrTS OFLEGISLATURES AND POLICYMAKERS
The problems faced by the disenfranchised must be understood in
more than just the theoretical context. In the realm of public health, the
legislature and related administrative agencies are the primary loci of
activity.24° Not surprisingly, disenfranchised classes often have less ability to
affect the outcome of the disputes and compromises that emanate from the
practitioners to a greater recognition of the interdependence of ethics and
epistemology.
237. See Wolf, Shifting Paradigms, supra note 137, at 399-408 (describing the rise in "a new
pragmatism" that includes feminist, race-attentive, and empirical critiques of the traditional
principlism of bioethics and observing that "[tjhe heart of pragmatist thought is the view that
the ultimate test is always experience" (quoting Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the
Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331, 1341 (1988))).
238. See Schneider, supra note 200, at 1077 ("At this stage in the history of bioethics and
law, we should be ready, and we surely need, to see the core problems of bioethics in all the
factual and moral complexity of reality .... [E]mpirical research provides one useful way to
bring more of that complexity back in."); Wolf, Shifting Paradigms, supra note 137, at 403.04
(discussing the rise of empiricism in bioethical literature). Of course, not all thinkers support
these changes. See id. at 413-14 (noting that pragmatism has been critiqued as potentially being
"anti-theory" and "incompatible with a strong concept of rights").
239. See Arras, supra note 198, at 1001 ("Just as the casuists insist that the weight of
principles resides in the details, so they insist that moral certainty resides in our responses to
paradigmatic cases, rather than in appeals to theory or principle."); Wolf, Foreword, supra note
202, at 187-88 ("Bioethicists have moved from mirror to window, and now look out upon the
world. We require detailed attention to the case as the ground for bioethical analysis .... Race,
gender, insurance status, and cultural context all now demand explicit analysis."); cf Minow &
Spelman, supra note 218, at 1599 (responding to critics that attention to context does not
"inexorably plop[] one into the muck of relativism").
240. See supra Part I.B.1 and note 30 (identifying the parties responsible for creating public
health policy).
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legislative and executive branches. 24' Indeed, among the thousands of
political action committees, lobbyists, and other advocates, it is rare to find
the disenfranchised or their representatives. 42 Moreover, despite its
pervasiveness, the problem of poverty in this country tends to be
geographically confined so that few legislators represent those with the most
significant needs.24 Administrative bodies also do not yet reflect the diversity
of the people whose lives they regulate.2 44
Complicating matters, legislators and policymakers are as susceptible to
bias and fear as the people they serve.2 4 Moreover, they face constant
241. See Stephen F. Ross, LegislativeEnforcement of Equal Proteclion, 72 MIN. L REv. 311,336
(1987) (discussing that, while some groups have the economic or historical power to succeed in
the political arena, 'others due to size, historical discrimination, or other factors, cannot
protect themselves against the 'tyranny of majority' at the state level').
242. See Ellen MX Yacknin, Hdping the Voices of Povert, to be Heard in the Health Care Refaun
Debate, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 143, 155 (1994) ("To be heard in the political arena requires the
power to influence legislation."). Yacknin notes that the poor lack two very important resources.
First, "interest groups and lobbyists effectively use the very thing poor people don't have:
money. Corporations, professional associations and interest groups often have full-time salaried
lobbyists on staff, enabling them to make the steady and close connections ith legislators and
their staff that are essential to being heard." Id. at 156. Second, "[P]rofessional lobbyists spend
careers building and nurturing their contacts so that decisionmakers will listen to them at key
moments. Poor people, on the other hand, spend much of their lives tr)ing to survive." Id.
(footnotes omitted); see also CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLTiON, supra note 32, at 133
(noting that the "one person, one vote rule has arguably impeded minority representation by
making gerrymandering easier" resulting in the underrepresentation of African Americans in
legislatures).
243. See Margaret Weir, BreakingBarriers, Forging New Bond.% I GEO.J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY
77, 77 (1993) ("Many of [the] problems [of the very poor] stem from limited housing
opportunities and the negative consequences of being confined to poor neighborhoods.*).
Barriers such as "inferior schools, poor access to jobs in the growing suburban periphery, and
extremely dangerous neighborhoods" have "created a destructive political dynamic pitting
minority-identified cities against white suburbs." Id.; see also Richard Thompson Ford, Gecgraphy
and Sovereignt,: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Srgregation, 49 STAN. L REv. 1365. 1409 (1997)
(noting that, while geography in sovereignty is used for minority representation, representation
for geographic "communities of interest" does not reach its goals because it is 'both too
malleable to ensure neutrality and too inflexible to serve as a medium for substantive norms");
Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, Comment, Reapportionment and Latino Political Per in California in the
Wake of the 1990 Census, 5 LA RA7 LJ. 28, 59-62 (1992) (finding that implementation of
proportional representation in the legislature would shift the focus of representation from
geographical constituencies to the basis of other cohesive factors).
244. See John C. Duncan, Jr., Multicultural Participation in the Public Hearing Pro:ess Sqr.
Theoretica, Pragnatical and Analeptical Considerations, 24 CoLu.J. EwrL. L 169, 170-73, 186-
207 (1999) (discussing the numerous social and cultural barriers that may interfere with
administrative agencies fulfilling their responsibilities to diverse constituents).
245. See Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct Democrac, Anti-Denoratic, 34 ILLA.IMETTE L REv. 609,
625 (1998) (commenting on Justice Hans Linde's admirable candor when he admitted that
legislators are susceptible to passions that might cause them to enact legislation that
discriminates against those who fall less easily within the 'communal judgment7). &z gn eraly
Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Dezision Mabing, 65 N.D. L RE .
161 (1989) (recognizing in the context of zoning that local legislators posse certain
representative decision making biases that threaten accuracy and legitimacy concerns, and
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pressure from their constituents, lobbyists, and legislative leaders to "do
something" about the social ills they were elected or appointed to eliminate,
246or at least, control. As such, there are increasing demands on these
officials to dissuade them from supporting legislation that is in "the public
interest "24 -which may include supporting the interests of the
disenfranchised, but which may not be popular with constituents, financial
supporters, or the media.48
These factors conspire virtually to ensure that those who are less
powerful to begin with are not likely to be the groups and individuals with
significant sway in our state or federal capitals.249 Predictably, then, those
who are least able to exercise agency in their individual lives also are those
who are least able to exercise agency on a broader scale: in the legislative or
executive (regulatory) arenas.
To some degree, the legislature-and the administrative bodies that
implement its statutory initiatives-functions as intended: it does not allow
disruptive "factions" to control the outcome of debate.25 However, it is
arguing that it is up to the courts to shape regulations to control biases.).
246. SeeJudge Weinstein, Gordon v. Griffith, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 31, 2000, at 36 (quoting Susan
Webb Hammond, The Management of Legislative Offices in the House of Work, as saying, "The
inability of legislators to respond to pressure [from constituents] may undermine their
effectiveness in other legislative activities because of reduced public support and confidence.");
see also Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: TheJudiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and
Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REv. 657, 698 (1988) (noting that "[lI]egislatures are centrally
concerned about the desires of their constituents (or at least those constituents with clout)").
The desires are conveyed in threats of ouster, lobbying, and other signals of political support or
opposition. Id.
247. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutoy.
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 231-32 (1986) (arguing that the
costs of promoting legislation are best absorbed when the benefit is limited to very few,
resulting in a lack of support for legislation in the public interest because the benefit is divided
among so many). "[Tihe laws that are enacted will tend to benefit whichever small, cohesive
special interest groups lobby most effectively. To use a familiar illustration, everyone who buys
milk is harmed by milk price supports, but the small cohesive lobby of milk producers
nonetheless is able to obtain these subsidies." Id. (footnotes omitted); see also HANNA PITKIN,
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 123 (1967) (discussing the "trustee" or "public interest"
model of representation in which a representative is called upon to exercise her own
"conscientious judgment" to benefit the common good).
248. See Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment For Future Generations: A Proposal for a
"Republican"Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 444,502-03 (1996):
While there is certainly a role for popular participation in addressing long-term
problems, it is not clear that the general public is as interested in long-term issues
as it is in short-term ones. Moreover, the public lacks the technical expertise to
predict long-term consequences without the assistance of scientific elites.
249. See Macey, supra note 247, at 231 (predicting that under an economic theory of
legislation, "laws are likely to benefit the few at the expense of the many, because no one has an
incentive to enact laws that benefit the people in general"); see also supra notes 241.43
(discussing limitations on the disenfranchised in the political process).
250. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the democratic model
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inappropriate to characterize concern for the lives of the disenfranchised as
disruptive factionalism. For example, when disease--or other structural
harm-befalls those who already have less sway with their elected or
appointed officials, these representatives ought to bear a particular
responsibility to ensure that the interests of the disenfranchised are
protected. Indeed, I have designed the Harm Assessment Protocol to
encourage legislators and policymakers to recognize the interests of the
disenfranchised and to engage in a deliberative process that helps to ensure
that their interests are protected.
III. THE HAM ASSESSMENT PROTOCOL
A. T _EELiMv'S OF TH HARffAss tENr PROTOCOL
The Harm Assessment Protocol seeks to rectify problems the
disenfranchised encounter that have been analyzed in theoretical terms 31
and are manifest in the practices of legislative bodies. 2 The Protocol is
unique in that it relies on theoretical principles but provides a pragmatic
tool to affect positively the development of public health law and policy.
Building on the critique developed in Part II, the Protocol accepts that
there are limitations on the exercise of agency by disenfranchised groups
and recognizes the "moral significance" of this reality.r'3 It endorses the
notion that communities can serve as viable and important vehicles for
greater expressions of agency, but is not bound to them in a strict
communitarian sense.Z4 Finally, the Protocol privileges the voices of the
disenfranchised in the context of a debate in which their voices rarely are
heard, but does so while continuing to value the importance of preserving
the public health.
The first step of the Protocol (see infra fig. 1) requires that one identify
the "targeted population" of the legislative or policy proposal. It is important
not to fall into the trap of assuming that because one is examining a public
health proposal, the targeted population is the general public. Indeed, this
Protocol does incorporate an assessment of the needs of the general public,
but relegates this consideration to a point later in the process.
Step Two requires an assessment of whether the targeted population
would experience an increase in social risk under the statutory proposal in
question. To conduct this evaluation, one first must examine the existing
social reality of the targeted population. Does it have access to wealth or
in protecting minority interests).
251. See supra Part 11.B.3 (analyzing the values of autonomy and agency).
252. See supra Part H.C (analyzing habits of legislatures regarding public health policy).
253. So supra Part 11.B. (discussing notions of partial agency and standpoint theory).
254. See i&. (discussing how communities, as understood through a lens of critical theory,
may facilitate more complete expressions of agency).
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other indicia of capital?255 Is it a group traditionally subjected to
discrimination, stigma, or social hostility? Can its individual members
exercise agency and enjoy self-determination, or are they more likely to
exercise incomplete agency, if at all? Does the law generally protect or place
further burdens on this group?
In Step Three, the lawmaker or policymaker must assess whether the
proposal exacerbates the social risk already faced by the target population.
The decision makers must consider the following questions:
" Will the proposal enhance rather than eliminate stigma?
* Does it exacerbate or diminish social hostility?
" Does it further disenfranchise a disempowered group?
" Does it empower a powerful group?
To answer these questions, lawmakers should determine whether the
targeted population has voiced any concerns about the underlying legislative
or policy proposal.25 6
Surveys are one alternative to finding the answers, but they often are
superficial and difficult to interpret. It may be more prudent to conduct or
consult formal studies or in-depth interviews, although they too have their
257flaws. One of the most effective ways to identify and explore the concerns
of the target population is to discern whether members of the targeted
population are represented by an advocacy organization.25 Although the
most disenfranchised are the least likely to be so mobilized (e.g., active drug
users), many among the less-powerful regularly rely on such groups to try to
protect their interests (e.g., NAACP, the Urban League, NOW, the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force).259
255. See supra notes 146, 150, and accompanying text (discussing the term "capital in the
context of stigma).
256. This element of the Harm Assessment Protocol draws heavily from the pragmatic,
empirical, narrative, and communitarian critiques of bioethics in general, and autonomy more
specifically. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing these critiques).
257. See generally Burris, Social Risk, supra note 19 (discussing the problems found in many of
the studies that have tried to explore influences on an individual's decision to be tested for HIV
and calling for studies to be conducted that can yield more accurate data to inform the
development of law and policy). Among the difficulties would be ensuring a sufficiently reliable
and diverse sample, negotiating the expense, and protecting against influence by the
interviewer. On balance, however, it is necessary to incur these costs to ensure an equitable
result.
258. Some may be troubled by the lack of scientific rigor of this part of the inquiry. See e-
mail from Scott Burris to the author (Jan. 23, 2001) (on file with author). However, so long as
the organization is community-based, it is one of the most direct ways to learn the concerns of a
target population.
259. I draw here from the feminist critique of communitarianism, which calls for the
acceptance of constitutive communities that are nonoppressive and may be chosen, rather than
found. See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text (exploring strict communitarian
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Figure 1. The Harm Assessment Protocol
prindples through a critical theory lens).
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Lawmakers and policyrnakers should consider both actual and
perceived social risk that might be experienced by the targeted population.
The presence of either danger could serve to undermine the efficacy of the
proposal through noncompliance or by inflicting harm on the dignity of the
targeted group. Such harm ultimately would diminish trust between the
targeted group and health officials, an outcome that should be avoided
when seeking to achieve effective disease control and prevention.26 0
If, after conducting the social risk evaluation, the lawmaker concludes
that the proposal neither increases social risk nor constitutes a lost
opportunity to reduce it, she should proceed to Step Four, which involves an
inquiry into whether the proposal is a legitimate means of protecting the
261general public health. If it is legitimate, then lawmakers should support
the proposal. If it is not, lawmakers ought not adopt it. In the unlikely event
the assessment is neutral, a separate evaluation must be conducted to
determine whether it is otherwise prudent to enact the proposal. 62
If, however, the proposal is likely to exacerbate the social risk
experienced or perceived by the target population, lawmakers must conduct
a further inquiry. They first must determine whether the state has
articulated a legitimate public health goal. In other words, if the proposal is
properly implemented, will it improve the public health? If it will not, the
proposal must be rejected.
Should the lawmaker or policynaker determine that the state interest is
legitimate, the Protocol requires that the statutory proposal constitute the
least restrictive alternative available to meet that legitimate public health
goal. Here the Protocol borrows from constitutional doctrine, which states
that if a state actor creates classifications affecting the rights of a
constitutionally-protected group26 or infringes on a fundamental right,2 4
260. See supra Part I.B.1 (identifying the parties responsible for creating public health
policy); infra Part LI.B (applying the proposed Harm Assessment Protocol); see also supra note
87 and infra note 325 (discussing the relationship between trust and preservation of the public
health).
261. For a discussion of what constitutes legitimate public health goals, see Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977), which upheld a computerized patient-identification requirement because
it was a reasonable method of attempting to control drug abuse and did not unnecessarily
infringe on any fundamental rights, andJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905), which
upheld a mandatory vaccination statute because "the police power of a state must be held to
embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as
will protect the public health and the public safety."
262. This evaluation might incorporate concerns beyond the scope of this Article,
including economic, environmental, or other structural political concerns external to public
health issues.
263. The "least restrictive alternative" doctrine originated with a suggestion byjustice Stone
in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), where he noted that "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 153
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courts must strike down the classification unless it both serves a compelling
state interest and is the least restrictive alternative available to achieve that
interest.265 In the context of the Protocol, if the proposal does not employ
n.4. Since 1938, the Supreme Court has implemented a "searchingjudicial inquiry" in the form
of a two-part "strict scrutiny" analysis. The test requires a compelling government interest and a
showing that the state action in question was narrowly tailored to reach that interest. This
approach is used especially to examine race-based classifications. Se e.g., Missouri v.Jenkins 515
U.S. 70, 112 (1995) (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (concluding school desegregation orders to be
beyond a federal court's authority because, where such efforts "classily persons on the basis of
their race, we have mandated strictjudicial scrutiny"); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 510
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting, in the affirmative action context, that "Ithe Judicial
Branch has the special responsibility to make a searching inquiry into the justification for
employing a race-conscious remedy" and that "[c]ourts must be sensitive to the possibility that
less intrusive means might serve the compelling state interest equally as well"); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (striking down Florida's ban on interracial cohabitation after
finding that the racial classifications drawn in the statute are not "reasonable in light of its
purpose" but rather exhibited "an arbitrary or invidious discrimination"); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (upholding the internment of Japanese-Americans while
recognizing that "all legal restrictions which curtail the cil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect" and "must [be] subject... to the most rigid scrutiny").
264. The "strict scrutiny" standard is also employed in examining state action that restricts a
"fundamental right." See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 485 (1963) (striking down
Connecticut's law banning the use of contraceptives because a more narrowly tailored approach
was possible and "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadl)');
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down a mandatory sterilization act for
habitual criminals, the Court noted that deference to the legislature was not mrranted because
"we are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man" and
thus "strict scrutiny of the classification" is required). State action that infringes upon voting
rights has also received heightened scrutiny requiring a narrowly tailored approach. Se Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (citing NAACP v. Button, 357 U.S. 449 (1958))
(invalidating Tennessee's durational residence requirements for voters because the State could
not "demonstrate that such laws are 'ncessaiy to promote a camldling government interest'"));
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969) (striking down voting restrictions in
school board elections because "close scrutiny of the ... classifications demonstrates that they
do not accomplish [the State's purported compelling] purpose with sufficient precision to
justify" the restrictions).
265. Employment of the "least restrictive alternative" or "less restrictive alternative" test
arises primarily in the context of free speech cases, where the courts examine the goal of the
legislation to see if an alternative is available that Nrdll not restrict the freedom of speech as
much as the one in question. SeeBroadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,611 (1973) (upholding a
law limiting the rights of civil servants to engage in political activities but recognizing that "the
First Amendment needs breathing space and that statutes auempting to restrict or burden the
exercise of First Amendment rights must be narwly drawn") (emphasis added); ACLU v. Reno,
217 F.3d 162, 177 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding an injunction of the enforceability of the Child
Online Protection Act because, inter a/a, it "imposes an overreaching burden and restriction on
constitutionally protected speech"). Closely related to the "least restrictive alternative test" is the
"narrowly tailored means" test which is used mostly in equal protection and fundamental rights
cases. Supra notes 263-64. A hybrid of both tests is employed to analyze claims in a number of
other contexts as well: the Dormant Commerce Clause, see C & A Carbone, Inc. %. Clarkstoln,
511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (holding, in the context of state regulation of the dumping of
garbage, that the State had many other alternatives and noting that "[d]iscrimination against
interstate commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se invalid, save in a narrow
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the least restrictive means, the lawmaker or policymaker must reject the
proposal, perhaps in favor of one that does adopt a more tailored approach.
If the assessment reveals that the proposal seeks to use the least restrictive
means, the policymaker must ask whether the state has a compelling interest
in enacting the proposal. If it does, she should support the proposal,
notwithstanding an increase in social risk.2
However, if the state interest is legitimate but not compelling, the
lawmaker ought to employ a balancing test. The lawmaker should consider
several factors, including the strength of the state interest in achieving the
stated public health goal, the likelihood that the proposal reasonably will
help achieve that goal, and the anticipated increase in social risk. The more
diffuse the state's goal or its means of achieving it, the more the lawmaker
must yield to concerns that enactment of the statute will serve primarily to
increase social risk, rather than to preserve or enhance the public health.2 7
By privileging the concerns of the disenfranchised and incorporating
rather stringent standards borrowed from constitutional jurisprudence, 268
the Protocol provides a mechanism for legislators and policymakers to
incorporate a social risk assessment into their deliberations. The goal of the
Protocol is straightforward: it seeks to facilitate implementation of policies
that are simultaneously more just and more effective, in that they protect the
interests of the minority and still safeguard the public health.
To demonstrate the potential success of the Protocol in practice, I now
apply it to an issue that is currently the subject of significant debate in the
class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no
other means to advance a legitimate local interest"); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (holding the same regarding regulation of the interstate
transportation of apples); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (striking down a
statute regulating importing of milk because, inter alia, the state had not pursued "reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives"); the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1984) (requiring the state to
show that the statute in question, which discriminated against out-of-state employees, was
necessary to correct grave social ills); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528 (1978) (striking
down an Alaska statute giving preference to in-state workers in hiring because the statute "must
be more closely tailored" to the goal of decreasing unemployment); the Confrontation Clause,
see generally Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (discussing the implications of face-to-face
confrontation); and Substantive Due Process, see Exxon v. Governor of Md. 437 U.S. 117, 133
(1978) (striking down a statute for improperly interfering with competition of in-state and out-
of-state businesses because the state failed to show its interests could not be vindicated by less
discriminatory alternatives).
266. For example, quarantine of people with infectious tuberculosis would increase social
risk, but must be tolerated, as the state's interest in limiting the spread of this airborne and
potentially deadly disease is, in fact, compelling.
267. Although this balancing test is somewhat diffuse, it should be applied in the spirit of
the Harm Assessment Protocol: sensitivity to increased social risk and specificity of an
achievable state interest must be given prime consideration.
268. Cf. Ross, supra note 241, at 313 ("Legislators should not adopt wholesale the rational
basis standard used by the courts to evaluate equal protection challenges. Rather, they should
test statutory classifications against different, stricter standards.").
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context of HIV/AIDS public health policy: HIV name reporting.
B. THE APPLICATIONOFTHEHAMIASFSSMIENTPROTOCOL'HIVN.%IE
RFPORTiNG
1. Who Comprises the Targeted Population?
The first step of the Protocol requires that decision makers identify the
targeted population of the proposed legislation. G9 In the case of HIV name
reporting, the targeted group consists of those infected with HV, those vho
engage in activity that could cause them to become HIV-infected, and, to a
lesser extent, those who identify their interests in concert ith these
populations (e.g., through demographic, political, or emotional
connections). This group traditionally is composed of gay or bisexual men
and injection drug users. Increasingly, this group also includes people of
color, women, and the poor, as well as those that ally with them (such as the
broader gay/lesbian or minority communities or family members)."71
269. Even though we are analyzing a public health proposal, it would be inappropriate to
identify the "targeted population" as the general public. To do so would turn the Protocol on its
head, causing one to conduct the "legitimate public health" inquiry first, leaving behind the
social risk analysis that serves as the linchpin to the Protocol.
270. HIV can be transmitted only in utero or through an exchange of bodily fluids
involing blood, semen, vaginal secretions, or breast milk. Sez generally Gerald H. Friedland et
al., Lack of Transmission of HLTV-I/LAV Infedion to Household Contacts of Patients uith AMIDS or
AIDS-Rdated Complex with Oral Candidsis, 314 NEv ENG. J. MED. 334 (1986) (finding that
HLTV-mI/LAV-now known as HIV-is not transmissible through casual contact); Gerald H.
Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Trannnission of the Human Immunodefidenv l7rns, 317 NEvw' E;G. J.
MED. 1125 (1987) (identifying the modes of potential HIV transmission, which include
transfusion by blood, intravenous drug use, sexual transmission, and perinatal transmission).
271. In 1983, 3064 cases of AIDS were reported to the CDC; 93% were men, 7% were
women; 58% were white, 26% were Black, 14% were Hispanic, <3% were other or unknown;
71% were homosexual or bisexual, 17% were intravenous drug users, and <1% were
hemophiliac. CDC, AIDS WEEKLYSURVEILLANCE REP. I (Dec. 22, 1983). At the end of 1999, the
CDC had received reports of 733,374 cases of AIDS; 82% of which were men, 18% were women;
43% were white, 37% were Black, 18% were Hispanic, <1% were Asian/Pacific Islander, <1%
were American Indian/Alaskan Native; 47% were men who have sex with men, 25% were
injection drug users, 10% were persons infected heterosexually, and 2% were persons infected
through blood or blood products. CDC, SURVEILLANCE REP., supra note 1, at 5. "During the
1990s the epidemic shifted steadily toward a growing proportion of AIDS cases in Blacks and
Hispanics and in women and toward a decreasing proportion in [men who have sex with men),
although this group remains the largest single exposure group." l; see also Bob Herbert, T.e
QuietScourge, N.Y. TItrEs,Jan. 11, 2001, atA31 (noting the surging rates of HIV/AIDS in Black
communities and stating that "[y]ou can put away the notion that AIDS is a disease that
primarily affects gay white males[; that] story has changed").
Further, most people are "multidimensional" and do not fit easily within one
demographic category: one may be a low-income gay (white) man who injects drugs, a wealthy
woman who has engaged in risk behavior, or a middle-class gay man of color. See Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, "Gay Rights"for "Gay W11ites"?: Race, Sexual Identit, and Equal Pmuection Diswuram, 83
CORNLL L. REv. 1358, 1390 (2000) (developing the framework of multidimensionality analysis
to understand "the diverse effects of beterosexism and other forms of oppression on personal
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2. What is the Current Experience of Social Risk of the Targeted
Populations?
The Protocol's second step requires lawmakers to learn about the
current social risks faced by the groups identified in Step One. It makes
sense to start with an understanding of the history of AIDS-related law and
policy in the United States, as it has gone through several stages.2 The first
stage occurred from the early to mid-1980s and was characterized by
ignorance, coupled with a naive belief that the epidemic could be contained
within certain "other" communities-namely gay men (often perceived of as
273white) and injection drug users. During this time, most legislatures did
nothing to respond to the epidemic. 27 4 Indeed, the New York State
HW/AIDS 275 testing and confidentiality statute, long regarded as a model
for others to follow, was not enacted until 1988276 -seven years after the first
cases of what later became known as AIDS were diagnosed.277
identity and well-being" within the context of civil rights law); Peter Kwan, Complicity and
Compledty: Cosynthesis and Praxis, 49 DEPAuL L. REV. 673, 689 (2000) (using a theory of
cosynthesis to "move beyond a single axis or uni-dimensional view of identity to one that
reconceives individuals as made up of many axes all supporting the others and together
constituting the whole"); see also supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing multiple
burdens and oppressions). See generally Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture:
Ramifications of Identities & Inter-Connectives, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995)
(using an interconnectivity analysis to illuminate the complexities of multiple group identities
in the law).
272. Cf D. Zeegers Paget, HIV/AIDS and the Legislature: An International Comparison, 10 AIDS
CARE (SUPP 1) S65 (identifying a chronological pattern of legislative reaction to AIDS: denial,
recognition, and mobilization). Of the 208 jurisdictions studied, by the end of 1995, 11
countries were still in the stage of denial, 99 countries evolved from denial to recognition, and
88 countries had already evolved from denial to recognition to mobilization. Id.
273. See Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 31 MMWR 507,
513-14 (Sept. 24, 1982) ("Only a small percentage of cases have none of the identified risk
factors (male homosexuality, intravenous drug abuse, Haitian origin, and perhaps hemophilia
A).").
274. See GARRET-r, BETRAYAL OF TRUsT, supra note 11, at 400-01 ("Bigotry against
homosexuals and injecting drug users had blinded the general public, politicians, the medical
community, and sadly, many public health leaders to the urgency of responding to AIDS when
effective action might have had a profound impact: between May 1981 and the end of 1984.").
275. This Article uses the phrase "HIV/AIDS" to refer to the spectrum of HIV-related
medical experiences-from being HIV-infected and asymptomatic to having full-blown AIDS.
Admittedly, the social-medical experiences of the epidemic vary widely depending on at which
end of the spectrum one lives. Indeed, it may take a decade or longer to press from initial
infection to full-blown AIDS and its coroUaries. Still, the term "HI/AIDS" often is used to
reinforce the spectral nature of infection with the human immunodeficiency virus and its
progression to acquired immune deficiency syndrome. The Article does make some
distinctions, however, such as between HI V-related name reporting and AIDS-based name reporting.
See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the differences between HIV- and AIDS-based name reporting).
Other distinctions, as necessary, are noted throughout the text.
276. See Article 27-F-HP! and AIDS Related Information, ch. 584, 1988 N.Y. Sess. Law
Serv. (McKinney).
277. See supra note 1 (providing sources showing that AIDS first was recognized in 1981).
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The second stage of the development of AIDS-related law and policy,
running from the late 1980s until the early 1990s, was characterized by the
enactment of many privacy and consent-to-testing statutes."7 By creating
explicit counseling and consent prerequisites to testing,' and by
establishing firm protections of confidentiality, lawmakers were doing all
they could to encourage people "at risk" for HIV/AIDS to get tested.<"
During that era, lawmakers by-and-large did not yet perceive either
themselves or most of their constituents to be at risk for HIV."* Perhaps
because of this, they were able to follow a "public interest" model of
legislating,2s heeding the advice given to them by both public health experts
and the gay male communities who, by this time, were increasingly vell-
organized.28
278. See SENAK, supra note 183, at 175 (noting that during the earlier years of tie epidemic,
state legislatures enacted stringent confidentiality requirements, "prohibiting the disclosure of
1HV test results to unauthorized persons"); Scott Burris, Testing Disclosur, and the Rig it to
Privacy, MAIDS IAwToDAY, supra note 114, at 115, 121:
The public health consensus in support of privacy protections and against coercion
led a majority of states to adopt measures in the late 1980s governing 1W testing
and confidentiality. By the end of 1991, thirty-six states had enacted legislation
requiring informed consent for HIV testing, and virtually every state provided
some degree of protection for the confidentiality of 1HV information.
279. HV antibody testing first became idely available in 1985. ROTELLO. supra note 104. at
106-07.
280. See GARRa-r, BEMAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 401 (noting that in order to
counter the public's ignorance and prejudice towards persons with AIDS, "disease suneillance
and identification of infected individuals ias made confidential or anon)lnous, [in an attempt
to protect] individuals from societal discrimination"); Nancy Krieger & Rose Appelman, CQap!er
On The Politics of AIDS, in AIDS: THE POLrCs OF SURVIVAL 3,22 (Nancy Krieger & Glen Margo
eds., 1994) (observing that the "social consequences of even tahing a test-that is, the
implications of being labeled a 'queer' or a 'junkie" were extraordinary). Lack of available care
made people especially suspicious of being tested. See DENNtS ALTMAN, AIDS I, IE MID OF
AMERICA 78 (1986) ("So great were the fears, both of false results and of their consequences,
that various gay groups urged people not to take the test except for research purposes....');
ROTELLO, supra note 104, at 107 ("[Initially most gay AIDS groups advised gay men to avoid
the test.").
281. Senior Reagan Administration officials did not discuss the AIDS epidemic until
September 1985, four years after the disease first was identified. At the time, they labeled the
disease "an epidemic of fear," but stated "that there was no need to panic because AIDS
remained confined to the gay and 1VDU population." Krieger & Appelman, supra note 280, at
25 (citing Phillip M. Boffey, U.S. Counters PublkiFear of AIDS, N.Y. T iES, Sept. 20, 1935, at'X15).
282. See supra Part 1.0 (describing the "public interest" model of legislating and the
obstacles to adopting this approach).
283. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL PANEL ON MONrroRING THE SOC. LMPACr OF TIE 'IDS
EPIDEMIC, THE SOCIAL IMPACr OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1993) (noting that, in tie
early stage of the AIDS epidemic, U.S. public health officials "had to negotiate the cour-c of the
public health strategy with representatives of a well-organized gay community and their allies in
the medical and political establishments"); ROTELLO, supra note 104, at 277 ("Gay men, with
the strong support of lesbians, of civil liberties organizations, and of liberal and progressive
groups and leaders, managed to stave off almost all of the worst scenarios .... ").
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Two factors facilitated this collaboration. First, the interests of the
public health officials and of the AIDS advocacy community overlapped to a
great extent.284 Their goals were two-fold-to encourage people to engage in
less risky behavior and to begin to trust a government that had not
previously been an ally. Second, and just as important, despite the
outrageous stigma that accompanied either an AIDS diagnosis or being gay
(particularly during the mid-1980s), enough lawmakers recognized in AIDS
advocates, who were by and large gay men, a mirror of, if not themselves,
then perhaps their brothers, their uncles, their cousins, or even their college
roommates. Although the advocates often belonged to at least two "outsider"
groups,286 they were sufficiently familiar to the lawmakers that, during this
period, their concerns were integrated into some of the earliest, most
progressive, and most effective AIDS-related legislation.287
284. See, e.g., Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 90 n.112:
People with and at risk of HIV banded together to work the political process for
greater spending on research, prevention, and care. Although nominally acting in
opposition to bureaucratic delay and neglect, blamed in part on health officials, in
practice HIV advocates and health officials have been allies more often than
antagonists.
See also Krieger & Appelman, supra note 280, at 18 (noting that, although "(t]he scientific
community's reaction to AIDS was also initially hostile and inadequate," this started to change
earlier than that of the general population). "This shift is due in part to scientists' growing
understanding of the disease and their recognition that the spread of AIDS cannot be halted
without cooperation of those at risk." Id.
285. The federal government has had a long history of discrimination against gay people.
SeeJohn Charles Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and
Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REV. 375, 378-79 (1990)
(listing the various ways that the federal government has discriminated against homosexuals,
including explicit discrimination by the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, and the State Department, and
discrimination in its immigration policy). This type of mistreatment led to serious mistrust of
government actions surrounding the HIW/AIDS epidemic, particularly in the early years. See
Burnis, Social Risk, supra note 19, at 874-75 ( describing a study of gay men and their motives for
taking or not taking the HIV antibody test, which revealed "a mistrust of government and its
motives, particularly a fear that over the long term HIV test information would be subject to
misuse").
Elements of this distrust began to shift over time. See Krieger & Appelman, supra note
280, at 22 (citing COMMIrrEE ON A NAT'L STRATEGY FOR AIDS, INST. OF MED., CONFRONTING
AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE AND RESEARCH 15 (1986) [hereinafter
IOM REPORT]). As of 1986, there was agreement between scientists and activists that explicit
AIDS education (about sex and drug use) was essential: more drug treatment programs were
necessary, substantially more resources should be allocated for biomedical and social science
research, discrimination against persons with or at risk for AIDS should be banned, and
coercive measures-such as forced antibody testing or quarantine-could not be used. ld. at 23
(citing IOM REPORT, supra, at 1-3). Krieger and Appelman attribute this to an "increased
understanding of the disease [and a] common opposition to the simultaneously inadequate
and reactionary response of the federal government." Id.
286. They were "outsiders" as gay men or as people living with or at risk for HIV/AIDS.
287. Although this may seem incongruous, or unexpected, this is indeed what occurred in
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The third era of AIDS legislation was ushered in through the mid-1990s
and continues today. This era is marked by two developments. The first is
the discovery of protease inhibitors and other anti-HIV medications that
make it increasingly possible to treat HIV as a long-term illness. The
second development concerns the shifting demographics of the epidemic.
The epidemic looks significantly different now than it did almost twenty
years ago when the first cases were identified," as the number of women
New York, California, and a handful of other states, many of which were experiencing the
greatest concentration of people living with H1V/ADS. See SENArE, supra note 183 at 166
(noting that, early in the epidemic, "[S]tate legislatures around the nation, particularly in
epicenters of the AIDS epidemic, enacted laws providing for the confidentiality of people wlho
stepped fonvard to take an HIV-antibody test"); ef. ELINOR BURKETT, THE GRAVEST SHOW ON
EARTH: A-MICA IN THEAGE OFAIDS 305 (1995) (noting that "[glay men were parts of families
and churches and workplaces that embraced and supported the sick more frequently than the)
rejected them"). Legislators did not, of course, accept all of the recommendations of AIDS
advocates, choosing to close bathhouses in the face of opposition by many in the AIDS and gai
communities. See GARRE-Tr, supra note 11, at 402-03 (citing such actions by the Ne. York State
legislature).
288. See BURKETT, supra note 287, at preface (citing Andrew Sullivan, Figlitiw the Death
Sentence, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at A2 ("[D]octors are now treating HIV as a chronic but
manageable condition.")); Gostin & Hodge, The ,arnes Debate, supra note 46, at 698-99
("Medical advances may change our conception of HIIV/AIDS from a terminal disease to a
chronic treatable condition, akin to diabetes, which can be controlled in individuals for
decades."). Although such drugs may not work for everyone and increasing numbers will
develop resistance to them, they are responsible for a precipitous drop in the AIDS death rate
since the start of their use in 1996. See GARRETT, BETR'.VL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 46-69
("From 1997 to 1998 the U.S. HIV death rate dropped by 20 percent... [a]nd that w.-as after a
42 percentAIDS death rate decline from 1996 to 1997.").
289. See CDC, SURVILANCE REP., supra note 1, at5:
In absolute numbers, blacks have outnumbered whites in new AIDS diagnoses and
deaths since 1996 and in the number of persons living with AIDS since 1998. The
proportion of women with AIDS increased steadily, reaching 23% in 1999, and the
proportion infected heterosexually also increased, surpassing (in 1994) the
proportion infected through injection drug use.
See also supra note 271 (providing additional demographic information about H1V/AIDS).
Reports tended to undercount women and people of color for the first decade or
more of the epidemic. Although these populations were dying of AIDS from tie very
beginning, doctors did not always recognize the disease. Ga' men generall) were of a social and
economic class that facilitated their maintaining good health; the sudden decline in health
wrought by AIDS sas noticed. Early in the epidemic, low-income men and women, often drug
users or partner of drug users, did not necessarily have ready access to health care and also wvere
not so generally healthy; the epidemic was not noticed as quickly in these quarters. &wc COPE A,
supra note 24, at 29 ("None of the physicians or scientists talked about the women with AIDS
being sick themselves. They all saw women simply as vectors or disease to men and fetuses, as
organisms, like insects, that transmit a pathogen."); Sally Zierler & Nancy Krieger, Refraring
Women's Risk.: Social Inequalities and HIV Infection, 18 A.NN. REv. PUB. HF-LTH 401, 402 (1997)
[hereinafter Zierler & Krieger, Social Inequalities] ("Unlike white gay men diagnosed %ith MDS,
sickness among these women was not unexpected. It wasjust a part of the ongoing, usual excess
morbidity and mortality among the poor and racially oppressed.").
Compounding this problem was that the initial definitions of AIDS did not recognize
the symptoms that were occurring in these populations. Women, poor people, and people of
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and people of color living with HIV/AIDS continues to grow at a
disproportionate rate.2°
This third era of AIDS is marked by a frustration that this disease seems
as if it is here to stay. It is not a momentary crisis. We have no magic bullets.
Protease inhibitors help but do not cure, 29 are expensive, and can have
292horrible side effects. Moreover, AIDS is creating an increasing drain on
public coffers and has spawned a multi-million dollar industry.29 3 Many
people, including legislators and policymakers, frustrated and frightened by
the seeming failure of medicine to find a cure, just want this disease to go
away. Many feel that if doctors cannot control the disease, the government
ought to do something to control people living with HIV/ADS.4 Indeed,
color were getting sick with HIV-related illnesses, but they were not being diagnosed with AIDS,
See Elizabeth B. Cooper, Historical and Analytical Overview of Policy Issues Affecting Women Living
with AIDS: A BlueprintforLearningfrom OurPast, 72 BuLL. N.Y. AcAD. MED. 283, 283-87 (Summer
Supp. 1995) (exploring factors that delayed diagnosis of HIV/AIDS in these populations);
Zierler & Krieger, Social Inequalities, supra, at 401 ("In 1981, six women in the United States were
noted to have an unexplained underlying cellular immune deficiency. It was the description of
the same phenomenon among five gay, young, white men, however, that prompted the 1981
MMWR report now viewed as the first official recognition of AIDS."). In turn, they were being
denied access to relevant medical care as well as support programs, which often depended on
an AIDS diagnosis to qualify for coverage. SeeTheresa M. McGovern, S.P. v. Sullivan: The Effort to
Broaden the Social Security Administration's Definition of AIDS, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1083, 1085-86
(1994) (describing this difficulty in qualifying for Social Security benefits). In 1993, the CDC
modified the definition of AIDS to include multiple bouts of bacterial pneumonia, pulmonary
tuberculosis, and invasive cervical cancer, conditions found more frequently in immuno-
compromised poor people, women, and people of color. CDC, 1993 Revised Classification System
for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults,
41(RR17) MMWR 1-19.
290. See Krieger & Appelman, supra note 280, at 12 (stating that early in the epidemic, the
male:female ratio was approximately 19:1). Today, the ratio is about 5:1. CDG, SURVEILLANCE
REP., supranote 1, at 5.
291. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on the use of
protease inhibitors).
292. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the side effects of current
HIV/AIDS treatments); see also Tina Rosenberg, Solving AIDS. Look at Brazil N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Jan. 28, 2001 at 26 (noting that triple therapy in wealthy contries like the U.S. costs
$10,000 to $15,000 a year).
293. See BURKE=r, supra note 287, at 109 ("AIDS isn'tjust a disease. It's a booming industry
that bolsters the stock prices of multinational drug companies .... ).
294. The shifting demographics of the epidemic may be facilitating this change in attitude.
See Ronald Bayer, Public Health Polity and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to HlVExceptionalism?, 324
NEW ENG.J. MED. 1500, 1501 (1991) [hereinafter Bayer, HIVExceptionalism] (noting that "[a]s
the focus of public health concern has shifted from homosexual men ... to poor black and
Hispanic drug users and their sexual partners, the influence of those who have spoken on
behalf of the gay community has begun to wane[,]" thereby facilitating the shift toward
implemetation of more traditional, and more restrictive, public health measures); cf Burr, supra
note 46, at 211 (describing current AIDS policy as an inappropriate displacement of traditional
public health measures in favor of civil rights concerns); The Atlantic Online, AIDS: Privacy vs.
Public Health, http://www.tdh.state.tx.us/hivstd/facts.htn (abandoning a unique identifier
system of HIV name reporting because of insufficient data collection).
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this frustration appears to be manifesting itself in an increasing number of
legislative and policy initiatives that seek to do just that.-M Advocates for such
measures describe themselves as seeking to end "HIV excepdonalism."-
Calls for more aggressive control measures sound off warning bells to
most in the targeted population in light of their ongoing experiences of
'197stigma, social hostility, and discrimination. As the epidemic continues to
295. See Roger Doughty, The Confidenliality of HIV-Rdatcd Informatim: Respanding to the
Resurgence ofAggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82 CAI- L REV 111, 163-77
(1994) (discussing the increase in legislative initiatives that would assert more direct control
over the lives of people living ith HIV/AIDS).
296. See Bayer, flVExceptionaism, supra note 294, at 1500 (defining "ll, exceptionalism"
as a term that indicates that public health officials have not adopted "the [conventional]
policies developed to control sexually transmitted diseases or other communicable conditions,"
such as mandatory screening, treatment, health registries, and quarantine to help monitor and
control the HIV/AIDS epidemic). Those who criticize decisions not to test, identify, or report
the names of people living with H1V often claim that they are based on a supervaluation of civil
rights and civil liberties and a devaluation of society's obligation to protect the public health. S&z
Tom Coburn, Round Two-Conduding Remarks: June 1997 Roundtable on AIDM Prit'a Vs. Pub!r i
Health, at http://theatlantic.com/unbound/forum/aids/cobu3.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2001)
(stating that "[elvery day that we delay implementing [traditional] public health measures we
allow the disease to claim more lives"); see also Burr, supra note 46. at 218 ("However legitimate
the civil-liberties issues it sought to address may have been more than a decade ago, the
exceptionalist orthodoxy is now fundamentally uTongheaded as a matter of good public health
and medicine."). The basis for this differential treatment, such advocates assert, is the influence
of the "gay lobby" and the "AIDS lobby," that has exerted undue influence on our legislators
and public health officials--to the detriment of the general public. &-z Bayer, HV
Exceptionalis supra note 294, at 1500 (noting that, "in the first decade of the AIDS epidemic,
an alliance of gay leaders, civil libertarians, physicians, and public health officials began to
shape a policy for dealing with AIDS that reflected the exceptionalist perspective"); Burr, supra
note 46, at 220 (noting that attempts to alter the "exceptionalist" approach to AIDS were met
with fierce opposition from "virtually every gay and AIDS group"). Such assertions of H,
exceptionalism, however, raise concerns in light of the spotty historical record of
implementation, the dubious success of more intrusive public health measures, and the
disenfranchisement and oppression that characterize the experiences of most people living wiith
HIV/AIDS. Supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text; infta notes 302-08 and accompan)ing
text.
297. See generally CDC, HIV-Rdated Knowadge and Stigmna-United States, 2000,49(47) MMR
1062 (Dec. 1, 2000), available at http://iww%.cdc.gov/tobacco/research.data/health_
consequences/ccmm4947.pdf (reporting on a nationwide survey revealing that HIV-related
stigma remains a source of major concern); Lawrence 0. Gostin & David AV. Webber, T7e AIDS
Litigation Projec, Part I: I V/AIDS in the Courts in the 1990s, 13 AIDS & PUIB. PoL'J. 1 (Spring
1998), available at http://tv,-.ama-assn.org/special/hiv/libray/readroom/other9S/apl.htn
(cataloging incidents of discrimination against people living with HJV. focusing on cases
involving the duty of an individual or the government to prevent HIV transmission); Lawmence
0. Gostin & David W. Webber, The AIDS Litigation Proje, Part II: HIV/AIDS in the Court in the
1990s, 13 AIDS & PUB. POL'YJ. 2 (Summer 1998), available at http://%%%-vw.ama-assn.org/
special/hiv/library/readroom/other98/alp2.htm (focusing on cases involving individual civil
rights, as they ciash ith government interests); Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Cor nur-nts
on the CDC's "Draft Guidelinesfor HlV Case Surveillan, Including Monitoring Hlr lnfedion &AIDS
(Jan. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Lambda, Comments on the CDC s Draft Guidelints], at
http://-ww.lldeforg/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=360 (noting that a University
of California survey documented that "the public may be becoming more suspicious and less
HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 935 2000-2001
86 IOWA LAWREVIEW
move at full force into marginalized communities that still include gay men
and injection drug users, but which increasingly include the low-income and
poor, people of color, adolescents (gay and straight), and older adults-
communities too often characterized by extraordinary disempowerment,
regardless of HINT status-there appears to be no lessening in the
experiences of oppression.298
This assessment and analysis informs the response to Step Two of the
Protocol: social risk is alive and well among the targeted populations of an
299HIV name reporting proposal.
3. Does the Legislative Proposal Increase the (Actual or Perceived) Social
Risk of the Targeted Populations?
Step Three of the Protocol further opens the door to debate. There is
active dispute as to whether instituting a plan to report the names of people
living with HIV would pose an actual increase in social risk to the targeted• 300
populations. A number of studies have been conducted in the fifteen years
tolerant of those who contract the virus," resulting in increases in the incidents of
discrimination against people with HIV) (citations omitted).
298. See Vivian B. Brown et al., Mandatory Partner Notification of HIV Test Results: Psychological
and Social Issuesfor Women, 9 AIDS & PUB. POL'YJ. 86, 86 (1994) ("Many women lack the social,
psychological, financial, and other resources to deal with the potential violence and/or
abandonment that may result from notifying their partner of their HIV status."); Sally Zierler et
al., Economic Deprivation and AIDS Incidence in Massachusetts, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1064, 1064
(2000) (finding that the "[i]ncidence of AIDS increased with economic deprivation, with the
magnitude of these trends varying by both race/ethnicity and sex").
299. See Name Brands, supra note 88, at 2106-10 (noting that HIV name reporting raises fear
of criminal sanctions, domestic violence, and stigma among communities living with individuals
that are infected or at-risk of contracting HIV).
300. Compare Lambda, Comments on the CDC's Draft Guidelines, supra note 297:
[S] tudies overwhelmingly indicate that those considering testing, particularly racial
and sexual minorities, will be deterred if they are required to provide their name.
We believe that instituting a reporting system with little or no other evidence of
efficacy, in face of evidence that it will undermine the goals of encouraging testing
and of constructing an accurate picture of the epidemic on which to base tile
focusing of resources, is irresponsible.
and ACLU, HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting. A Public Health Case for Protecting Civil Liberties
(Oct. 1997) [hereinafter ACLU, HIV Surveillance], at http://ww.aclu.org/issues/alds/
namereport.html:
The available evidence strongly suggests that name reporting is a
counterproductive public health measure that will cause individuals to avoid HIV
testing. Numerous studies indicate that individuals avoid HIV testing that is not
anonymous because they do not have faith that test results will remain confidential
and because they fear the stigma and discrimination that is often associated with
HIV and AIDS.
with Gostin & Hodge, The Names Debate, supra note 46, at 743 (concluding that HIW name
reporting is justified on the grounds that there exist adequate safeguards to potential invasions
of privacy, and that alternative surveillance methods do not provide reliable data or necessarily
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since the test for HIV antibodies first became available to attempt to
determine the importance of confidentiality or anonymity to people
considering being tested.-,0 It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from
these studies, but we can discern a few messages.
First, it is critically important that a state make available anon)ymous
testing sites.' This resource has encouraged people to get tested earlier,' 3
which is an essential predicate to getting care and often increases the
probability that the person will engage in fewer activities likely to transmit
HIV. 3M Second, if given a choice, most people who test positive for HlV
would prefer that their names not be transmitted to the government:'
Some people have delayed getting tested for fear that their confidentiality
will be breached-casually or intentionally, by private actors or by
protect anonymity).
301. See Andrew B. Bindman et al., Multistate Evaluation of Anonymous HIV Testing and Access
to Medical Care, 280 JAMA 1416, 1416-20 (1998) (describing studies in various states to
determine if the availability of anonymous testing increases the number of people who get
tested for HV); Burris, Social Ris, supra note 19, at 843-56 (reviewing and critiquing many of
the studies concerning attitudes toward testing).
302. At anonymous test sites, the person seeking to be tested either provides or is given a
code with which she can obtain her test results and be given post-test counseling. She need not
provide her true identity nor that of any partners with whom she may have engaged in risk
activity. See Bindman et al., supra note 301, at 1416 (detailing how anonymous testing is done);
Burris, Social RiA supra note 19, at 834 (noting the attraction of anonymous testing); AMvin
Novick, Yale Univ. Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Research on AIDS (CIRA), HIV Cas Reporting
(May 4, 1998), at http://cir.med.yme.edu/hivcase.reporting.update.html ("Some CDC
spokespersons currently favor allowing states to continue to offer anonymous HIV testing and
counseling to those who fear having their identities revealed. If anonymous testing were to be
banned, some people would be unwilling to be tested at all."). Anonymous testing differs from
confidential testing. The latter requires one to identify oneself (and depending on the state,
perhaps to identify one's partners); still, the test results are not to be disclosed to anyone except
the testee, her health care provider, and perhaps a government office, if HIV name reporting is
in effect. See Kramer, supra note 114, at 185 (describing how HIV reporting is conducted at a
confidential test site).
303. See Bindman et al., supra note 301, at 1418 ("Persons tested anonymously presented
earlier in the course of HIV disease for testing and care than did persons tested
confidentially."); CDC, Guidelines for National Human Immunodeficienty 17rus Case Sureillance,
Including Monitoring for Human Immunodeficienoy Virus Infeation and Acquired Immuncefldeny
Syndrome, 48 (RR-13) MIMWR 1, 9 [hereinafter CDC, GuiddinasforNationalH1V Case Surmvillance]
("In a companion survey of persons reported with AIDS ... participants who had recognized
their HIV risk and sought testing at anonyinous testing sites reported entering care at an earlier
stage of HIV disease than persons who were first tested in a confidential setting.").
304. See CDC, Adoption of Protective Behaviors Among Persons with Recent HIV Infection and
Diagnosis-Alabama, NewJersey, and Tennessee 1997-1998,49 (23) MMWR 512, 514 (2000) ("The
findings in this study suggest that a high proportion of infected persons adopted safer sexual
behaviors following diagnosis of HIV infection.").
305. See CDC, Guidelines for National HIV Case Surveillance, supra note 303, at 8 ("Concern
about name-based reporting of HIV infections to the government was a factor for not testing for
HIV for 13% of heterosexuals, 18% of injecting-drug users, and 28% of men who have sex with
men.") (citations omitted).
HeinOnline  -- 86 Iowa L. Rev. 937 2000-2001
86 IOWA LAWREVIEW
government officials. °2 Third, although some may not even know their
state's policy concerning HIV name reporting when they go to get tested,0 7
many carry fear that the results will be disclosed to unauthorized persons.303
There have, in fact, been breaches of confidentiality by both
government °9 and private actors 1 0 Private actors tend to disclose HIV status
in the course of everyday conversation (gossip) or because they (falsely)
believe they have to disclose it to protect others".3  Gaffes by government
actors largely have been caused by unintentional gaps in security, but are
significant nonetheless.1
More threatening, though, than the aberrant leak by government
agents, is the legislature's power to change the rules of confidentiality.
Because lawmakers were the ones who created the rules, they also can
306. See Name Brands, supra note 88, at 2106 ("[D]istrust can stem from doubts about the
government's ability to keep certain information private... .") (citations omitted).
307. See Burris, Sodal Risk, supra note 19, at 846 & n.78 (describing a study of sexually active
teenagers in Massachusetts that found that thirty-five percent believed that HIV test results were
not confidential; eighty-one percent believed that their partners would not be notified in the
case of a positive result) (citations omitted); Div. OF STD PREVENTION, MASS. DEP'T OF PUn.
HEALTH, HIV PARTNER NOTIFICATION, at http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/dph/cdc/hivpn.htm
(last visited Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter HIV PARTNER NOTIFICATION] (describing
Massachusetts' voluntary partner notification program and strict confidentiality regulations).
308. See HIV PARTNER NOTIFICATION, supra note 307 (noting that thirty-five percent of
respondents thought test results were not confidential).
309. See Sonia Bhatnager, Note, HIVName Reporting and Partner Notification in New York State,
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1457, 1476 (1999) (describing how employees of the Pinellas County
Health Unit in Florida inadvertently leaked a list of names, addresses, birth dates, and the
means by which approximately 4000 HIV-positive people contracted HIV); Name Brands, supra
note 88, at 2106 n.50:
In 1997, for example, a Florida state health worker was charged with downloading
confidential databases containing the names of people with AIDS. He used the
information to screen potential dates for himself and his friends; eventually his
partner sent copies of the AIDS list to various newspapers. The story was widely
publicized.
(citations omitted).
310. See Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1180-81 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
probation officer violated probationer's constitutional right to privacy by telling his employer
and his sister of his HIV infection); P.F. v. Mendres, 21 F. Supp. 2d 476, 484 (D.NJ. 1998)
(holding that a father's right to privacy was violated when a police officer disclosed the father's
AIDS status to his neighbor, who then divulged the information to other parents and tie
media); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 391 (D.NJ. 1990) (holding that
disclosure of a father's AIDS status by a police officer to a neighbor violated his right to privacy,
noting that the neighbor, who both worked for the school district and had children in the same
school, had alerted other parents and the media).
311. See Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1273-74 (NJ. Super.
1991) (holding that a staff member of a medical facility wrongfully disclosed health care
provider's AIDS diagnosis).
312. See Bhatnager, supra note 309, at 1476 (describing a health department's inadvertent
leak of confidential information).
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change them.313 For example, the state of Illinois did just this when it
decided that health officials should inform all patients of their health
practitioner's HIV status-and Nice versa.31 4 Although advocates ultimately
persuaded lawmakers to withold funding for this mandate, the law was
passed and remains on the books.3 '5 Similarly, legislatures can choose to
amend confidentiality laws to track HIr-infected people (such as health care
providers or public school teachers) or to determine whether they should be
prosecuted under HIV/AIDS criminalization statutes.316
One could assert that the actual risk of disclosure described herein is
not likely to occur and that if it does, legal recourse would be available. Or,
were the government to misuse lists of IRV-infected individuals collected for
surveillance purposes, its actions would be enjoined were there no
compelling reason for it to do so. 31 7 Under this reasoning, the actual social
risk attendant to adopting l1lY name reporting might be calculated as not
being terribly significant.3 s
313. See Anna Forbes, Mytits and Facts about HIV Case Rrporting bj Narre Ve1ems b- U ,ate
Identier, at http://hiinsite.ucsf~edu/topics/testing/2093.33br-ltml (Oct. 16. 1997)
[hereinafter Forbes, My)ths and Facts about HIV]:
State privacy laws are only as strong as the legislatures' will to uphold them. States
can, and do, change their laws regarding privacy all the time. If a state Health
Department has a name-based registry listing people ith HIV, it can be forced at
any time to open that registry by either legislative mandate or court order.
314. See Susan L DiMaggio, State Regulations and the HIVPosithe Health Care Proftnianal: A
Response to a Problem that Does Not Exis4 19 AM.J.L & MED. 497, 513-14 (1993) (describing the
Illinois health care worker statute, 410 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 325/5.5(c) (West 2000), and its
inherent flaws).
315. 410 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 325/5.5(c) (West 2000).
316. See Gostin & Hodge, The Names Debate, supra note 46, at 732 CSouth Crolina health
authorities legislatively are required to cross-check prospective and existing public school
teachers against state HIV/AIDS databases."); Alvin Noxick, HVSunillance. lzat' Hot, M7at's
Not, 13 AIDS & PUB. PoL'YJ., Summer 1998, at 52,52-53:
Access to a list [(of names)] could be [(and has been)] gained by state law or by
other legal authority. A state might for example pass legislation that anyone
accused of rape or convicted of rape would be checked against a list of persons
reported with HIV disease so that law enforcement authorities could decide
whether to enhance the criminal charges.
See also Doughty, supra note 295, at 165 (1994) ("[A] legislature (or the voters by referendum)
might determine that the welfare of children demands that they not be in the custody of H-,"
infected parents, who could be identified using state lists. Prisoners might make another
inviting target."); supra notes 313-14 (discussing how legislators can change confidentiality rules
for H1V/AIDS records).
317. See Gostin & Hodge, The Names Debate, supra note 46, at 732 (noting that examples of
breaches of confidentiality are the "rare exception rather than the norm"); Stacey D. Blayer,
Note, But Names iW Aever Hurt Me" HI Surv'illance & Mandatoly RPorting, 39 B.C. L REv.
1175, 1214 (1998) [hereinafter Blayer, But Namres MIUll NeerHurt Afe] (conduding that the right
to privacy in one's HIV status is likely to be outweighed by other factors. "including the strong
public interest in HIV surveillance data").
318. See supra note 300 (comparing vieus on whether the potential negative effects of H1V
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The Protocol, however, requires law and policymakers to look not just
to actual social risk, but also to perceived social risk, as the line between the
two is narrow, particularly in terms of how it affects behavior. 319 As described
by Scott Burris, "[Pleople's behavior is likely to be governed by the
perceived risk," 320 which may or may not be "particularly sensitive to actual
probabilities of harm."31 In other words, at least in the realm of social risk,
perception creates the reality. There is little doubt that the identified target
populations perceive significant social risk attendant to the adoption of an
HIV name reporting proposal. Indeed, there is virtual unanimity among
people living with HIV/AIDS and the advocacy organizations representing
their interests: they do not trust HIV name reporting and they do not want it
322implemented .
This increase in perceived social risk may cause significant damage in
two ways. First, it may affect decisions to be tested.32 3 Second, and perhaps
more profoundly, members of the targeted population may understand it as
an affront to their human dignity. This type of harm can only serve to
undermine the necessary relationship of trust between the government that
is seeking to contain epidemics and preserve the public health and its
324populace.
Application of this step of the Protocol has yielded important
information. However, an increase in (actual or perceived) social risk is not
reason enough to reject a proposal for HIV name reporting. Rather,
lawmakers must proceed to Step Four of the Protocol: determining the
legitimacy of the state's interest in enacting such a policy.
name reporting outweigh the positive results).
319. See Burris, Surveillance, supra note 21, at 5122 ("The distinction between the threat and
the perception of risk emphasizes that the actual danger of harm coming from surveillance is
largely irrelevant."); supra text accompanying note 146 (noting that informing a person that it Is
unlikely that surveillance data will be disclosed may minimize the actual risk, but the perception
of risk remains significant).
320. Burris, Surveillance; supra note 21, at S122.
321. Id.
322. For Internet sites discussing the distrust of HIV name reporting, see Tammy Vitrano &
Marina Gomez, Naming Names: Why We Don't Want Names Reporting, WOMEN ALIVE, Winter 2000,
at 8, available at http://thebody.com/wa/inter00/kick.html; Gay Men's Health Crisis, GMIC
Opposes New York State Health Department's Draft Regulations on Partner Notification: Names Reporting
System Will Deter People at Risk from Testing for HIV, Regs Offer No Protection Against Domestic Violence,
at http://thebody.com/gmhc/pr/mar299.htmi (March 12, 1999); HIV Testing Action
Coalition, Statement of the National HIV Testing Action Coalition on the Necessity for Maintaining
Anonymous HIV Testing Sites in All States, (May 21, 1997), at http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/topics/
testing/2098.330d.html (May 21, 1997); National Association of People With AIDS, NAP WA
Position Statement on HI Surveillance, at http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/topics/testing/2098.33a9.
html (Oct. 3, 1997).
323. See supra notes 299-304 (analyzing the ramifications of HIV name reporting).
324. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between trust
and enhancing the efficacy of public health programs).
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4. Does the Proposal Help Achieve Legitimate Public Health Goals?
Before inquiring about the particular proposal to report the names of
people living with HIV, it is important for lawmakers to revisit the state's
interest in surveillance in general. Many public health officials consider
surveillance to be the cornerstone of their disease prevention and treatment
activities.32 Their primary concern is: how can we know what to prevent or
treat, and in which populations, absent using surveillance tools?4'5
Therefore, when used affirmatively to affect allocation of health care
resources, and when appropriate privacy protections are in place,
surveillance can help achieve legitimate public health goals.'
AIDS surveillance has been conducted from the very beginning of the
epidemic.32 Indeed, it was through the reporting of cases to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") that we even learned of this
disease.3 9 For the first years of the epidemic, there generally was very little
time from date of diagnosis to death."SO The only way epidemiologists could
learn about AIDS was by assessing the patterns of disease manifestation
reported to the CDC, which served as an information bank.
The CDC, and other advocates who support a s)stem of HIV
surveillance, assert that the development of new drugs, in particular, has
rendered AIDS surveillance somewhat anachronistic. -' The), maintain that
325. See GARR=r, BETRAYAL OF TRUST, supra note 11, at 280 ("[A]s early as 1629 American
colonists in Virginia realized that they couldn't protect their people's health unless the, had
numbers-hard facts, entered dutifully by quill into log books: births, deaths, illnesses, and
marriages were, by law, recorded, chronicling the vital statistics of the colony."); see al s supra
Part I.B.3.c (discussing the use ofsurveillance as a tool for achieving public health goals).
326. See Patricia L Fleming et al., Trading the HIVEpidnit: Currant Issues, Future Ctallenge.,
90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1037, 1037 (1998) (stating that surveillance of HIV and of AIDS "can
improve the allocation of needed prevention and treatment resources to communities).
327. See Gostin, Burris & Lazzarini, supra note 10, at 125-26 (setting forth criteria to permit
surveillance data collection); Gostin & Hodge, The Vnames Debate, supra note 46, at 743 (noting
that effective surveillance is essential when public health needs are compelling and the practice
is mindful of the privacy of the individual).
328. See THE AS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CTy OF N.Y., CoMMrrTEEs ON AIDS, CivIL RIGHTS,
HEALTH Lxvw, LEGAL IsSUES AFFECTING PEOPLE wiTH DIstLsTtmEs XND SEX AND Lw, N,1E
REPORTING OF HIV C.sES 3 (June 1998) [hereinafterACNY, NAME REFORTINGI ("Surveillance
of AIDS cases including reporting of names of persons diagnosed with AIDS to public health
authorities, began almost immediately with little fanfare, as it w-s a traditional public health
approach to learning more about little-understood and serious medical conditions."); -ve aLco
supra Part I.B.3.c (discussing the public health tool ofsurveillance).
329. See CDC, Pneumotystitis Pneuanonia, supra note 1, at 3 (describing the discover) of the
disease).
330. See ABCNY, NANME REPORTING, supra note 328, at 3 (describing how in the earl), years of
the epidemic, "the harsh reality was that persons with AIDS usually died quickle).
331. See CDC, Guidlines for National HiV Case Surveillanee, supra note 303, at 2 (V1ith the
advent of more effective therapy that slows the progression of HIV disease, AIDS surveillance
data no longer reliably reflect trends in HIV transmission and do not accurately represent the
need for prevention and care services."); AIDS Action Council, Creating an Effectire Pu Vir Health
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only by measuring disease distribution from an earlier point and then
continuing to monitor disease progression will we be better able to
understand patterns of illness and rates of disease progression, and
therefore be able to improve both our HIV-related prevention and
treatment efforts.332 Although some question the ability of the government
to attain these goals, there is little doubt that achieving them would
constitute a legitimate state interest.
5. Is the Proposal the Least Restrictive Alternative?
Since surveillance generally qualifies as a legitimate public health goal,
the focus of Step Five of the Protocol is whether HIV name reporting
constitutes the least restrictive alternative, or a sufficiently narrowly tailored
means,33 3 to accomplish legitimate public health goals. As discussed earlier,
epidemiologists have a range of surveillance tools available to them to
understand the scope of an epidemic. To understand the distribution of a
bloodborne disease, they can conduct anonymous tests on blood samples
collected at any number of sites, including inpatient hospitals, outpatient
treatment centers, sexually transmitted disease clinics, or anonymous testing
sites, all of which can be performed in a nonintrusive manner.335 However,
because the tests by law are conducted on anonymous blood samples, it is
Response to the Changing Epidemic: Moving to HIV Surveillance by Unique Identifier and Other Non.
Name Based Surveillance Systems 4 (Oct. 1997), at http://hivinsite.uscf.edu/topics/testing/
2098.347b.html [hereinafter Creating an Effective Public Health Response] ("Because of changes in
the epidemic, AIDS Action [a Washington, D.C.-based advocacy group] believes that AIDS
surveillance can no longer provide as timely, complete, representative, and accurate a reflection
of the epidemic as we need.").
332. See Gostin & Hodge, The Names Debate, supra note 46, at 699 ("HIV, once believed to be
a latent infection, has medically been shown to be active from the point of infection. Early
detection and treatment is critical to providing individuals infected with HIV the opportunity to
live longer without visible symptoms."); Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note
331, at 3 ("If planned and implemented carefully and thoughtfully, HIV surveillance can be a
valuable tool in fighting HIV and AIDS.").
333. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text (providing cases discussing the least
restrictive alternative).
334. See supra Part I.B.3.c (discussing the public health tool of surveillance).
335. These tests are conducted on blood collected from patients who otherwise would be
having blood drawn. Before the tests are performed, all information that might identify the
patient is removed. Only demographic data, such as gender, age, and race of the patient are
noted, as well as the identity of the institution where the test was conducted. These tests cannot
be conducted unless all identifying information is removed. See ACLU, HIV Surveillance, supra
note 300 ("[N]ame reporting is not essential to effectively monitor the epidemic, target
prevention, link individuals with HIV to health care, and allocate funding. Existing HIV
tracking mechanisms, including sentinel studies and incidence and prevalence surveys, help to
accomplish these goals."); Lambda, Comments on the CDC's Draft Guidelines, supra note 297
("Other established methods of surveillance, such as anonymous seroprevalence surveys of
newborns or clients in family planning or STD clinics (where demographic data can be
obtained without linking a test result to a particular name), would better determine the extent
of HIV infection.").
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inherently impossible to conduct follow-up with patients to inform them of
their disease condition, to try to facilitate their getting into care, or to learn
about their disease progression.
It also is possible to conduct surveillance studies by requiring testing
facilities to report data by using a unique identifier, rather than by using a
name or other ideniring information.S Under this type of system, data
particular to the individual (such as initials, parts of the social security
number, date of birth, race, and gender), and perhaps the identity of the
health care provider, are combined in an algorithm that yields an encrypted
code; this code is then used to submit disease-related information to
government officials without providing any identifying information about
the tested individual.33 7
The beneficial aspects of successful unique identifier programs are
many: they yield a code either that the individual can recall or that often can
be regenerated with that person's assistance; they cannot be readily
decoded, thereby protecting the anonymity of the person who has been
tested; and they make it possible continually to update the "person's" file
with information about disease progression. Because epidemiologists have
indicated that it would be very helpful to have data indicating how Hal
disease progresses, particularly in this relatively new age of effective
medications, 39 there is no reason why they could not use the unique
identifier for this purpose-posing little to no threat to patient
confidentiality.m
There are, though, disadvantages to using unique identifier systems.
According to some studies, they can be both more expensive and yield less
336. See CDC, GudelinsforNationalHIVCase Surdllance, supra note 303, at 9-10 (outlining
unique identifier surveillance programs). In early 1994, both Texas and Maryland implemented
HIV case surveillance through the use of non-name unique identifiers. Sz CDC, Evaluation of
MIV Case Surveillance Through the Use of Non-Name Unique Identfim-Ma'land and Texas, 1994-
1996, 46 MMWR 52 (Jan. 9, 1998) [hereinafter CDC, Evaluation of HV Case Surv illance].
Currently four states use this approach to HIV surveillance. See infta note 341 (listing these
states).
337. See Kevin M. Kramer, A National Epidenic, a National Conressation, a National Law: In
Support of Unique Identifier Reportingfor HVSuredllane 16 J. CoN'rFMPt. HEALTI! L & POL'Y 173,
205 (1999) (describing the system of unique identifiers used in Maryland).
338. See Blayer, But Names Will/Neer Hurt Me, supra note 317, at 1213 ("With unique
identifiers, the public health need for HIV information can be fulfilled with less risk to
individual confidentiality."); Anna Forbes, An Activist's Guide to Unique Identifiers (Nov. 26, 1997),
at http://hivinsite.ucsfedu/topics/testing/2098.351E£html (discussing the high level of privacy
afforded by unique identifiers).
339. See CDC, Guidelinesfor National HIV Case Surveillance, supra note 203, at 4 (concluding
that as a result of the advent of more effective medications that slow the progression of HI
disease, states should extend AIDS case surveillance activities to include HIV case surveillance
and should improve surveillance of disease progression).
340. See CDC, Evaluation of H1V Case Survlance, supra note 336, at 1 (noting thatMaryland
enacted a statute in 1993 requiring health care providers to construct the unique identifier
code and record it in a surveillance log for purposes of case investigation and follow-up).
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complete results than name reporting systems. 41 However, states currently
using this approach have claimed that any additional expense, excluding
start-up costs, is minimal to non-existent. 342 Moreover, they have concluded
that, following an initial period of adjustment, the unique identifier system
yields data that are at least as complete as that produced by a name
reporting system. 3
Some flaws in name reporting systems also are to be expected. As with
unique identifiers, it is impossible to rule out both under- and over-
reporting.3" Also some advocates allege that implementation of a name
341. See id. (noting that the implementation of unique identifiers in Texas yielded higher
rates of incomplete case reporting, as compared to name-based HIV surveillance); see also AIDS
Action Committee of Massachusetts & AIDS Action Council of Washington D.C., Creating an
Effective Public Health Response to the Changing Epidemic: Moving to HIV Surveillance by Unique
Identifler and Other Non-Name Based Surveillance Systems (Nov. 14, 1997), at http://hivinsite.ticsf.
edu/topics/testing/2098.347b.html [hereinafter AIDS Action Committee of Massachusetts &
AIDS Action Council of Washington D.C., Creating an Effective Public Health Response] ("Unique
identifier reporting systems are more expensive and will take more time to successfully
implement than name reporting systems .... [they] are inherently more complex than name
reporting systems, and thus more costly to operate."). Texas ultimately ceased using unique
identifiers and adopted HIV name reporting. CDC, 11(1) HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP. 3
(1999).
342. SeeForbes, Myths and Facts about HIV Case Reporting supra note 313:
HIV case reporting costs money to implement, whether names or unique
identifiers are used. Maryland and Texas set up their systems after receiving one-
time CDC grants of $600,000, allocated to evaluate the systems over three years.
Both states report that the difficulty of mounting a unique identifier system was
exacerbated by the total lack of state funding, among other factors.
See also Blayer, But Names Will Never Hurt Me, supra note 317, at 1212 ("[W]hile unique identifier
systems have been criticized as cumbersome and expensive, federal funding could make them
more effective and cost-efficient. HIV case reporting costs money to implement regardless of
the type of scheme used.").
343. See News Release, Md. Dep't. of Health & Mental Hygiene, HIV Reporting System
Found To Be Highly Accurate (Aug. 31, 1999) (announcing the finding that "Maryland's non-
name based HIV reporting system has been found to provide a highly accurate and
unduplicated count"); Forbes, Myths and Facts about HIV Case Reporting supra note 313 (noting
that the Maryland Health Department reports a 96.6% completeness rate in reporting by state-
funded HIV test sites, and that completeness from other testing sites is steadily improving); cf.
TEx. DEP'T OF HEALTH, BUREAU OF HIV AND STD PREVENTION, RECOMMENDATIONS ON HIV
INFECTION REPORTING, http://www.tdh.state.tx.us/hivstd/facts.htm (abandoning a unique
identifier system of HIV name reporting because of insufficient data collection).
344. See ACLU, HIVSurveillance, supra note 300 (citing T. Hoxworth et al., Anonymous HIV
Testing. Does It Attract Clients Who Would Not Seek Confidential Testing?, 9 AIDS PUB. POL'YJ. 182
(1994)):
With one unique identifier composed of intimate information (so the individual
remembers it), a repeat tester can be identified as such and not double counted.
The accuracy of names-based reporting, by contrast, depends upon whether the
testee uses his or her real name, and the available evidence suggests that many
people who are required to give their name when taking an HIV test use a
pseudonym to hide their identity.
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reporting system will drive people aw-ay from being tested or will cause them
to seek testing in a non-name-reporting state, resulting in an undercounting
or inaccurate understanding of HIV infection patterns.345
It is not necessary to resolve every dispute about the pros and cons of
every means of conducting HIV-related surveillance. It is important,
however, that the CDC, the widely recognized arbiter of public health
standards, accepts unique identifier systems as a legitimate means of
gathering HIV-related surveillance data.r In light of the availability of
alternatives to name reporting and the CDC's acceptance of unique
identifier systems, a lawmaker or policymaker must conclude that HIV name
reporting cannot qualify as the "least restrictive alternative" under the Harm
Assessment Protocol.
6. The Outcome of the Harm Assessment Protocol as Applied to HIV
Name Reporting
If a proposal does not satisfy the least restrictive alternative prong of the
inquiry, it must be rejected. However, this does not mean the state must give
up on its attempts to satisfy a particular legitimate public health goal-in
this case, HIV case surveillance. Rather, the proposal should be reconfigured
to incorporate a less restrictive, or more narrowly tailored, alternative and
then run it through the Protocol.- 7
It is evident that, although any form of HIV-related surveillance is likely
to cause some increase in or perception of social risk, a unique identifier
system is not nearly as threatening as name-based reporting. Indeed, use of
unique identifiers has been endorsed by the vast majority of organizations
representing the interests of the populations targeted by this legislative
proposal.3S It further is clear from the prior analysis that a unique identifier
Cf. Blayer, But Names liT/ Never Hurt Me, supra note 317, at 1211 ("IT]here will likely be fewer
duplication problems with a unique identifier system than with name reporting.').
345. See supra note 300 (providing differing views on whether HIV name reporting would
harm the target population).
346. See CDC, Guiddinesfor NationalHV Case Sundllace, supra note 303, at 10 (noting that
the CDC will continue to assist four states-Illinois, Maine, mar)land. and MAssachusetts, along
with Puerto Rico, in establishing unique identifier s)stems). Indeed, the CDC has employed a
unique identifier-type system (Soundex) for reporting the names of people diagnosed with
AIDS from state health departments to its offices in Atlanta for almost twenty years. See HEALTI1
INFORMATION AND SURVEiLLANcE SYSTEMs BOARD, CDC, SOUNDF x-REFERENCE GUIDE 2,
available at http://v.cdc.gov/od/hissb/docs/Soundex.pdf (Version 1.0, 1999) (explaining
the Soundex system). However, the CDC states that it historically has found HI- name
reporting to be more accurate than HIV case reporting through unique identifiers. CDC,
Guideinesfor National HIVCaseSuredllance, supra note 303, at 10.
347. See supra Part IIIA (setting forth the Protocol); supra fig.1 (graphically depicting its
contents).
348. See generaly ACLU, HIVSurrdllane supra note 300 (advocating for a unique identifier
system of reporting); Letter from Ad Hoc Committee on Smart AIDS Laus, to Antonia C.
Novello, Commission of the N.Y. State Dep't of Health (Jan. 14, 2000), at
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system would satisfy the least restrictive alternative inquiry.
The only remaining question under Step Six of the Protocol, then, is
whether the state has a compelling interest in conducting HIV case
surveillance. We already have accepted that HIV surveillance satisfies a
legitimate state interest. Most people (and most courts) would be
comfortable concluding that the government's interest in conducting this
type of surveillance is compelling because it is expected to lead to a superior
understanding of disease progression, improved means of treating the
disease, better formulated prevention efforts, and a more accurate allocation
of resources for prevention and treatment purposes.349 It is important,
though, that lawmakers conduct ongoing assessments to ensure that the data
yielded from the surveillance mechanism are being used to accomplish these
important goals. Should surveillance efforts deteriorate to the mere
collection of data, without more, the question of whether the government's
interest in collecting the data remains compelling, and therefore whether it
is appropriate to conduct HIV-related case surveillance, would have to be
revisited . °
This demonstration of the Harm Assessment Protocol has permitted us
to preference the assessment of social risk as experienced by the targeted
populations of two modes of disease surveillance: HIV name reporting and
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=556 (noting that
fifteen organizations, including the Latino Commission on AIDS, LeGaL (Lesbian and Gay Law
Association of Greater New York), New York AIDS Coalition, HIV Law Project, Housing Works,
and South Brooklyn Legal Services endorsed the use of a unique identifier system for HIV case
reporting); AIDS Action Committee of Massachusetts & AIDS Action Council of Washington
D.C., Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 331 (supporting HIV surveillance
system over an AIDS surveillance system); Tammy Vitrano & Marina Gomez, Naming Names: Why
We Don't Want Names Reporting WOMEN ALIvE, Winter 2000, at 8, available at http://thebody.
com/wa/winter00/kick.html (summarizing a debate between proponents and opponents of
name reporting);
349. See supra note 326 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of HIV
surveillance). See generally supra Part I.B.3.c (describing surveillance as a means of achieving
public health goals).
Some representatives of people living with HIV would assert that conducting HIV
surveillance does not constitute a compelling state interest because surveillance data are rarely
put to effective use in disease prevention and treatment. In this instance, they would wish to
push the Protocol to its final inquiry: a balancing test between the state's interest in conducting
a particular type of surveillance and the increase in social risk articulated by the targeted
populations as attendant to adoption of that approach. Other factors, including pertinent
economic ramifications, also are likely to come into play at this point. See supra Part IIIA for a
description of this stage of the Protocol and supra fig.l for a flow chart reflecting this stage of
the inquiry.
350. Such ongoing assessments likely would be costily. However, without such verification,
there is a risk that surveillance could become an end unto itself, rather than a means to an end
of reducing disease incidence as well as its attendant morbidity and mortality. See supra Part
I.B.3.c (discussing the function of surveillance). Should this occur, the government's interest in
collecting the data would no longer be compelling and, as such, this surveillance activity ought
to cease.
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HIV case reporting through unique identifiers. Absent this process, it is
more likely that public pressure would lead to selection of HIV name
reporting as the mode of conducting surveillance. 351 Using this Protocol, we
have been able to identify a form of surveillance that is substantially
equivalent in its effectiveness and significantly preferable to the targeted
population than the original proposition. Moreover, by moving the concerns
of the traditionally disempowered to the forefront we have enhanced the
relationship between state officials and the people who often are most
vulnerable to them. Equally important, all of these goals have been met
while still protecting the public health.
CONCLUSION
Modem public health law has many failings. It often is inconsistent,
mired in historical anachronisms, and insufficiently attentive to
constitutional standards. Policymakers must undertake efforts to create
coherence with an awareness that experience of social risk-both actual and
perceived-plays a crucial role in determining the ultimate effectiveness of
public health law and policy.
The Harm Assessment Protocol provides a pragmatic tool for legislators
and policymakers to incorporate a social risk assessment into their
deliberations. Acknowledging the critiques of autonomy, the recognition of
the "moral significance of groups," and the awareness of the harms caused
by social risk, the Protocol seeks to privilege the voices of the
disempowered-people who already carry a disproportionate burden of
social risk. Indeed, only by engaging in this process are we able to ensure
that the interests of the disenfranchised are not ovenhelmed by the actions
of the majority, no matter how well-intentioned they may be.
Fundamentally, though, the Protocol works because it both attends to
the concerns of the disempowered and remains grounded in the legitimate
governmental need to prevent and treat disease.3 '2 Indeed, it is only by
adopting this approach that we can devise and implement public health law
and policy that both increases the public trust and enhances the public
health.
351. See CDC, SURVEILLANCE REP., supra note 1, at 5 (noting that thirtyfourjurisdictions in
the United States have HIV name-based reporting, including Connecticut and Oregon. where
only pediatric cases are reported by name).
352. Indeed, the Protocol could be used not only ithin the realm of public health taw and
policy, but also in other substantive areas where there is concern that the voices of the
disenfianchised have been displaced from the halls of our legislatures and the offices of our
policymakers.
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